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APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF ADEQUATE EXCUSE.

The Second Department determined petitioner’s application for leave to file a late notice of claim should have been granted, despite the lack of an adequate excuse. The respondent city’s employees were involved in the accident and the police report alerted the city to a potential lawsuit:

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Here, the City of New York acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accident, since its employees were directly involved in the accident, and the police accident report gave reasonable notice from which it could be inferred that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the City and that the petitioner was injured as a result thereof … . Furthermore, the City received a late notice of claim 22 days after the expiration of the 90-day period, which it accepted, and informed the petitioner that it would do its best to investigate and, if possible, settle the claim … .

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Moreover, the petitioner made an initial showing that the City was not substantially prejudiced, since the City acquired timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim through the police accident report and became aware of the negligence claim less than one month after the expiration of the 90-day period … . Matter of Cruz v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02789, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

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MUNICIPAL LAW (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF ADEQUATE EXCUSE)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF ADEQUATE EXCUSE)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK OF ADEQUATE EXCUSE)

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SEX OFFENDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDINGS.

The Second Department determined a respondent in a Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding (re: civil commitment of sex offenders) has a right to effective assistance of counsel (not usually the case in a civil proceeding). Respondent’s writ of error coram nobis, alleging ineffective assistance, however, was denied on the merits:

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Generally, in the context of civil litigation, an attorney’s errors or omissions are binding on the client and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be entertained in the absence of extraordinary circumstances … . However, a respondent in a Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding has a statutory right to counsel …  and, as in proceedings pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C) and certain Family Court proceedings, the consequences of an unfavorable determination in these particular civil proceedings are uniquely severe … . Indeed, a respondent in a Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding “arguably faces an even more severe threat to his or her liberty than that faced by a criminal defendant. When successfully litigated by the State, such a proceeding can result in civil confinement, after a respondent is released from prison, which is involuntary and indefinite, and can last the remainder of a respondent’s life” … . Further, a respondent’s statutory right to counsel in a Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding would be eviscerated if counsel were ineffective… .  Thus, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding … . Matter of State of New York v Wayne J., 2017 NY Slip Op 02798, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDINGS)/ATTORNEYS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDINGS)/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDINGS)

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NEGLECT FINDING REVERSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the neglect finding was not supported by the evidence. The child was removed from the hospital shortly after mother gave birth:

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The Administration for Children’s Services (hereinafter ACS) filed a child neglect petition four days after the mother gave birth to the subject child in a Brooklyn hospital. During the initial days in the hospital, the child was placed in the room with the mother, where she took appropriate care of him. However, when the hospital personnel discovered that the mother only had income from public assistance and that she and the baby would not be accepted back into the home where the maternal grandmother was staying, they called ACS, which undertook an emergency removal of the child. It is undisputed that no ACS worker provided the mother with housing information, including emergency housing information, or provided any supplies for the child. After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the mother neglected the child. * * *

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“At a fact-finding hearing in a neglect proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, a petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject child was neglected”… . A neglected child is one “whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education . . . though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so”… . Actual or imminent danger of impairment is a “prerequisite to a finding of neglect [which] ensures that the Family Court, in deciding whether to authorize state intervention, will focus on serious harm or potential harm to the child, not just on what might be deemed undesirable parental behavior”… . “Imminent danger . . . must be near or impending, not merely possible”… . Here, ACS failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother did not supply the child with adequate food, clothing, and shelter although financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so … . Matter of Zachariah W. v Dominique W., 2017 NY Slip Op 02801, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

 

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT FINDING REVERSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT FINDING REVERSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION.

The Second Department determined defendant school did not owe a duty of care to a student who was struck by a car one block from the school after leaving the school with permission:

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A school’s duty to supervise the students in its charge arises from its physical custody and control over them … . “When that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the school’s custodial duty also ceases”… . “Generally, a school cannot be held liable for injuries that occur off school property and beyond the orbit of its authority” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the infant plaintiff had left school grounds with the permission of his mother and, thus, was no longer in the defendants’ custody or under their control and was outside the orbit of their authority … . The defendants also demonstrated, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff was not released into a foreseeably hazardous setting that the defendants had a hand in creating … . Donofrio v Rockville Ctr. Union Free Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 02774, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION)/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION)

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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THIS LEASE AGREEMENT WAS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the liquidated damages portion of a lease agreement was unenforceable. Here the complaint alleged that defendant did not vacate the leased premises on time and sought holdover damages:

“[W]hether a clause represents an enforceable liquidation of damages or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law, giving due consideration to the nature of the contract and the circumstances”‘ … . An enforceable liquidated damages clause is “an estimate . . . of the extent of the injury that would be sustained as a result of breach of the agreement,” thereby embodying “the principle of just compensation for loss” … .

