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PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR CREATED AN UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM WHEN INSTALLING A FLOOR AND THEREFORE OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTFF, HOWEVER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised an issue of fact whether defendant contractor owed a duty to plaintiff because its flooring work created an unreasonable risk of harm to others. However Supreme Court erred in not finding the defect trivial as a matter of law:

Here, the record establishes that the bullnose tile was slightly less than one-half of an inch in height and was not the same color as the tile floor. * * * …”[T]he test established by the case law in New York is not whether a defect is capable of catching a pedestrian’s shoe. … [T]he relevant questions are whether the defect was difficult for a pedestrian to see or to identify as a hazard or difficult to pass over safely on foot in light of the surrounding circumstances” … . Upon our review of the photos of the alleged defect and in view of the less than ½-inch height of the bullnose tile and the circumstances surrounding decedent’s accident … , we conclude that, although an accident occurred that is “traceable to the defect, there is no liability” because the alleged defect ” is so slight that no careful or prudent [person] would reasonably anticipate any danger from its existence’ ” under the circumstances present here … . Stein v Sarkisian Bros., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 07501, 4th Dept 11-10-16

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR CREATED AN UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM WHEN INSTALLING A FLOOR AND THEREFORE OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTFF, HOWEVER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW)/CONTRACT LAW (TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR CREATED AN UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM WHEN INSTALLING A FLOOR AND THEREFORE OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTFF, HOWEVER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW)/SLIP AND FALL (PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR CREATED AN UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM WHEN INSTALLING A FLOOR AND THEREFORE OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTFF, HOWEVER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW)/TRIVIAL DEFECT (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR CREATED AN UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM WHEN INSTALLING A FLOOR AND THEREFORE OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTFF, HOWEVER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW)

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STORM IN PROGRESS RULE REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, FAILURE TO REMOVE ALL SNOW FROM A PARKING LOT DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARD.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Defendants established they had no duty to remove snow at the time of plaintiff’s fall under the storm in progress doctrine. The court noted that the duty to render a parking lot safe does not entail the removal of all the snow:

It is undisputed that defendants met their initial burden on the motion “by establishing that a storm was in progress at the time of the accident and, thus, that they had no duty to remove the snow and ice until a reasonable time ha[d] elapsed after cessation of the storm” … . In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ” whether the accident was caused by a slippery condition at the location where [she] fell that existed prior to the storm, as opposed to precipitation from the storm in progress, and that the defendant[s] had actual or constructive notice of the preexisting condition’ ” … . Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was entitled to rely upon the theory that the icy condition formed prior to the storm upon the melting and refreezing of snow piles created by defendants’ plowing practices … , we conclude that plaintiff’s assertion is based on mere speculation and thus is insufficient to raise an issue of fact … . Indeed, in surmising that there must have been snow piles throughout the parking lot from prior accumulations, plaintiff relied upon inadmissible printouts from a weather data website … , as well as defendants’ general practices regarding snow removal as set forth in their contract … . The record is devoid of competent evidence that any such snow piles existed or, more specifically, that a pile of snow was located near the area of the parking lot where plaintiff fell that had melted and had then refrozen prior to the storm, resulting in the icy condition that caused plaintiff’s accident … . Finally, to the extent that plaintiff contends that defendants’ snow removal efforts created the hazardous condition because they did not properly care for the area where she fell even though they had treated other areas of the parking lot during the storm, we note that it is well settled that ” [t]he mere failure to remove all snow and ice from a . . . parking lot does not constitute negligence’ and does not constitute creation of a hazard” … . Hanifan v Cor Dev. Co., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 07498, 4th Dept 11-10-16

NEGLIGENCE (STORM IN PROGRESS RULE REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, FAILURE TO REMOVE ALL SNOW FROM A PARKING LOT DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARD)/STORM IN PROGRESS (STORM IN PROGRESS RULE REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, FAILURE TO REMOVE ALL SNOW FROM A PARKING LOT DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARD)/SLIP AND FALL (STORM IN PROGRESS RULE REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, FAILURE TO REMOVE ALL SNOW FROM A PARKING LOT DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARD)

