You are here: / LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF,...

Search Results

/

LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING STILTS, FELL WHEN A STILT CONTACTED AN OBJECT ON THE FLOOR.

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor law 240 (1) action should not have been granted. Plaintiff was using stilts to work on a ceiling when a stilt contacted a conduit on the floor, causing him to fall:

Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant established its entitlement to judgment on the theory that plaintiff’s fall was caused solely by stepping on the conduit, i.e., a “separate hazard wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first place” … , we nevertheless conclude that plaintiff raised an issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion … In his affidavit submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff clarified his deposition testimony with respect to why and how he fell … . Plaintiff was installing the last of eight ceiling tiles in a room. He explained in his deposition and in his affidavit that his work was obstructed by electrical wiring and conduit in the ceiling that had not been properly secured, thereby leaving limited space in which to install the tile, which measured two feet by four feet. With his arms fully extended overhead while attempting to move and secure the electrical wiring and conduit, he lost his balance and was forced to step backwards, at which point his right stilt came into contact with the conduit and he fell. Thus, plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether his “injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant height differential” while he was attempting to secure the electrical wiring and conduit in the ceiling in order to install the ceiling tile … , and were not solely caused by the presence of the conduit on the floor … . Piche v Synergy Tooling Sys., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03673, 4th Dept 5-5-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING STILTS, FELL WHEN A STILT CONTACTED AN OBJECT ON THE FLOOR)/STILTS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING STILTS, FELL WHEN A STILT CONTACTED AN OBJECT ON THE FLOOR)

/ , ,

PARTIES HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE NEGATIVE DECLARATION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, NEGATIVE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANNULLED FOR FAILURE TO SET OUT THE UNDERLYING REASONING.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the negative declaration by the City of Rochester Director of Planning and Zoning under the State Environmental Quality Review Act [SEQRA] should have been annulled. The Fourth Department first held that the parties had standing to contest the negative declaration because of their proximity to the subject construction site. In the face of the acknowledged contamination of the soil at the site, the negative declaration did not set forth or document the underlying reasoning:

We … agree with petitioners that the negative declaration did not contain a ” reasoned elaboration’ of the basis for [the] determination” … . “It is well settled that SEQRA’s procedural mechanisms mandate strict compliance, and anything less will result in annulment of the lead agency’s determination of significance” … . The lead agency must “set forth its determination of significance in a written form containing a reasoned elaboration and providing reference to any supporting documentation” … . The purpose of that regulation “is to focus and facilitate judicial review and . . . to provide affected landowners and residents with a clear, written explanation of the lead agency’s reasoning at the time the negative declaration is made” … . Here, despite the undisputed presence of preexisting soil contamination on the project site, the negative declaration set forth no findings whatsoever with respect to that contamination. The document containing the purported reasoning for the lead agency’s determination of significance, which was prepared subsequent to the issuance of the negative declaration, does not fulfill the statutory mandate … . Contrary to respondents’ contention, the developer’s promise to remediate the contamination before proceeding with construction did not absolve the lead agency from its obligations under SEQRA … . Matter of Rochester Eastside Residents for Appropriate Dev., Inc. v City of Rochester, 2017 NY Slip Op 03665, 4th Dept 5-5-17

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PARTIES HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE NEGATIVE DECLARATION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, NEGATIVE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANNULLED FOR FAILURE TO SET OUT THE UNDERLYING REASONING)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PARTIES HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE NEGATIVE DECLARATION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, NEGATIVE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANNULLED FOR FAILURE TO SET OUT THE UNDERLYING REASONING)/ZONING (STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, PARTIES HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE NEGATIVE DECLARATION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, NEGATIVE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANNULLED FOR FAILURE TO SET OUT THE UNDERLYING REASONING)/NEGATIVE DECLARATION (STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, PARTIES HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE NEGATIVE DECLARATION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, NEGATIVE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANNULLED FOR FAILURE TO SET OUT THE UNDERLYING REASONING)

/ ,

AFTER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE COURT CONCLUDED THE PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT SHARED THE INTENT OF HIS SON, WHO STABBED THE VICTIM EIGHT TIMES.

