You are here: / WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DOCTOR WHO OVER-PRESCRIBED DRUGS TO PERSONS...

Search Results

/

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DOCTOR WHO OVER-PRESCRIBED DRUGS TO PERSONS WHO MURDERED A PHARMACIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a wrongful death cause of action brought on behalf of a pharmacist killed by persons addicted to prescription drugs should have been dismissed. The defendant-doctor, who allegedly over-prescribed the drugs, brought the motion to dismiss:

​

The defendants David Laffer and Melinda Brady conspired to commit a robbery at Haven Drugs Pharmacy, where Raymond A. Ferguson, Jr. (hereinafter the decedent), was employed as a pharmacist. During the robbery, Laffer shot and killed the decedent. Ultimately, Laffer was convicted of murder in the first degree, and Brady was convicted of robbery in the first degree. In this action, the plaintiff, as the administratrix of the decedent’s estate, and individually, alleges that in the years leading up to these crimes, the defendant physician Stan Xuhui Li prescribed Laffer and Brady excessive amounts of addictive prescription pain medications, that Laffer and Brady became addicted to these medications, and that they committed their crimes as a result of their addictions. …

​

The plaintiff does not allege that Li had “the authority or the ability to control Laffer” or Brady … , that Li had any relationship with the plaintiff or the decedent … , or that Li’s treatment of Laffer or Brady “necessarily implicate[d] protection of . . . identified persons foreseeably at risk because of a relationship with [the plaintiff or the decedent]” … . Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a cause of action sounding in negligence against Li … . Ferguson v Laffer, 2017 NY Slip Op 02967, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DOCTOR WHO OVER-PRESCRIBED DRUGS TO PERSONS WHO MURDERED A PHARMACIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DOCTOR WHO OVER-PRESCRIBED DRUGS TO PERSONS WHO MURDERED A PHARMACIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/PHARMACISTS (WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DOCTOR WHO OVER-PRESCRIBED DRUGS TO PERSONS WHO MURDERED A PHARMACIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/FORESEEABILITY (WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DOCTOR WHO OVER-PRESCRIBED DRUGS TO PERSONS WHO MURDERED A PHARMACIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

/ ,

LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, POSSESSION OF DECEDENT’S HOSPITAL RECORDS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE HOSPITAL’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL CLAIM FOR CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING.

The Second Department determined a petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation for conscious pain and suffering was properly denied. The court determined the hospital was not timely put on notice of the claim simply by its possession of the decedent’s hospital records:

​

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the respondent did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering within the requisite 90-day period or a reasonable time thereafter by virtue of its possession of hospital records relating to the decedent’s death … . A medical provider’s mere possession or creation of medical records does not establish that it had “actual knowledge of a potential injury where the records do not evince that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted any injury on” the claimant … . Furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and for the lengthy delay in filing the petition … . Even assuming that the petitioner met its initial burden to show that the late notice will not substantially prejudice the respondent, and that the respondent failed to make “a particularized evidentiary showing that [it] will be substantially prejudiced if the late notice is allowed” in response … , upon consideration of the balance of the relevant factors (see General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying leave to serve a late notice of claim with respect to the cause of action alleging conscious pain and suffering … . Matter of Rosenblatt v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 03004. 1st Dept 4-19-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, POSSESSION OF DECEDENT’S HOSPITAL RECORDS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE HOSPITAL’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL CLAIM)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, POSSESSION OF DECEDENT’S HOSPITAL RECORDS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE HOSPITAL’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL CLAIM)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, POSSESSION OF DECEDENT’S HOSPITAL RECORDS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE HOSPITAL’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL CLAIM)

/

BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s riding in the back of a pick-up truck was not an Industrial Code violation. Plaintiff was injured when the truck came to an abrupt stop. He was instructed to ride in the back of the truck a short distance while moving debris to a dumpster. The Second Department held that the bed of the truck was a proper “platform” within the meaning of the Industrial Code and, therefore, plaintiff’s injury was not caused by an Industrial Code violation:

​

… [T]he plaintiff asserted a cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) predicated on an alleged violation of section 23-9.7(e) of the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR 23-9.7[e]), which reads as follows: “Riding. No person shall be suffered or permitted to ride on running boards, fenders or elsewhere on a truck or similar vehicle except where a properly constructed and installed seat or platform is provided.” The defendants separately moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them, arguing that the platform of a pickup truck is a “properly constructed and installed . . . platform” within the meaning of section 23-9.7(e). The Supreme Court denied those branches of the motions.

