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ALTHOUGH THE MURDER WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE BURGLARY CHARGE, THE PEOPLE JUSTIFIED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BY PRESENTING PROOF THE TWO CRIMES ENCOMPASSED DISTINCT ACTS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Klein, determined there was sufficient evidence the burglary and murder were separate acts to justify consecutive sentences. The defendant was charged with breaking and entering his girlfriend’s home, dragging her downstairs and then murdering her:

“By definition, the act of causing death is subsumed within the element causing . . . physical injury” … and, thus, the act constituting murder here was a material element of that burglary count. The People therefore concede that, with respect to the latter burglary charge, they were required to identify facts establishing that defendant committed this offense and murder through separate and distinct acts. Because “the People offer[ed] evidence of the existence of . . . separate and distinct act[s]” with respect to that count of burglary in the first degree — indeed, with respect to both counts — “the trial court ha[d] discretion to order consecutive sentences” … . People v Brahney, 2017 NY Slip Op 02465, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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DISMISSAL OF INTENTIONAL TORT CAUSES OF ACTION PRECLUDED SUBSEQUENT ACTION SOUNDING IN NEGLIGENCE, NO NEGLIGENT ASSAULT IN NEW YORK.

The Second Department noted that New York does not recognize an action for negligent assault. Plaintiff’s intentional tort causes stemming from an arrest by a security guard were dismissed as time-barred. Plaintiff then brought suit under a negligence theory:

“[U]nder New York’s transactional analysis approach to res judicata, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'” … . Here, the purported negligence cause of action asserted in the plaintiff’s second action arose from the same operative facts as the dismissed intentional tort claims, and could have been raised in the first action. Accordingly, in view of the previous litigation between the parties, the Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of that cause of action on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata … .

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the negligence cause of action on the additional ground that the allegations in support of it failed to state a cause of action. The allegations that Doe physically injured the plaintiff while restraining and arresting him did not transform the plaintiff’s time-barred cause of action alleging assault into a timely cause of action alleging negligence, as New York does not recognize a cause of action to recover for negligent assault … . Johnson v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02410, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO WHICH ALLEGEDLY SHOWED HOW PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WARRANTED A SANCTION, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMAND THE TAPE OR ASK THAT IT BE PRESERVED.

The Second Department determined defendants should have been sanctioned for not preserving a videotape which allegedly showed plaintiff deliberately allowing a car to run over her toes. Plaintiff had not asked that the videotape be preserved. The Second Department determined the appropriate sanction is to prohibit the defendants from introducing any evidence of the contents of the tape. The Second Department further held that plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because her conclusory affidavit was not sufficient to demonstrate the absence of comparative fault:

Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to impose any sanction. The plaintiff sustained her burden of establishing that spoliation occurred, given that the defendants failed to preserve the surveillance video despite their knowledge of a reasonable likelihood of litigation regarding the incident, and the highly relevant nature of the video evidence to that litigation … . However, since the destruction of the evidence did not deprive the plaintiff of her ability to prove her claim so as to warrant the drastic sanction of striking the defendants’ answer, the appropriate sanction for the spoliation herein is to preclude the defendants from offering any evidence in this action regarding the alleged contents of the erased surveillance video … . Rokach v Taback, 2017 NY Slip Op 02456, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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CLAIMANT STRUCK A DOWNED LIGHT POLE WHICH HAD ROTTED BELOW GROUND, STATE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION.

The Second Department determined the state did not have actual or constructive notice that a light pole was rotten. Claimant was injured when his vehicle struck a downed pole. The rot was not visible above ground. Evidence that rot was visible on other poles did not provide adequate notice:

Here, the Court of Claims correctly concluded that the claimant failed to establish that the State had either actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition of the subject light pole. Rather, the evidence established that the rot on the pole was at the bottom of the pole, which was buried between six and seven feet below ground. Thus, a reasonable inspection would not have revealed the dangerous condition. The claimant’s evidence that a witness noticed rot on some of the wooden poles along Ocean Parkway during the prior 15 years is insufficient to provide notice regarding the specific pole involved in the accident. “A general awareness of a recurring problem in insufficient, without more, to establish constructive notice of the particular condition that caused the accident” … . Jeffries v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02409, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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FOOT OF A DECORATIVE FENCE OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Second Department determined the foot of a decorative fence over which plaintiff tripped was open and obvious as a matter of law and not actionable:

While a landowner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition … , “there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous” … . “While the issue of whether a hazard is . . . open and obvious is generally fact-specific and thus usually a jury question, a court may determine that a risk was open and obvious as a matter of law when the established facts compel that conclusion, and may do so on the basis of clear and undisputed evidence” … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the fence, including the “leg” or foot of the fence, was open and obvious, as it was readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses and, as a matter of law, was not inherently dangerous … .