Here, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the amended agreement imposed an unenforceable penalty, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. The damages section of the amended agreement provided the plaintiff with a remedy for the whole extent of any injury that would be sustained as a result of a holdover, “in addition to” the sum of $5,000 per day in liquidated damages. The liquidated damages clause therefore is not “an estimate . . . of the extent of the injury that would be sustained” … , but rather an unenforceable penalty … . 555 W. John St., LLC v Westbury Jeep Chrysler Dodge, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02769, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

CONTRACT LAW (LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THIS LEASE AGREEMENT WAS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY)/LANDLORD-TENANT (LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THIS LEASE AGREEMENT WAS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY)/LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THIS LEASE AGREEMENT WAS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY)

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NOT CLEAR WHETHER $1740 EXEMPTION FROM A JUDGMENT CREDITOR’S RESTRAINT OF FUNDS  HELD BY A BANK APPLIES TO ALL ACCOUNTS IN THE AGGREGATE OR TO EACH ACCOUNT, BANK’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING EACH ACCOUNT MUST BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the Bank of America’s (BOA’s) motion to dismiss a CPLR Article 52 proceeding contesting BOA’s application of the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA) was properly denied. The EIPA exempts $1740 in a bank account from restraint by judgment creditors. BOA aggregated the amount in all of the plaintiffs’ accounts, sent the plaintiffs $1740 and froze the rest. The plaintiffs argued the accounts should not be aggregated, rather the $1740 exemption should be applied to each account separately. The court deemed the statutory language ambiguous (the word “account,” singular, was used). The Second Department noted that Supreme Court’s conversion of the action to the correct format, a CPLR Article 52 special proceeding, was proper:

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… [W]e find that CPLR 5222(i) is ambiguous as to whether it applies to an “amount” on deposit at a bank or to each “account” maintained at a bank. Turning to the legislative history of the EIPA, the bill jacket indicates that the stated legislative purpose was to create a procedure for the execution of money judgments on bank accounts containing exempt funds to ensure that debtors can keep access to exempt funds … . The legislative history, as reflected in the bill jacket, particularly in a letter in support of the bill written by the bill’s Assembly sponsor, Helene Weinstein, indicates that the statute applies to each account.

Accordingly, BOA failed to establish its entitlement to dismissal of the cause of action alleging violations of the EIPA, and that branch of its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) was properly denied. Jackson v Bank of Am., N.A., 2017 NY Slip Op 02780, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EXEMPT INCOME PROTECTION ACT (EIPA), NOT CLEAR WHETHER $1740 EXEMPTION FROM A JUDGMENT CREDITOR’S RESTRAINT OF A FUNDS  HELD BY A BANK APPLIES TO ALL ACCOUNTS IN THE AGGREGATE OR TO EACH ACCOUNT, BANK’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING EACH ACCOUNT MUST BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY PROPERLY DENIED)/BANKING LAW (EXEMPT INCOME PROTECTION ACT (EIPA), NOT CLEAR WHETHER $1740 EXEMPTION FROM A JUDGMENT CREDITOR’S RESTRAINT OF A FUNDS  HELD BY A BANK APPLIES TO ALL ACCOUNTS IN THE AGGREGATE OR TO EACH ACCOUNT, BANK’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING EACH ACCOUNT MUST BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY PROPERLY DENIED)DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW (EXEMPT INCOME PROTECTION ACT (EIPA), NOT CLEAR WHETHER $1740 EXEMPTION FROM A JUDGMENT CREDITOR’S RESTRAINT OF A FUNDS  HELD BY A BANK APPLIES TO ALL ACCOUNTS IN THE AGGREGATE OR TO EACH ACCOUNT, BANK’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING EACH ACCOUNT MUST BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY PROPERLY DENIED)/EXEMPT INCOME PROTECTION ACT (EIPA) (NOT CLEAR WHETHER $1740 EXEMPTION FROM A JUDGMENT CREDITOR’S RESTRAINT OF A FUNDS  HELD BY A BANK APPLIES TO ALL ACCOUNTS IN THE AGGREGATE OR TO EACH ACCOUNT, BANK’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING EACH ACCOUNT MUST BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY PROPERLY DENIED)

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FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY DEMANDS WARRANTED STRIKING THE ANSWER.

The Second Department determined the defendants’ repeated failure to comply with discovery demands warranted striking defendants’ answer:

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The nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is within the broad discretion of the motion court … . The striking of a pleading may be appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands or court-ordered discovery is willful and contumacious … . The willful and contumacious character of a party’s conduct can be inferred from the party’s repeated failure to comply with discovery demands or orders without a reasonable excuse … .