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ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

The Third Department determined all “rezoned” property-owners, deemed “necessary parties” by Supreme Court in this action to annul a local law rezoning property for industrial use. were, in fact, not “necessary parties.” The petition, which had been dismissed for failure to timely serve the newly-added “necessary parties,” was reinstated. The local law, which would allow a recycling center in a previously residential-agricultural zone, was challenged based upon an alleged failure to comply with the State Environment Quality Review Act:

The newly-added respondents were not necessary parties merely because the ordinance at issue affected their property rights. “‘[T]he absence of a necessary party may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, by any party or by the court on its own motion'” (Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Sulyman, 130 AD3d 1197, 1198 [2015], quoting Matter of Estate of Prospect v New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 13 AD3d 699, 700 [2004]). Given a court’s power to raise the issue, it is notable that the Court of Appeals and this state’s appellate courts, including this Court, have long entertained challenges to municipalities’ legislative actions in regard to zoning ordinances without requiring the joinder of every property owner whose rights are affected by the ordinance at issue … . ]). This has been true even when the ordinance at issue is one that, on its face, is likely to dramatically affect the property rights held by real property owners (see e.g. Matter of Wallach v Town of Dryden, 23 NY3d 728, 740 [2014]). Although this Court has, in limited cases, found property owners to be necessary parties in regard to legal challenges to municipal ordinances that affect the property owners’ rights, it has only done so in cases where the owners had obtained an actual approval pursuant to the challenged zoning ordinance that would be adversely impacted by a judgment annulling that ordinance … . Matter of Hudson Riv. Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v Town Bd. of The Town of Coeymans, 2016 NY Slip Op 07358, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/ZONING (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PAPERS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HIS FAILURE TO USE A LADDER WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE OPPOSING PAPERS.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion papers in the Labor Law 240(1) action raised a triable issue of fact whether his failure to use an available ladder was the sole proximate cause of his fall from a wall. Plaintiff’s motion must therefore be denied without any need to consider the opposing papers:

Liability under section 240 (1) does not attach when the safety devices that [the] plaintiff alleges were absent were readily available at the work site, albeit not in the immediate vicinity of the accident, and [the] plaintiff knew he [or she] was expected to use them but for no good reason chose not to do so, causing an accident” … . Under those circumstances, the “plaintiff’s own negligence is the sole proximate cause of his [or her] injury” … .

Where the plaintiff’s submissions in support of the motion raise a triable issue of fact whether his or her own actions were the sole proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability because “if the plaintiff is solely to blame for the injury, it necessarily means that there has been no statutory violation” … . In this case, plaintiff’s submissions raised triable issues of fact whether plaintiff knew that he was expected to use a readily available ladder at the work site to perform his task, but for no good reason chose not to do so, and whether he would not have been injured had he not made that choice … . Scruton v Acro-Fab Ltd., 2016 NY Slip Op 07428, 4th Dept 11-10-16

 

LABOR LAW (PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PAPERS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HIS FAILURE TO USE A LADDER WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE OPPOSING PAPERS)/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW 240(1), PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PAPERS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HIS FAILURE TO USE A LADDER WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE OPPOSING PAPERS)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW 240(1), PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PAPERS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HIS FAILURE TO USE A LADDER WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE OPPOSING PAPERS)

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COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION.