“The interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation presents a question of law for the court” … . Moreover, in interpreting a regulation, this Court must assume that the promulgating agency ” did not deliberately place a phrase in the [regulation] which was intended to serve no purpose . . . and each word must be read and given a distinct and consistent meaning'” … .

Guided by the above principles, the word “platform” as used in subdivision (e) of section 23-9.7 must reasonably be read to include the platform of a pickup truck. While such a platform is normally intended for transporting cargo, the Vehicle and Traffic Law contemplates that it may also be used, without restriction, to carry people over distances of less than five miles (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1222). Thus, it is reasonable to interpret section 23-9.7(e) as excluding from its scope an activity that is not prohibited by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1222.

Therefore, under the facts presented, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff could not establish a violation of section 23-9.7(e) of the Industrial Code. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Pruszko v Pine Hollow Country Club, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03025, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)/PLATFORM (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, INDUSTRIAL CODE, BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)/TRUCKS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)

/ ,

CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined a child’s out of court statements about father’s physical abuse of mother was sufficiently corroborated by similar evidence concerning the children in a prior neglect proceeding:

​

A preponderance of the evidence established that the father neglected the subject children by perpetrating acts of domestic violence against the mother in their presence … . Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, the child’s out-of-court statement was sufficiently corroborated. Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi) provides, in part, that “previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence, but if uncorroborated, such statements shall not be sufficient to make a fact-finding of abuse or neglect. Any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements, including, but not limited to the types of evidence defined in this subdivision shall be sufficient corroboration.” Family Court Act § 1046(a)(i) provides, in part, that “proof of the abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any other child of . . . the respondent.” The child’s statement was corroborated by, among other evidence, proof of the father’s prior neglect of the children by perpetrating acts of domestic violence against the mother in their presence … . Additionally, contrary to the court’s further determination, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the father’s acts of domestic violence against the mother in the children’s presence impaired, or created an imminent danger of impairing, the children’s physical, mental, or emotional condition ,,, . Moreover, a negative inference is properly drawn from the father’s failure to testify ,,, , Matter of Jubilee S. (James S.), 2017 NY Slip Op 03006, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

FAMILY LAW (CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/HEARSAY (FAMILY LAW, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

/ ,

PARTY FACING POSSIBLE INCARCERATION IN SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS IS ENTITLED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, FATHER HERE DID NOT RECEIVE MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION.

The Second Department determined father had a right to meaningful assistance of counsel in proceedings stemming from a failure to pay court-ordered child support. The court further found father’s counsel was ineffective because no attempt was made to submit proof father could not work due to his mental illness:

​

With respect to this proceeding, Family Court Act § 262(a)(vi) extends the right to counsel to “any person in any proceeding . . . in which an order or other determination is being sought to hold such person . . . in willful violation of a previous order of the court,” because such persons potentially may be incarcerated. The possibility of incarceration exists where a party fails to comply with a support order, since Family Court Act § 454(3) authorizes the court, upon a finding that a respondent “has willfully failed to obey any lawful order of support,” to “commit the respondent to jail for a term not to exceed six months.”