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to her contention, she did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the foot of the fence constituted a “trap for the unwary” because it was somehow obscured … . Gerner v Shop-Rite of Uniondale, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02407, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS, DEFENDANT’S SNOW REMOVAL MAY HAVE EXACERBATED THE SLIPPERY CONDITION, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact in this slip and fall case. Although there was a storm in progress, defendant’s snow removal efforts may have exacerbated the ice condition (facts not described in decision):

Here, in support of its motion, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence, which included the affidavit of its meteorologist, as well as certified climatological data, which demonstrated that the subject accident occurred while a storm was in progress … . In opposition, the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff, which included her affidavit and the affidavit of her meteorologist, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether any snow removal efforts the defendant undertook prior to the accident in relation to the storm either created or exacerbated the ice condition which allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall … . Dylan v CEJ Props., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02403, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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19 YEAR OLD NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS NOT SUFFICIENT WRITTEN NOTICE OF SIDEWALK DEFECT.

The Second Department determined a 19-year-old notice of claim did not meet the written notice requirement for a sidewalk defect in this slip and fall case:

“Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) limits the City’s duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location” … . Accordingly, “prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent which plaintiff is required to plead and prove to maintain an action against the City” … .

Here, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting proof that a search of its records revealed that it had not received any prior written notice of the allegedly defective condition … . In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. “To satisfy a prior written notice statute, the notice relied upon by a plaintiff must not be too remote in time” … . Here, the plaintiffs’ submission of a notice of claim, filed almost 19 years prior to the accident complained of, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact since it was too remote in time to constitute prior written notice within the meaning of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) … . Gellman v Cooke, 2017 NY Slip Op 02404, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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SECOND DEPARTMENT JOINS THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEPARTMENTS IN HOLDING INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES NEED NOT BE NAMED AS DEFENDANTS IN A NOTICE OF CLAIM.

The Second Department decided to follow the Third and Fourth Departments and did not require the naming of individual municipal employees as defendants in a notice of claim. The decision in this false arrest, malicious prosecution and civil rights violation case is substantive and deals with several issues not summarized here, including the District Attorney’s immunity from suit. With respect to the notice of claim, the court wrote:

The Appellate Division, First Department, has held that “General Municipal Law § 50-e makes unauthorized an action against individuals who have not been named in a notice of claim” … . * * * The plurality opinion in that case stated that the names of individual employees, if unknown, should still be named as John or Jane Does to enable the municipality to properly investigate the claims and to put individual defendants on notice that they will be sued. …

In contrast, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has held that naming individual municipal employees in a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to joining those individuals as defendants in the action … . In Goodwin, the Fourth Department noted that General Municipal Law § 50-e(2), which sets forth the requirements for a notice of claim, does not include a requirement that specific individual employees be named, and concluded that “[t]he underlying purpose of the statute may be served without requiring a plaintiff to name the individual agents, officers or employees in the notice of claim” (id. at 216). In Pierce v Hickey (129 AD3d 1287, 1289), the Appellate Division, Third Department, followed Goodwin, stating that there was no requirement that “an individual municipal employee be named in the notice of claim.”

We agree with the Third and Fourth Departments. * * * Listing the names of the individuals who allegedly committed the wrongdoing is not required … . Blake v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02399, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS ALLOWING JUVENILE TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, PARENTAL NEGLECT PRECLUDED REUNIFICATION.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should have made findings which would allow the juvenile to petition for special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS). Reunification with a parent was precluded by parental neglect, including excessive corporal punishment, and forcing the juvenile to work rather than attend school:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) … and 8 CFR 204.11, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who, inter alia, is under 21 years of age, is unmarried, and has been legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an individual appointed by a state or juvenile court. Additionally, for a juvenile to qualify for special immigrant juvenile status, a court must find that reunification of the juvenile with one or both of the juvenile’s parents is not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under state law … , and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interests to be returned to his or her native country or country of last habitual residence … .

Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not a viable option based upon parental neglect, which includes the infliction of excessive corporal punishment and requiring the child to begin working at the age of 12 instead of attending school on a regular basis … . The record further supports a finding that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return to India … . Matter of Palwinder K. v Kuldeep K., 2017 NY Slip Op 02423. 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PHYSICAL INJURY ELEMENT OF ASSAULT THIRD, INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT SENTENCING AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER.

The Second Department determined the evidence of physical injury was not sufficient to support the assault third conviction. The court further determined the totality of the circumstances did not support sentencing defendant as a persistent felony offender:

The record, which contains photographs that were shown to the jury depicting the complainant’s injury, demonstrated that the complainant sustained a one-half inch laceration on one of her toes, which stopped bleeding before an emergency medical technician arrived at the scene. No evidence was introduced that the injury sustained by the complainant caused her more than trivial pain. The complainant’s vague testimony that she was unable to wear shoes for an unspecified period of time failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the use of her foot was impaired by her injury. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence that the complainant suffered a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9) … . …

… [T]he totality of the evidence adduced at the persistent felony offender hearing, although warranting the defendant’s adjudication as a second felony offender, did not warrant his adjudication as a persistent felony offender … . In addition, in reaching its determination, the Supreme Court improperly considered a crime of which the defendant was acquitted as a basis for sentencing … . People v Fews. 2017 NY Slip Op 02443, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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