Here, the defendants’ willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from their repeated failures, without an adequate excuse, to comply with discovery demands and the Supreme Court’s discovery orders … . Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer and for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants. Mears v Long, 2017 NY Slip Op 02782, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY DEMANDS WARRANTED STRIKING THE ANSWER)/DISCOVERY (FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY DEMANDS WARRANTED STRIKING THE ANSWER)

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IDENTITY THEFT STATUTE AMBIGUOUS, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE VICTIM’S IDENTITY IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE, HERE DEFENDANT USED HER OWN NAME, CONVICTION REVERSED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined defendant’s conviction of identity theft first degree must be vacated. Defendant tried to cash a check which was not actually from the bank identified on the face of the check. The People argued defendant was assuming the identity of the bank, which is a “person” under the law. The First Department, disagreeing with the 4th Department, found that the identity theft statute was ambiguous and the rule of lenity required the statute be interpreted to require proof of the assumption of the victim’s identity as an element of the offense:

… [T]he People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant assumed the identity of another person. The People argue that defendant assumed the identity of H & R Block Bank when she attempted to cash a check that contained the bank’s personal identifying information (the company’s name, address, account number, and routing number). However, the People did not demonstrate that the result of defendant’s use of that information was that she assumed the bank’s identity. To be sure, defendant presented a check containing the personal identifying information of H & R Block. However, the check was made payable to defendant, in her real name. Defendant presented her own identification establishing her identity as Blondine Destin, and signed her own name on the back of the check when the bank teller asked her to endorse it. None of the TD Bank employees were under the impression that defendant was anyone other than herself … . Thus … the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that defendant committed identity theft, because she did not assume the identity of the victim … . People v Destin, 2017 NY Slip Op 02767, 1st Dept, 4-11-17

CRIMINAL LAW (IDENTITY THEFT STATUTE AMBIGUOUS, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE VICTIM’S IDENTITY IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE, HERE DEFENDANT USED HER OWN NAME, CONVICTION REVERSED)/IDENTITY THEFT (IDENTITY THEFT STATUTE AMBIGUOUS, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE VICTIM’S IDENTITY IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE, HERE DEFENDANT USED HER OWN NAME, CONVICTION REVERSED)

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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT.

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined a recorded option agreement allowing plaintiff to buy back a portion of the parcel of land sold by the plaintiff was enforceable against subsequent purchasers of the parcel, even though the deed to the option property could not be recorded at the time the option was exercised (subdivision approval would be necessary to record the deed). The court held that because only transfer of the deed, not the recording of the deed, was required under the option agreement, the agreement could be enforced by an action for specific performance (which requires that the buyer be ready, willing and able to purchase the property when the option is exercised):

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… “[N]othing within the four corners of the option agreement requires plaintiff to obtain subdivision approval prior to exercising its option with respect to the 3.5-acre parcel, nor does the option agreement provide that the failure to obtain such approval renders the underlying agreement null and void” … . Further, as Supreme Court correctly noted, Real Property Law § 291 does not compel plaintiff to actually record the reconveyance deed for the subject parcel, as “recording is not required in order to transfer title to real property” (… see Real Property Law § 291). Rather, title to property vests upon the execution and delivery of the deed (see Real Property Law § 244…), and the fact that the deed may not be recorded until a later date — or at all — does not affect the validity of the conveyance … . While it is true that, generally speaking, prudence would suggest that a grantee record his or her deed, there is no requirement that he or she do so. More to the point, we do not interpret the option agreement before us as requiring plaintiff to record the deed obtained subsequent to exercising its rights relative to the 3.5-acre parcel — only a provision that, if it elects to do so, it be at its expense.  Tomhannock, LLC v Roustabout Resources, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02712, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

REAL PROPERTY (SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)/SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (REAL PROPERTY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)/DEEDS  (SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)/OPTION AGREEMENTS (REAL PROPERTY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)

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NO DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF TRACKED IN WATER DURING RAINSTORM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant bus company did not have a duty to keep the entry steps free of tracked in water during a rainstorm. Plaintiff slipped and fell on the steps while attempting to board the bus:

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Plaintiff’s claim that Swift River negligently allowed a slippery condition to persist on the stairs leading into the bus was precluded, as a matter of law, by plaintiff’s testimony that it was raining at the time of the accident … . “Defendant is not obligated to provide a constant remedy for the tracking of water onto a bus during an ongoing storm” … , and here, the evidence showed that plaintiff was the last of a group of people to board the bus during the rainstorm … . Collins v Nate Tours Bus Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 02739. 1st Dept 4-6-17

NEGLIGENCE (NO DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF TRACKED IN WATER DURING RAINSTORM)/SLIP AND FALL (NO DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF TRACKED IN WATER DURING RAINSTORM)/BUSES (SLIP AND FALL. NO DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF TRACKED IN WATER DURING RAINSTORM)/WATER, TRACKED IN (BUSES, NO DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF TRACKED IN WATER DURING RAINSTORM)

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