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court erred when it refused to apply the “made whole” rule in this subrogation action. After settling for the full amount of the policy, respondent insurer sought the full amount paid to plaintiff by another insurer. The matter was sent back because it was unclear whether the settlement made plaintiff whole:

Plaintiff contends that, under the “made whole” rule, respondent has no right of subrogation because plaintiff’s damages exceed the amount of the settlement. By way of background, the “made whole” rule provides that, if “the sources of recovery ultimately available are inadequate to fully compensate the insured for its losses, then the insurer—who has been paid by the insured to assume the risk of loss—has no right to share in the proceeds of the insured’s recovery from the tortfeasor” … . “In other words, the insurer may seek subrogation against only those funds and assets that remain after the insured has been compensated. This designation of priority interests . . . assures that the injured party’s claim against the tortfeasor takes precedence over the subrogation rights of the insurer” … . Although we agree with plaintiff that the court erred in refusing to apply that rule, on this record, it is unclear whether the settlement made plaintiff whole. Grinage v Durawa, 2016 NY Slip Op 07429, 4th Dept 11-10-16

INSURANCE LAW (COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)/MADE WHOLE RULE (INSURANCE LAW, COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)/SUBROGATION (INSURANCE LAW, COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)

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FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS.

The Fourth Department determined father, who was incarcerated in Michigan, was afforded due process in the proceedings in which his petition for visitation was denied. However, the court noted that Family Court did not have the power, under the circumstances, to prohibit any further petitions by father:

… [W]e agree with the father that the court erred in sua sponte imposing conditions restricting him from filing new petitions. It is well settled that “[p]ublic policy mandates free access to the courts” … , but ” a party may forfeit that right if she or he abuses the judicial process by engaging in meritless litigation motivated by spite or ill will’ ” … . Here, however, there is no basis in the record from which to conclude that the father had engaged in meritless, frivolous, or vexatious litigation, or that he had otherwise abused the judicial process … . Matter of Otrosinka v Hageman, 2016 NY Slip Op 07553, 4th Dept 11-10-16

FAMILY LAW (FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS)

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FAMILY COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A PERMANENCY HEARING (RE: PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) AFTER THE UNDERLYING NEGLECT PETITION (WHICH LED TO TEMPORARY PLACEMENT) HAS BEEN DISMISSED.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scudder, over a two-justice dissent, determined Family Court had jurisdiction to conduct a permanency hearing (re: placement in foster care) even though the underlying neglect petition which led to temporary placement of the child was dismissed:

We … conclude, based upon the plain language of the provisions of Family Court Act article 10-A, that the court obtains jurisdiction as a result of a placement with petitioner pursuant to section 1022 (see § 1088), and that the court is required to make a determination whether to return the child to the parent based upon the best interests and safety of the child, including whether the child would be at risk of abuse or neglect if the child were to return to the parent (see § 1089 [d] [1], [2] [i]). Thus, we conclude that the court retained jurisdiction to conduct the permanency hearing despite the dismissal of the neglect petition. Moreover, our interpretation of the statutory provisions of article 10-A comports with the longstanding principle that “an overarching consideration always obtains for children to be returned to biological parents, if at all possible and responsible . . . When that cannot be done, the emphasis shifts to securing permanent, stable solutions and settings”… . Matter of Jamie J. (Michelle E.C.), 2016 NY Slip Op 07424, 4th Dept 11-10-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A PERMANeNCY HEARING (RE: PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) AFTER THE UNDERLYING NEGLECT PETITION (WHICH LED TO TEMPORARY PLACEMENT) HAS BEEN DISMISSED)/NEGLECT (FAMILY COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A PERMANENCY HEARING (RE: PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) AFTER THE UNDERLYING NEGLECT PETITION (WHICH LED TO TEMPORARY PLACEMENT) HAS BEEN DISMISSED)/PERMANENCY HEARING (FAMILY COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A PERMANENCY HEARING (RE: PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) AFTER THE UNDERLYING NEGLECT PETITION (WHICH LED TO TEMPORARY PLACEMENT) HAS BEEN DISMISSED)/SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (FAMILY COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A PERMANENCY HEARING (RE: PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) AFTER THE UNDERLYING NEGLECT PETITION (WHICH LED TO TEMPORARY PLACEMENT) HAS BEEN DISMISSED)

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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED DISCRIMINATION, DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THERE WAS A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR ADVERSE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A CPLR 3211 (a)(7) MOTION TO DISMISS.