The Fourth Department, after conducting a weight of the evidence analysis, determined the proof was not sufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shared the intent of his son who stabbed the victim eight times. Therefore the assault first conviction was reversed. The proof indicated the defendant may have been away from the victim, looking for his dog, when his son stabbed the victim:

Although “all of the elements [of the crime] and necessary findings are supported by some credible evidence,” we conclude that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable … . We therefore must “independently assess all the proof; substitute [our] own credibility determinations for those made by the jury [if necessary]; determine whether the verdict was factually correct; and acquit . . . defendant if [we] are not convinced that the jury was justified in finding that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt”… . Here, defendant was charged as an accessory, and thus the People had to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] acted with the mental culpability necessary to commit the crime charged and that, in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided the principal to commit such crime”  … . We conclude that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with the requisite mental culpability to commit assault in the first degree by causing serious physical injury to the victim by the use of a dangerous instrument, or that he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided his son in committing the offense … . People v Farley, 2017 NY Slip Op 03634, 4th Dept 5-5-17

CRIMINAL LAW (AFTER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE COURT CONCLUDED THE PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT SHARED THE INTENT OF HIS SON, WHO STABBED THE VICTIM EIGHT TIMES)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ACCOMPLICE, ACCESSORY LIABILITY, AFTER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE COURT CONCLUDED THE PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT SHARED THE INTENT OF HIS SON, WHO STABBED THE VICTIM EIGHT TIMES)/ACCOMPLICE, ACCESSORY LIABILITY (AFTER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE COURT CONCLUDED THE PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT SHARED THE INTENT OF HIS SON, WHO STABBED THE VICTIM EIGHT TIMES)/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, AFTER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE COURT CONCLUDED THE PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT SHARED THE INTENT OF HIS SON, WHO STABBED THE VICTIM EIGHT TIMES)

/ ,

IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS UNDULY SUGGESTIVE, OFFICER WAS TOLD WHO THE POLICE WERE SEEKING TO IDENTIFY BEFORE VIEWING A SURVEILLANCE VIDEO, ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL IN THE MOTION PAPERS, IT IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE COUNTY COURT ADDRESSED IT. 

The Fourth Department, reserving on the appeal until County Court rules on other issues related to the suppression of the identification of the defendant, determined County Court erred when it concluded the identification of the defendant by a parole officer viewing a surveillance video was not an unduly suggestive procedure. The Fourth Department first noted that the issue was not preserved for appeal by the motion papers, but was appealable because County Court considered the issue in its findings. The Fourth Department held the procedure unduly suggestive because the parole officer was told who the police were seeking to identify before viewing the video:

… [W]e agree with defendant that, contrary to the court’s determination that “[t]here was no influence or suggestion” by the investigator, the evidence establishes that the investigator suggested to the parole officer prior to her identification that the person depicted committing the robbery on the surveillance video was defendant … . Instead of requesting the parole officer’s assistance in identifying someone from the video without preemptively disclosing the subject of his investigation, the investigator engaged in a conversation “about her being a parole officer for [defendant].” During the conversation, the investigator “asked [the parole officer] if she was familiar with [defendant].” The parole officer responded that she had “lots of contact” with defendant, so the investigator proceeded to ask her to “come down and view a video.” The investigator subsequently met with the parole officer at the police department and asked her to view the video to determine if she recognized anyone, and the parole officer identified defendant as the person committing the robbery. We conclude that the investigator, by contacting the parole officer and inquiring about her familiarity with defendant prior to the parole officer’s viewing of the video, engaged in … undue suggestiveness … inasmuch as his comments improperly suggested to the parole officer that the person she was about to view was a particular acquaintance of hers, i.e., defendant … . People v Gambale, 2017 NY Slip Op 03658, 4th Dept 5-5-17

 

/ , ,

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The Fourth Department, in the interest of justice, reversed defendant’s conviction based upon prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to object to the prosecutor’s remarks in summation and failure to object to evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts for which no admissibility ruling was sought):

Here, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during her closing statement by repeatedly appealing to the jury’s sympathy, asking the jury to do justice and protect the victim by convicting defendant, bolstering the victim’s credibility and injecting the prosecutor’s personal opinions into the trial. Perhaps most egregiously, in arguing that the jury should reject defendant’s testimony that he confessed falsely to the police because he needed to use the bathroom, the prosecutor gave her personal opinion regarding defendant’s credibility by stating that she would sit in her own urine rather than falsely admit that she committed a crime. “We can only conclude herein that the prosecutor’s inflammatory [comments had] a decided tendency to prejudice the jury against the defendant’ “… . Consequently, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct, which substantially prejudiced defendant’s rights … , requires reversal.