The statutory right to counsel afforded under Family Court Act § 262(a)(vi) would be “meaningless unless the assistance of counsel is effective” … . Accordingly, in support proceedings such as this one in which a party faces the potential of imprisonment and has a statutory right to counsel, we hold that the appropriate standard to apply in evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance is the meaningful representation standard.  Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v King, 2017 NY Slip Op 02992, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

 

FAMILY LAW (PARTY FACING POSSIBLE INCARCERATION IN SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS IS ENTITLED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, FATHER HERE DID NOT RECEIVE MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION)/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, PARTY FACING POSSIBLE INCARCERATION IN SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS IS ENTITLED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, FATHER HERE DID NOT RECEIVE MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION)/CHILD SUPPORT (PARTY FACING POSSIBLE INCARCERATION IN SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS IS ENTITLED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, FATHER HERE DID NOT RECEIVE MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION)

/

BIOLOGICAL FATHER ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING PATERNITY.

The Second Department determined the acknowledged biological father’s paternity petition was properly dismissed in the best interests of the child:

​

Pursuant to Family Court Act § 532(a), “[t]he court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the court’s own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests . . . to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman” (emphasis added). ” The paramount concern in applying equitable estoppel in paternity cases is the best interests of the subject child'” … . ” In situations where an individual has assumed the role of a father and where the petitioner putative father has neglected to assume such a role, the petitioning putative father has been estopped from asserting a claim of paternity'” … . “The issue of equitable estoppel does not involve the equities between [or among] the . . . adults; the case turns exclusively on the best interests of the child”… .

Here, the Family Court properly determined that it was in the best interests of the child to deny the petition. Among other things, the petitioner provided limited financial support for the child and had seen the child only approximately 20 times over the course of the child’s life. Additionally, the respondent’s husband, whose name appears on the birth certificate, had assumed the role of the child’s father, providing for the child financially and emotionally and living with the respondent and their other children as a family unit consistently for the entirety of the child’s life. As such, although the parties agreed that the petitioner was the child’s biological father, the court properly estopped the petitioner from asserting any paternity claim in the child’s best interests … . Matter of Carlos O. v Maria G., 2017 NY Slip Op 02993, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

 

FAMILY LAW (BIOLOGICAL FATHER ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING PATERNITY)/PATERNITY (BIOLOGICAL FATHER ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING PATERNITY)/ESTOPPEL (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, BIOLOGICAL FATHER ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING PATERNITY)

/ ,

PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR NOT AN EMPLOYEE, NO VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY PHOTOGRAPHER.

The Second Department determined a wedding photographer (Kataiev) was an independent contractor and the company which hired him (HR) could not be vicariously liable for injuries to plaintiff allegedly caused by the photographer:

“The general rule is that an employer who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligent acts” … . “The determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists turns on whether the alleged employer exercises control over the results produced, or the means used to achieve the results. Control over the means is the more important consideration” … . “Factors relevant to assessing control include whether the worker (1) worked at his own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer’s payroll and (5) was on a fixed schedule” … . ” [I]ncidental control over the results produced without further indicia of control over the means employed to achieve the results will not constitute substantial evidence of an employer-employee relationship'”… .

Here, HR demonstrated, prima facie, that Kataiev was hired as an independent contractor. The transcripts of the deposition testimony submitted in support of HR’s motion established that HR hired Kataiev only for the wedding, that HR did not provide Kataiev with health insurance, that HR did not provide Kataiev with a W-2 form, that Kataiev used his own equipment at the wedding, that HR paid Kataiev in cash, and that HR did not withhold Social Security taxes or employment taxes from the money paid to Kataiev … . Additionally, the evidence submitted by HR demonstrated, prima facie, that HR exercised only minimal or incidental control over Kataiev’s work … . Weinfeld v HR Photography, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03038, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (VICARIOUS LIABILITY, PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR NOT AN EMPLOYEE, NO VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY PHOTOGRAPHER)/NEGLIGENCE (EMPLOYMENT LAW, PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR NOT AN EMPLOYEE, NO VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY PHOTOGRAPHER)/VICARIOUS LIABILITY (EMPLOYMENT LAW, PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR NOT AN EMPLOYEE, NO VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY PHOTOGRAPHER)

/ ,

COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL.