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the New York City Human Rights Law for sexual orientation-based discrimination:

Plaintiff’s allegations that he is an openly gay man and was qualified for the positions of correction officer and captain meet the first two elements of his discrimination claim. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was written up, twice suspended, and ultimately demoted meet the third element of disadvantageous treatment … . Defendant’s argument that plaintiff has not alleged that he was treated worse than similarly situated captains — as opposed to correction officers — is unavailing. Suspension and demotion are, on their faces, adverse employment actions. Defendant’s argument is, effectively, that those actions were warranted by plaintiff’s conduct while a captain, but this argument goes more properly to the second leg of the … burden-shifting framework … , namely rebuttal of a prima facie claim of employment discrimination by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, and is misplaced at this early procedural juncture. James v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 07400, 1st Dept 11-10-16

EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED DISCRIMINATION, DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THERE WAS A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR ADVERSE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A CPLR 3211 (a)(7) MOTION TO DISMISS)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYC) (PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED DISCRIMINATION, DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THERE WAS A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR ADVERSE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A CPLR 3211 (a)(7) MOTION TO DISMISS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED DISCRIMINATION, DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THERE WAS A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR ADVERSE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A CPLR 3211 (a)(7) MOTION TO DISMISS)/CPLR 3211 (a)(7) (PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED DISCRIMINATION, DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THERE WAS A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR ADVERSE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A CPLR 3211 (a)(7) MOTION TO DISMISS)

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SCHOOL MAY HAVE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STUDENT’S CLAIM, BUT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE; LEAVE TO SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department determined claimant high school wrestler should not have been granted leave to serve a late notice of claim against one of the two named schools, Akron. The claimant alleged he contracted herpes from an Akron wrestler during a tournament at Akron. Although Akron was deemed to have constructive knowledge of the claim, the court found it did not have timely actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim:

We agree with Akron … that it did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim. Akron established that it was not aware until it received claimant’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim that he was allegedly infected with herpes by wrestling Akron’s student at the tournament. …[C]laimant here established that, at most, Akron had constructive knowledge of the claim, which is insufficient … . It is well settled that actual knowledge of the claim is the factor that is accorded “great weight” in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim … . Even if we agree with claimant that Akron suffered no prejudice from the delay, we nevertheless conclude that the court abused its discretion in granting claimant’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim against Akron … . Matter of Ficek v Akron Cent. Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 07545, 4th Dept 11-10-16

EDUCATION SCHOOL LAW (LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM, SCHOOL MAY HAVE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STUDENT’S CLAIM, BUT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, LEAVE TO SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM, SCHOOL MAY HAVE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STUDENT’S CLAIM, BUT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, LEAVE TO SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (SCHOOL, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM, SCHOOL MAY HAVE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STUDENT’S CLAIM, BUT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, LEAVE TO SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, DETERMINATION ANNULLED.

The Third Department concluded the nature of the confidential information provided to the hearing officer and the hearing officer’s failure to adequately inquire into the reliability of the information required annulment of the determination:

Here, the confidential information considered by the Hearing Officer consisted of, among other things, memoranda prepared by correction officials that briefly summarized their interviews with three confidential sources who stated, in conclusory fashion, that petitioner was the individual who broke the window. In addition, a memorandum and photo array identification were provided by one of the confidential sources, but were similarly lacking in detail. The Hearing Officer also considered the confidential testimony of the two correction officials who spoke directly with the confidential sources. The officials related that the sources identified petitioner as the individual who broke the window, but did not reveal any specific information regarding the basis of their knowledge. Significantly, there is no indication that the sources actually witnessed petitioner break the window nor any explanation as to how they acquired this information. In addition, the correction officials who interviewed them did not provide any endorsement of their reliability other than to state that they freely provided the information and were not coerced. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Hearing Officer failed to undertake the requisite independent assessment of the confidential information to establish its reliability … . Matter of Belliard v New York State Dept. of Corr., 2016 NY Slip Op 07382, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, DETERMINATION ANNULLED)/EVIDENCE (INMATE DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS, HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, DETERMINATION ANNULLED)

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