Furthermore, “[i]n light of the foregoing, we agree with defendant’s related contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel owing to defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct during summation” … . Defense counsel also failed to object when the prosecutor introduced evidence of prior bad acts despite having failed to seek a ruling regarding the admissibility thereof, most notably the testimony of a sheriff’s deputy that, months before this incident, defendant stole the victim’s truck and was arrested for driving it while intoxicated while on the way to attack a person with whom he believed the victim was having an affair. Defense counsel also failed to object when the prosecutor cross-examined defendant regarding that issue. Thus, reversal is also required because defense counsel was ineffective in “fail[ing] to object to prejudicial evidence of prior uncharged crimes and bad acts introduced by the prosecutor” … . People v Case, 2017 NY Slip Op 03638, 4th Dept 5-5-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR BAD ACTS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/PRIOR BAD ACTS (FAILURE TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR BAD ACTS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)

/ ,

RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a release referred only to claims arising from injuries suffered by defendant, and not injuries suffered by another:

In March 2013, third-party defendant John Salewski, while operating a tractor trailer owned by his employer and third-party defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc., was involved in a collision with a tractor trailer operated by defendant. Plaintiff is Salewski’s wife and was a passenger in the vehicle operated by Salewski at the time of the accident. Defendant commenced a personal injury action against Salewski and Werner for damages allegedly sustained in that accident. That action was settled in June 2014, and, in connection therewith, defendant executed a general release in favor of Salewski and Werner. In April 2015, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant for damages that she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. Defendant answered and thereafter commenced a third-party action for contribution and indemnification against Salewski and Werner. Instead of answering, Salewski and Werner moved to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground of release. Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the plain language of the release barred the third-party action. * * *

Here, the release clearly defines the incident, the claim and the lawsuit. The fact that there are multiple references to the term “injuries” indicates an unambiguous intention to limit the release’s application only to the personal injuries suffered by defendant in the incident. We further find this language to be a clear and unambiguous expression of the parties’ intention that the release applies only to claims related to defendant’s injuries. As such, and giving full meaning and effect to its material provisions, the release plainly manifests an intent to release Salewski and Werner for any and all claims related to defendant’s personal injuries, and not to claims for contribution and indemnification for injuries allegedly suffered by another party — here, plaintiff … . Salewski v Music, 2017 NY Slip Op 03582, 3rd Dept 5-5-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER)/NEGLIGENCE (RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER)/RELEASES (RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER)

/ ,

A WRITTEN WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED FOR DEFENDANT’S REFUSING TO SIGN THE WRITTEN WAIVER.

The Fourth Department noted that the sentencing court did not have the power to enhance defendant’s sentence for refusing to sign a waiver of appeal because the plea agreement did not call for a written waiver:

While waiving the right to appeal was a condition of the plea bargain, the execution of a written waiver was not, and thus the court was not empowered to enhance the sentence on that ground … . We therefore modify the judgment by reducing the term of imprisonment from a determinate term of 25 years to a determinate term of 20 years, and the period of postrelease supervision from 5 years to 2½ years, in accordance with the plea agreement. People v Days, 2017 NY Slip Op 03632, 4th Dept 5-5-17

CRIMINAL LAW (A WRITTEN WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED FOR DEFENDANT’S REFUSING TO SIGN THE WRITTEN WAIVER)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER, A WRITTEN WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED FOR DEFENDANT’S REFUSING TO SIGN THE WRITTEN WAIVER)/WAIVER OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL LAW, A WRITTEN WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED FOR DEFENDANT’S REFUSING TO SIGN THE WRITTEN WAIVER)

/

SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED CLAIMS, DECEDENT’S CLAIM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SPECIAL FUND IN 2002 AND HIS DEATH WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE 2002 CLAIM.

