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ALTHOUGH COMPLAINANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE COOPERATIVE BASED UPON A DISABILITY, COMPLAINANT DID DEMONSTRATE THE COOPERATIVE IMPROPERLY RETALIATED AGAINST HER AFTER SHE FILED THE DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT WITH THE NYS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Although the complainant, a shareholder in a cooperative, did not demonstrate she was discriminated against when the cooperative and the board (petitioners) refused to allow her to keep a dog in her apartment, the Second Department determined she did demonstrate petitioners retaliated against her for bringing her complaint to the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR). Complainant alleged she was disabled and the dog helped her cope with her disabilities:

To establish that a violation of the Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, the complainant was required to demonstrate that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of her disability it is necessary for her to keep the dog in order for her to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow her to keep the dog (see Executive Law § 296[2][a]…). …

… [T]he complainant failed to present medical or psychological evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the dog was actually necessary in order for her to enjoy the apartment. Notably, the complainant had resided in the apartment for more than 20 years without the dog. …

…[T]he complainant established that she participated in the protected activity of filing an SDHR discrimination complaint against the petitioners, the petitioners were aware of this action, and there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the petitioners’ retaliatory conduct, which included taking away the complainant’s designated parking space for a nine-day period, refusing to accept her maintenance checks, filing eviction proceedings against her, falsely informing her that the SDHR had ruled in the petitioners’ favor, and directing her to immediately remove her dog from her apartment … . Matter of Delkap Mgt., Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2016 NY Slip Op 08073, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (ALTHOUGH COMPLAINANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE COOPERATIVE BASED UPON A DISABILITY, COMPLAINANT DID DEMONSTRATE THE COOPERATIVE IMPROPERLY RETALIATED AGAINST COMPLAINANT AFTER SHE FILED THE DISCRIMINATION ACTION WITH THE NYS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS)/DISABILITIES (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, ALTHOUGH COMPLAINANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE COOPERATIVE BASED UPON A DISABILITY, COMPLAINANT DID DEMONSTRATE THE COOPERATIVE IMPROPERLY RETALIATED AGAINST COMPLAINANT AFTER SHE FILED THE DISCRIMINATION ACTION WITH THE NYS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS)/DISCRIMINATION (ALTHOUGH COMPLAINANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE COOPERATIVE BASED UPON A DISABILITY, COMPLAINANT DID DEMONSTRATE THE COOPERATIVE IMPROPERLY RETALIATED AGAINST COMPLAINANT AFTER SHE FILED THE DISCRIMINATION ACTION WITH THE NYS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS)/RETALIATION (ALTHOUGH COMPLAINANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE COOPERATIVE BASED UPON A DISABILITY, COMPLAINANT DID DEMONSTRATE THE COOPERATIVE IMPROPERLY RETALIATED AGAINST COMPLAINANT AFTER SHE FILED THE DISCRIMINATION ACTION WITH THE NYS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS)

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RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY BANK ATTORNEYS IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS DID NOT EXCEED RULEMAKING POWERS AND MUST BE FOLLOWED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the rules promulgated by the Chief Administrative Judge, concerning the affidavits submitted by bank attorneys in foreclosure actions, did not exceed the rule-making powers of the Chief Administrative Judge and must be complied with in actions commenced before August 30, 2013 (when a new CPLR statute went into effect):

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the Chief Administrative Judge was not acting ultra vires in issuing Administrative Orders 548/10 and 431/11 (hereinafter together the Administrative Orders), but pursuant to authority delegated by the Legislature to adopt rules and orders regulating practice in the courts after consulting with the administrative board … . Moreover, the attorney affirmation itself is not substantive … and, thus, is within the authority of the Chief Administrative Judge to promulgate rules of procedure.

In addition, that the Legislature manifested a clear intent to apply the certificate of merit requirement of CPLR 3012-b only to those actions commenced on or after August 30, 2013, does not manifest an intent by the Legislature to relieve a plaintiff’s counsel of the affirmation requirement in actions commenced prior to August 30, 2013. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Izmirligil, 2016 NY Slip Op 08033, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

FORECLOSURE (RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY BANK ATTORNEYS IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS DID NOT EXCEED RULEMAKING POWERS AND MUST BE FOLLOWED)/ATTORNEYS (FORECLOSURE, RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY BANK ATTORNEYS IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS DID NOT EXCEED RULEMAKING POWERS AND MUST BE FOLLOWED)/EVIDENCE  (FORECLOSURE, RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY BANK ATTORNEYS IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS DID NOT EXCEED RULEMAKING POWERS AND MUST BE FOLLOWED)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO MOVE TO SEVER AT TRIAL AFTER AN ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSE WAS PURSUED BY THE CO-DEFENDANT.

The Second Department, reversing the conviction, determined the defense attorney’s failure to move to sever the defendant’s trial from the co-defendant’s and request a missing witness charge constituted ineffective assistance. The need for severance became apparent during the trial when counsel for the co-defendant pursued a defense antagonistic to that of the defendant. The court noted the motion for severance can be made any time before the end of the trial when the defendant could not previously have been aware of the basis for it:

Where a defendant claims prejudice as a result of a joint trial because his defense is antagonistic to that of a codefendant, “severance is not required solely because of hostility between the parties, differences in their trial strategies or inconsistencies in their defenses” … . However, “severance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger, as both defenses are portrayed to the trial court, that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant’s guilt” … . Thus, severance should be granted where the defenses are not only antagonistic, but also mutually exclusive and irreconcilable … . Although a severance motion must generally be made before the commencement of trial … , CPL 255.20(3) permits a pretrial motion to be made and decided “at any time before the end of trial” when “the defendant could not, with due diligence, have been previously aware” of the basis for the motion. CPL 255.20(3) further provides that the court may, “in the interest of justice, and for good cause shown,” entertain and dispose of a pretrial motion “at any time before sentence.” People v Davydov, 2016 NY Slip Op 08090, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO MOVE TO SEVER AT TRIAL AFTER AN ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSE WAS PURSUED BY THE CO-DEFENDANT)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO MOVE TO SEVER AT TRIAL AFTER AN ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSE WAS PURSUED BY THE CO-DEFENDANT)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO MOVE TO SEVER AT TRIAL AFTER AN ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSE WAS PURSUED BY THE CO-DEFENDANT)/SEVERANCE, MOTION FOR (DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO MOVE TO SEVER AT TRIAL AFTER AN ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSE WAS PURSUED BY THE CO-DEFENDANT)

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CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER.

In an action stemming from the withholding of payment to plaintiff subcontractor, the Second Department determined the breach of contract cause of action should not have been dismissed, but noted that a conversion action cannot be based upon a breach of contract, and an unjust enrichment cause of action cannot coexist with a breach of contract cause of action.  Supreme Court had dismissed the breach of contract cause of action, finding the defendant had a legal right to withhold payment under Labor Law 220 because complaints had been lodged for failure to pay the prevailing wage for this school construction project. But since the Comptroller had not yet ruled on the Labor Law 220 complaints, Supreme Court should not have based its dismissal on them by making its own finding:

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . While a court is “permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)” … , “where the motion is not converted to one for summary judgment, the criterion is whether the [third-party plaintiff] has a cause of action, not whether [it] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the [third-party plaintiff] to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it . . . dismissal should not eventuate'” … . A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may appropriately be granted “only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . * * *

The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the third-party cause of action alleging breach of contract on the ground that the third-party defendants had a legal right to withhold payment pursuant to Labor Law §§ 220 and 220-b. Based upon the record before us, there is no indication that the Comptroller has rendered a final determination regarding the alleged Labor Law § 220 violation. As such, the court, in effect, determined the prevailing wage issue, which is within the exclusive province of the Comptroller, prior to a determination by the Comptroller … . Thus, the evidentiary material submitted by the third-party defendants, which demonstrated that payment to AGC under the subject contracts was withheld pending the Comptroller’s determination, failed to establish that any fact alleged in support of the third-party breach of contract cause of action was undisputedly not a fact, and failed to conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law to that cause of action. Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v Astoria Gen. Contr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08047, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER)/DISMISS, MOTION TO (CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER)

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CIVIL MATTER PROPERLY STAYED UNTIL RELATED CRIMINAL MATTER RESOLVED, DISCRETIONARY CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly stayed a civil matter after the defendant was indicted in a related criminal matter and indicated he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent if the civil matter went forward:

A motion pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay a civil action pending resolution of a related criminal action is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court … . “Factors to consider include avoiding the risk of inconsistent adjudications, [duplication] of proof and potential waste of judicial resources. A compelling factor is a situation where a defendant will invoke his or her constitutional right against self incrimination” … . “Although the pendency of a criminal proceeding does not give rise to an absolute right under the United States or New York State Constitutions to a stay of a related civil proceeding . . . there is no question but that the court may exercise its discretion to stay proceedings in a civil action until a related criminal dispute is resolved” … .

Here, this action and the criminal proceeding against Samuel arise from the same facts. While a stay may cause inconvenience and delay to the plaintiffs, the failure to grant the stay would cause Samuel to “suffer the severe prejudice of being deprived of a defense” … . Moreover, a prior determination in the criminal proceeding could have collateral estoppel effect in this action, thereby simplifying the issues … . Mook v Homesafe Am., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08054, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CIVIL MATTER PROPERLY STAYED UNTIL RELATED CRIMINAL MATTER RESOLVED)/CRIMINAL LAW (CIVIL MATTER PROPERLY STAYED UNTIL RELATED CRIMINAL MATTER RESOLVED)

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MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the County’s motion to amend its answer to assert a statute of limitations defense, six years after the initial answer was served, should have been denied:

The County waived a defense based on the statute of limitations by not raising that defense in its answer … . Nevertheless, defenses waived under CPLR 3211(e) can be interposed in an answer amended by leave of the court pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) … . ” In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit'” … . ” A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court’s broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed'” … . ” In exercising its discretion, the court should consider how long the party seeking the amendment was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated [and] whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered'” … . ” [W]here the application for leave to amend is made long after the action has been certified for trial, judicial discretion in allowing such amendments should be discrete, circumspect, prudent and cautious'” … .

We agree with the plaintiffs that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the County’s motion for leave to amend its answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred … . The County’s motion was not made until approximately six years after service of its answer, after the parties had completed discovery, and after the note of issue had been filed. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs have suffered significant prejudice from the County’s delay in asserting the statute of limitations as a defense … . Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v County of Nassau, 2016 NY Slip Op 08038, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)/ANSWER, MOTION TO AMEND MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)

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FALL FROM SCAFFOLD WITH NO SIDE RAILS ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, HEARSAY ALONE WILL NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT PROPERLY CONSIDERED.

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE.

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell from a Baker’s scaffold that had no side rails. Although hearsay can be submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion, the motion will not be defeated by hearsay alone (the case here). The court noted that the plaintiff’s unsigned deposition transcript was properly considered because it was certified by the reporter, its accuracy was not challenged by the defendant, and plaintiff adopted it as accurate by submitting it:

Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim where he fell from a six-foot-high Baker’s scaffold, which he was directed to use in order to plaster a ceiling. The record shows that the scaffold “had no side rails, and no other protective device was provided to protect him from falling off the sides” … . …

… [T]he statement in the affidavit of [defendant’s] owner that a subcontractor had assured him that the subcontractor had instructed all his employees to use the lifeline, belt and harness is insufficient raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff may be the sole proximate cause for disregarding such an instruction … . While hearsay may be considered in opposition to defeat a summary judgment motion if it is not the only evidence upon which opposition to the motion is predicated, because it was the only evidence establishing that plaintiff disregarded an instruction to use the safety devices, it is insufficient to defeat plaintiff’s motion … . Chong v 457 W. 22nd St. Tenants Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 07997, 1st Dept 11-29-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (FALL FROM SCAFFOLD WITH NO SIDE RAILS ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, HEARSAY ALONE WILL NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (HEARSAY ALONE WILL NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)/EVIDENCE (HEARSAY ALONE WILL NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)/SCAFFOLDS (FALL FROM SCAFFOLD WITH NO SIDE RAILS ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, HEARSAY ALONE WILL NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (HEARSAY ALONE WILL NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)

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SCAFFOLD DID NOT HAVE A SAFETY RAILING, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined plaintiff was properly awarded summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) action. Plaintiff fell from a scaffold which did not have safety railings. Any comparative negligence on plaintiff’s part (not locking the wheels) was irrelevant:

Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim by presenting undisputed evidence that he “fell off a scaffold without guardrails that would have prevented his fall” … . Plaintiff’s alleged “failure to use the locking wheel devices and his movement of the scaffold while standing on it” were at most comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim … . Celaj v Cornell, 2016 NY Slip Op 07996, 1st Dept 11-29-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (SCAFFOLD DID NOT HAVE A SAFETY RAILING, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION)/SCAFFOLDS (SCAFFOLD DID NOT HAVE A SAFETY RAILING, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION)

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MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined (1) plaintiff’s misrepresentation cause of action was properly dismissed because of a lack of specificity in the allegations, (2) the cause of action should not have been dismissed with prejudice, (3) and the specificity provided in the appellate briefs may support an amended complaint. Plaintiff, a stock insurance company, alleged it was induced to insure collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) by misrepresentations made by Bear Stearns:

[P]laintiff CIFG Assurance North America, Inc., a stock insurance company, alleges that Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., a predecessor of defendant J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, made material misrepresentations that induced CIFG to provide financial guaranty insurance in connection with two collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). According to CIFG, Bear Stearns had on its books a large number of high-risk residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), and embarked on a scheme to rid itself of these toxic assets by offloading them into the two CDOs, and marketing the CDOs’ securities to investors. * * *

… [T]he claim should not have been dismissed with prejudice, but rather, CIFG should be given the opportunity to replead. A request for leave to amend a complaint should be “freely given, and denied only if there is prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay, or if the proposed amendment is palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law” … . CIFG Assur. N. Am., Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08029, 1st Dept 11-29-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (STOCK INSURANCE, MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)/SECURITIESMISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE/FRAUD (MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)/COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS (MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES  (MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)

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STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED.

The Second Department determined the statement in a summons with notice alleging a mortgage was obtained by fraud was protected by judicial-proceedings privilege:

Generally, statements made at all stages of a judicial proceeding in communications among the parties, witnesses, counsel, and the court are accorded an absolute privilege, as long as the statements may be considered in some way “pertinent” to the issue in the proceeding … . This privilege, or “immunity” … , applies to statements made in or out of court, on or off the record, and regardless of the motive with which they were made … .

The test of pertinency to the litigation is extremely liberal, so as to embrace anything that may possibly or plausibly be relevant or pertinent … . The purpose of the privilege is to allow the parties, witnesses, and attorneys in a litigation to communicate freely without fear of defamation litigation … . Weinstock v Sanders, 2016 NY Slip Op 07947, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

 

DEFAMATION (STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED)/PRIVILEGE (DEFAMATION, STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED)/IMMUNITY (DEFAMATION, STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED)

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