The Second Department. over a dissent, rejected defendant’s argument that he did not consent to the release to the prosecution of recordings of his phone conversations from jail. Defendant acknowledged he was aware the conversations could be monitored and recorded, but noted that the stated reason for recording in the jail handbook was for jail security. The Second Department instructed that the better practice would be to notify inmates the recordings could be turned over to the prosecution:

​

We note that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison,” and certainly “pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that . . . are enjoyed by convicted prisoners” … . Since any concern that the notice provided to inmates by the DOC is inadequate can be readily ameliorated by an express notification that the recorded calls may be turned over to the District Attorney, the better practice going forward may be for the DOC to include such a warning … . Rather, the trial court must weigh the probative value of the recordings against the potential for prejudice to the defendant … . “[D]ue to the possibility of prejudice inherent in the prosecutor’s use of inmate recordings, the trial judge’s role as gatekeeper remains unchanged and necessary to ensure compliance with constitutional mandates and the usual rules of evidence and criminal procedure” … . People v Diaz, 2017 NY Slip Op 03013, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL)/RECORDINGS (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL)

/ , ,

DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED, PROCEDURE ON REMITTAL EXPLAINED.

The Second Department sent the matter back because defendant was not informed of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The court explained the relevant law and procedure:

​

In People v Peque (22 NY3d 168), the Court of Appeals held that, as part of its independent obligation to ascertain whether a defendant is pleading guilty voluntarily, a trial court must alert a noncitizen defendant that he or she may be deported as a consequence of the plea of guilty (see id. at 193). Although no particular litany is required, “[t]he trial court must provide a short, straightforward statement on the record notifying the defendant that, in sum and substance, if the defendant is not a United States citizen, he or she may be deported upon a guilty plea” (id. at 197).

​

Here, we agree with the defendant that the County Court did not provide him with such a statement on the record. However, contrary to the defendant’s contention, he is not entitled to reversal of the judgment of conviction at this juncture. In order to withdraw or obtain vacatur of a plea based upon a Peque error, “a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial had the trial court informed the defendant of potential deportation” (id. at 198). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the County Court, Suffolk County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to move to vacate his plea, and for a report by the County Court thereafter. Any such motion shall be made by the defendant within 60 days after the date of this decision and order, and upon such motion, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing that there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pleaded guilty had the court advised him of the possibility of deportation (id. at 176 ,,, ). In its report to this Court, the County Court shall state whether the defendant moved to vacate his plea of guilty, and if so, shall include its findings as to whether the defendant has made the requisite showing to entitle him to vacatur of the plea … . People v Lopez-Alvarado, 2017 NY Slip Op 03018, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED, PROCEDURE ON REMITTAL EXPLAINED)/GUILTY PLEA (DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED, PROCEDURE ON REMITTAL EXPLAINED)/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, GUILTY PLEA, DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED, PROCEDURE ON REMITTAL EXPLAINED)

/ ,

ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, THE ATTORNEY MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability in this action against plaintiff’s attorney alleging violation of ethics rules in setting a contingency fee in an equitable distribution matter. However the attorney may be entitled to payment under a quantum meruit theory:

​

The plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, through the submission of the parties’ retainer agreement, that the defendant charged her a contingency fee in violation of rule 1.5(d)(5)(i) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0). Because the defendant’s fee was to be “determined by reference to the amount of . . . equitable distribution” in the form of the money judgment and subsequent enforcement stipulation, the retainer agreement violated rule 1.5(d)(5)(i) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR § 1200.0). Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the enforcement of an equitable distribution award reduced to a money judgment is not exempt from rule 1.5(d)(5)(i) ,,, . The plaintiff also demonstrated prima facie that the defendant violated the rules set forth in 22 NYCRR 1400.3. In that respect, the retainer agreement did not specify how the defendant’s fee would be calculated if the plaintiff discharged the defendant “during the course of the representation” and did not specify how frequently itemized bills would be provided (22 NYCRR 1400.3). Additionally, the plaintiff did not receive itemized bills from the defendant … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Medina v Kraslow, 2017 NY Slip Op 02979, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

ATTORNEYS (ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, SHE MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/FAMILY LAW (ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, SHE MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/CONTINGENCY FEES (FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, SHE MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy