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JUDGE’S FIRST AGREEING WITH PROSECUTION’S REQUEST NOT TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION AND THEN GIVING THE CHARGE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant's conviction, in a very brief memorandum, determined the trial judge's decision not to charge the jury with constructive possession and then giving the charge was not harmless error:

Although we reject defendant's contention that the evidence presented at trial did not support a charge of constructive possession, we nevertheless conclude that defendant is entitled to a new trial. The trial court erred in that it agreed to the People's request at the charge conference not to charge the jury on constructive possession, but then ultimately provided a constructive possession charge to the jury, resulting in prejudice to defendant … . People v Smalling, 2017 NY Slip Op 03442, CtApp 5-2-17

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE'S FIRST AGREEING WITH PROSECUTION'S REQUEST NOT TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION AND THEN GIVING THE CHARGE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR)/CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE'S FIRST AGREEING WITH PROSECUTION'S REQUEST NOT TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION AND THEN GIVING THE CHARGE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR)/JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE'S FIRST AGREEING WITH PROSECUTION'S REQUEST NOT TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION AND THEN GIVING THE CHARGE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR)

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CHANGE OF VENUE TO ALLOW PETITIONER’S MOTHER TO TESTIFY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner sex offender’s motion for a change of venue for the annual review of his civil commitment under Article 10 should have been granted. The change was sought to allow petitioner’s mother to testify:

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In this annual review proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.09, petitioner appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied that part of his motion seeking a change of venue to New York County for the convenience of witnesses … . Petitioner was previously determined to be a dangerous sex offender requiring civil confinement and confined to a secure treatment facility … . He is currently confined at the Central New York Psychiatric Center in Oneida County. We now grant that part of the motion seeking a change of venue.

The court may change the venue of an annual review proceeding” to any county for good cause, which may include considerations relating to the convenience of the parties or witnesses or the condition of the [confined sex offender]’ ” … . We agree with petitioner that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying his motion inasmuch as the proposed testimony of his mother, who lives in New York County, is “relevant to the issue of whether petitioner remained a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement” … . Although respondent correctly notes that the subjects of the mother’s proposed testimony also may be the subjects of expert testimony, “[t]he pertinent question is whether a witness—expert or lay—has material and relevant evidence to offer on the issues to be resolved” … . We agree with petitioner that his mother’s proposed testimony concerning his stated goals and priorities, likely living arrangements, and the availability and extent of a familial support system in the event of release, is material and relevant to the issue whether he “is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility” … . Matter of Charada T. v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 03379, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, CHANGE OF VENUE TO ALLOW PETITIONER’S MOTHER TO TESTIFY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, CHANGE OF VENUE TO ALLOW PETITIONER’S MOTHER TO TESTIFY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL COMMITMENT (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, CHANGE OF VENUE TO ALLOW PETITIONER’S MOTHER TO TESTIFY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/VENUE (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, CHANGE OF VENUE TO ALLOW PETITIONER’S MOTHER TO TESTIFY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant doctor’s (Kolli’s) credentialing file was privileged and therefore not discoverable. The discovery request for the doctor’s personnel file was too broad; whether any parts of it are privileged must be determined document by document:

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Concerning the discoverability of Dr. Kolli’s credentialing file, we note that such files “fall squarely within the materials that are made confidential by Education Law § 6527 (3) and article 28 of the Public Health Law”… . That privilege shields from disclosure ” the proceedings [and] the records relating to performance of a medical or a quality assurance review function or participation in a medical . . . malpractice prevention program’ ” .. . Here, defendants established that the credentialing file was “generated in connection with a quality assurance review function pursuant to Education Law § 6527 (3) or a malpractice prevention program pursuant to [article 28 of the] Public Health Law” … . We therefore conclude that the credentialing file is privileged and that the court improperly ordered defendants to disclose it… .

Although there is an exception to the privilege, the exception is limited to those statements made by a doctor to his or her employer-hospital concerning the subject matter of a malpractice action and pursuant to the hospital’s quality-control inquiry into the incident underlying that action … . Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, that exception does not apply here because the injury underlying this action was never the subject of such an inquiry. Jousma v Kolli, 2017 NY Slip Op 03308, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DISCOVERY, PRIVILEGE, DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCOVERY, PRIVILEGE, DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)/PRIVILEGE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCOVERY, PRIVILEGE, DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)/DISCOVERY (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRIVILEGE, DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)/CREDENTIALING FILE  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRIVILEGE, DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)/PERSONNEL FILE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCOVERY, PRIVILEGE, DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALING FILE PRIVILEGED AND NOT DISCOVERABLE, WHETHER CONTENTS OF PERSONNEL FILE ARE PRIVILEGED MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT)

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SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONTRACTOR DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant snow removal contractor’s (Krotz’s) motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. The contractor was hired to plow only the center driveway area, not the parking area where plaintiff fell. It could not be said, therefore, the contractor launched an instrument of harm, the only theory under which the contractor could possibly (under the facts) be liable in tort to plaintiff based upon the plowing contract. The court noted that since the only Espinal factor that may have been alleged sufficiently was “launching an instrument of harm,” that was the only factor the contractor needed to negate in the motion for summary judgment:

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Here, any duty that Krotz had with respect to snowplowing on the subject property arose exclusively out of its contract with the apartment defendants … . It is well settled, however, that ” a contractual obligation, standing alone, will impose a duty only in favor of the promisee and intended third-party beneficiaries’ “… , and “will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party,” i.e., a person who is not a party to the contract … . There are “three situations in which a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care—and thus be potentially liable in tort—to third persons: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launche[s] a force or instrument of harm’ . . . ; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties . . . and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty to maintain the premises safely” … .

Even assuming, arguendo, that the allegations in the pleadings are sufficient to require Krotz to negate the possible applicability of the first Espinal exception in establishing its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment … , we conclude that Krotz met its initial burden of establishing that it did not launch a force or instrument of harm by creating or exacerbating a dangerous condition … . Lingenfelter v Delevan Terrace Assoc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03309, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONTRACTOR DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM)/CONTRACT LAW (TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTY ARISING FROM CONTRACT, SLIP AND FALL, SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONTRACTOR DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM)/ESPINAL FACTORS (TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTY ARISING FROM CONTRACT, SLIP AND FALL, SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONTRACTOR DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM)/SLIP AND FALL (SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONTRACTOR DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM)/CONTRACT, TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM  (SLIP AND FALL, SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONTRACTOR DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM)

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STONE WALL ABUTTING A SIDEWALK IS NOT A FEATURE CONSTRUCTED ON THE SIDEWALK, THE SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY, HERE THE WALL OBSTRUCTED PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST’S VIEW AND PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A CAR BACKING ACROSS THE SIDEWALK, PROPERTY OWNER OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property owner’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff bicyclist was struck by a car backing out of a driveway on defendant’s property. It was alleged that both the bicyclist’s and driver’s view was obstructed by a stone fence on defendant’s property abutting the sidewalk. The Fourth Department held that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff. The special use doctrine applies only when a special use of a sidewalk results in a structure on the sidewalk (not the case here):

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that it owed no duty to plaintiff, a user of the public way … . Although plaintiff contends that a duty arose because defendant made a special use out of the sidewalk by virtue of the fact that the driveway passed over the sidewalk, we conclude that the special use doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, there is no alleged defect in the sidewalk or driveway itself … . “In the absence of a special feature constructed in the sidewalk, the special use doctrine will not be applied even if the defendant makes continual, heavy use of the sidewalk”… .

We thus conclude that defendant established that it owed no duty of care to plaintiff. “In the absence of duty, there is no breach and without a breach there is no liability” … . Weston v Martinez, 2017 NY Slip Op 03301, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (STONE WALL ABUTTING A SIDEWALK IS NOT A FEATURE CONSTRUCTED ON THE SIDEWALK, THE SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY, HERE THE WALL OBSTRUCTED PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST’S VIEW AND PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A CAR BACKING ACROSS THE SIDEWALK, PROPERTY OWNER OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF)/SIDEWALKS (SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE, STONE WALL ABUTTING A SIDEWALK IS NOT A FEATURE CONSTRUCTED ON THE SIDEWALK, THE SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY, HERE THE WALL OBSTRUCTED PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST’S VIEW AND PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A CAR BACKING ACROSS THE SIDEWALK, PROPERTY OWNER OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF)/SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE (SIDEWALKS, STONE WALL ABUTTING A SIDEWALK IS NOT A FEATURE CONSTRUCTED ON THE SIDEWALK, THE SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY, HERE THE WALL OBSTRUCTED PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST’S VIEW AND PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A CAR BACKING ACROSS THE SIDEWALK, PROPERTY OWNER OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF)/BICYCLES (STONE WALL ABUTTING A SIDEWALK IS NOT A FEATURE CONSTRUCTED ON THE SIDEWALK, THE SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY, HERE THE WALL OBSTRUCTED PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST’S VIEW AND PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A CAR BACKING ACROSS THE SIDEWALK, PROPERTY OWNER OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF)

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SPEED BUMP NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Fourth Department determined defendants’ summary judgment motion in this slip and fall case was properly denied. A speed bump painted the same color as an adjacent walkway was not open and obvious as a matter of law:

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Contrary to defendants’ contention, we conclude that they failed to establish as a matter of law that the hazard posed by the speed bump was open and obvious and thus that they had no duty to warn plaintiff of a tripping hazard. It is well established that there is no duty to warn of an open and obvious dangerous condition “because in such instances the condition is a warning in itself’ “… . “Whether a hazard is open and obvious cannot be divorced from the surrounding circumstances . . . A condition that is ordinarily apparent to a person making reasonable use of his or her senses may be rendered a trap for the unwary where the condition is obscured or the plaintiff is distracted”… . “Some visible hazards, because of their nature or location, are likely to be overlooked . . . , and the facts here simply do not warrant concluding as a matter of law that the [speed bump] was so obvious that it would necessarily be noticed by any careful observer, so as to make any warning superfluous” … . Schneider v Corporate Place, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03300, 4th Dept 4-28-17

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, SPEED BUMP NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW)/SLIP AND FALL (SPEED BUMP NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW)/SPEED BUMP (SLIP AND FALL, SPEED BUMP NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (SLIP AND FALL, SPEED BUMP NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should not have been granted. There was a question of fact whether the scaffold was an adequate safety device because defendant alleged he was ordered to work on the scaffold when it was not high enough to reach his work area:

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Inasmuch as a modification to the scaffold was required and could have taken hours to be performed, we conclude that there are triable issues of fact whether an adequate safety device was “readily available” for plaintiff’s use … . Moreover, based on plaintiff’s testimony describing the third supervisor’s instructions, we conclude that there are triable issues of fact whether plaintiff chose “for no good reason” not to wait for the scaffold to be modified … . Although the third supervisor denied making such a comment, that denial merely establishes that neither party is entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. Videan v NRG Energy, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03315, 4th Dept 4-28-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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FRAUD ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN A PRIOR PROCEEDING MUST BE ADDRESSED BY A MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT IN THAT PROCEEDING, NOT IN A SECOND PLENARY ACTION.

The Fourth Department determined that a second plenary action for fraud allegedly committed in a foreclosure proceeding is not proper. The proper remedy is a motion to vacate the judgment in the foreclosure proceeding:

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“To the extent that the [amended] complaint alleged fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party committed during the course of the prior litigation, plaintiff[s’] sole remedy was a motion to vacate the court’s prior order pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3). A litigant’s remedy for alleged fraud in the course of a legal proceeding lies exclusively in that lawsuit itself, i.e., by moving pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate the [judgment] due to its fraudulent procurement, not a second plenary action collaterally attacking the” judgment … .

Contrary to plaintiffs’ further contention, this case does not fit within the exception … which applies when the alleged fraud or perjury “is merely a means to the accomplishment of a larger fraudulent scheme,” i.e., one “greater in scope than [that] in the prior proceeding” … .  MAA-Sharda, Inc. v First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 03290, 4th Dept 4-28-17

FRAUD (FRAUD ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN A PRIOR PROCEEDING MUST BE ADDRESSED BY A MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT IN THAT PROCEEDING, NOT IN A SECOND PLENARY ACTION)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FRAUD ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN A PRIOR PROCEEDING MUST BE ADDRESSED BY A MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT IN THAT PROCEEDING, NOT IN A SECOND PLENARY ACTION)

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PROOF INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE INCARCERATED FATHER ABANDONED THE CHILDREN.

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the proof did not demonstrate father, who was incarcerated, abandoned the children. The Fourth Department noted that the failure to offer a meaningful plan for the children’s future is not relevant to an abandonment proceeding:

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A child is deemed abandoned where, for the period six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for abandonment . . . , a parent evinces an intent to forego his or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or her failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or [petitioner], although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from doing so by [petitioner]’ ” … . Here, the evidence established that the father, who was incarcerated for most of the six-month period immediately prior to the filing of the petition, contacted the children or petitioner every month during that period. The father wrote letters to the children and called, met with, and wrote letters to the children’s caseworker. We conclude that the father’s contacts were not minimal, sporadic, or insubstantial … . Moreover, during that period, the father filed a petition seeking custody or visitation with the children, which indicates that he did not intend to forego his parental rights … . Although Family Court’s finding that the father failed to offer a meaningful plan for the children’s future is relevant to a termination proceeding based on permanent neglect… , it is not relevant to a termination proceeding based on abandonment … . Matter of John F. (John F., Jr.), 2017 NY Slip Op 03369, 4th Dept 4-28-17

FAMILY LAW (PROOF INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE INCARCERATED FATHER ABANDONED THE CHILDREN)/ABANDONMENT (FAMILY LAW, PROOF INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE INCARCERATED FATHER ABANDONED THE CHILDREN)

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FAMILY COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER COUNSELING AS A PREREQUISITE FOR FATHER’S VISITATION.

The Fourth Department, after finding father’s physical abuse of mother in the children’s presence justified a modification of custody, determined Family Court did not have the authority to order counseling as a prerequisite to father’s visitation:

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We agree with the father, however, that the court erred to the extent that it ordered that future modification of the father’s visitation is conditioned on completion of a parenting class. “[A]lthough a court may include a directive to obtain counseling as a component of a custody or visitation order, the court does not have the authority to order such counseling as a prerequisite to custody or visitation” … . Thus, “the court lack[s] the authority to condition any future application for modification of [a parent’s] visitation on her [or his] participation in . . . counseling” … . Nevertheless, the court may order that a parent’s completion of counseling and compliance therewith “would constitute a substantial change of circumstances for any future petition for modification of the order” … , provided that “[n]othing in the order prevents the [parent] from supporting a modification petition with a showing of a different change of circumstances” … . We therefore modify the order by striking the provision requiring the father to complete a parenting class as a prerequisite for modification of visitation and substituting therefor a provision directing that he comply with that condition as a component of supervised visitation. Matter of Allen v Boswell, 2017 NY Slip Op 03312, 4th Dept 4-28-17

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER COUNSELING AS A PREREQUISITE FOR FATHER’S VISITATION)/VISITATION (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER COUNSELING AS A PREREQUISITE FOR FATHER’S VISITATION)/COUNSELING (FAMILY LAW, VISITATION, FAMILY COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER COUNSELING AS A PREREQUISITE FOR FATHER’S VISITATION)

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