The Third Department determined the Special Fund was responsible for the decedent’s Workers’ Compensation claim. Decedent’s claim had been transferred to the Special Fund in 2002. The fact that decedent died after the 2014 cutoff for newly reopened claims was irrelevant:

The Special Fund argues that it is not liable because the consequential death claim is a new claim and, since it was filed after the January 1, 2014 cutoff for newly reopened claims against the Special Fund, liability against it is precluded (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]). The Special Fund is correct that “a claim for death benefits . . . is a separate and distinct legal proceeding brought by the beneficiary’s dependents and is not equated with the beneficiary’s original disability claim” … . Indeed, there are separate statutory provisions for disability and death benefits (compare Workers’ Compensation Law § 15, with Workers’ Compensation Law § 16). However, where, as here, liability for a claim has already been transferred from the carrier to the Special Fund and the employee thereafter dies for reasons causally related to the original claim, the Special Fund remains liable for the claim for death benefits … . Thus, under these circumstances, claimant need not obtain another transfer of liability to the Special Fund upon decedent’s death, as liability had already been transferred. In that regard, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a (1-a), which closed the Special Fund to newly reopened cases as of January 1, 2014, has no bearing on the Special Fund’s liability for a claim for which liability was transferred to it in 2000 ,,, . This result is consistent with the purpose of Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a, which “is to shift the liability for paying stale claims to the [Special] Fund” … . Matter of Misquitta v Getty Petroleum, 2017 NY Slip Op 03585, 3rd Dept 5-4-17

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED CLAIMS, DECEDENT’S CLAIM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SPECIAL FUND IN 2002 AND HIS DEATH WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE 2002 CLAIM)/SPECIAL FUND (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED CLAIMS, DECEDENT’S CLAIM WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SPECIAL FUND IN 2002 AND HIS DEATH WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE 2002 CLAIM)

/ , ,

STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS.

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a state trooper, defendant Begeal, was entitled to summary judgment in this personal injury case because he was immune from suit for his actions, which were discretionary. Plaintiff physician assistant was injured by a patient (Lacey) brought into the hospital by law enforcement officers, including Begeal. Plaintiff was kicked by the patient and alleged Begeal negligently failed to restrain the patient’s legs:

Although Begeal had access to plastic leg restraints, the undisputed evidence established that, at the time that he left the examination room, Lacey was still handcuffed, was “extremely calm” and had allowed a nurse to remove pieces of glass from his feet without kicking or otherwise resisting the nurse’s efforts. Begeal thus made a “reasoned judgment” not to utilize the leg restraints … . Accordingly, “[t]he decision to employ [only handcuffs] was a discretionary one . . ., and [Begeal] may not be held liable for that determination” … . …

Begeal’s decision to leave the examination room to permit the medical personnel to examine Lacey in private was likewise discretionary. Although Lacey was combative when he first arrived at the hospital, Begeal did not leave the examination room until approximately 20 minutes after that time and only after ensuring that Lacey had calmed down. Based on these circumstances, Begeal “did not feel that [the hospital personnel and Feeney] were in any immediate danger” and concluded that he could safely leave the room and go to the main area in order to, among other things, wash off Lacey’s blood from his clothes. While Begeal’s judgment call proved to be incorrect, “it is not for courts to second-guess the wisdom of discretionary governmental choices, troubling though they may sometimes seem in the glaring clarity of hindsight” … . Feeney v County of Del., 2017 NY Slip Op 03583, 3rd Dept 5-4-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)/MUNICIPAL LAW (IMMUNITY, STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)/IMMUNITY (STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)

/ , ,

DEFENDANT IN THIS CONDOMINIUM ACTION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.

The First Department determined the defendant in this condominium foreclosure action was not entitled to a mandatory mortgage foreclosure settlement conference. The court had ordered settlement conferences in the past and defendant had refused to participate:

The express language of the condominium’s bylaws permitted the appointment of a receiver, without notice, to collect unpaid common charges in this foreclosure action. Further, the record demonstrates that while defendant, an owner of an apartment in the condominium, paid maintenance arrears after plaintiff board filed a notice of lien and commenced the action to foreclose on the lien, she still owed plaintiff for assessments, late fees and associated attorney’s fees. Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to seek judgment for these fees, which constitute common charges under the bylaws… . We reject defendant’s claim that she was entitled to a mandatory mortgage foreclosure settlement conference, particularly since the court directed the parties to engage in settlement conferences to resolve this matter, and it appears that defendant, for the most part, refused to participate. Board of Mgrs. of St. James’s Tower Condominium v Kutler, 2017 NY Slip Op 03605, 1st Dept 5-4-17

FORECLOSURE (CONDOMINIUMS, DEFENDANT IN THIS CONDOMINIUM FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFENDANT IN THIS CONDOMINIUM FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE)/CONDOMINIUMS (FORECLOSURE, MANDATORY FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFENDANT IN THIS CONDOMINIUM FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy