Page 1051 – New York Appellate Digest

/ Criminal Law, Evidence

PURSUANT TO THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE, THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BELONGINGS AT THE HOSPITAL DID NOT TAINT THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH NEAR DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a detailed decision, over a dissent, determined that the illegal search of defendant’s belongings at the hospital did not taint the subsequent search of an area near defendant’s residence (his uncle’s apartment) which turned up a gun. Defendant, although charged with robbery, was convicted only of criminal possession of a weapon. The victim had been robbed by a masked man who fired a gun in the elevator where the robbery took place. Because the police could not find evidence a shot was fired in the elevator they believed the robber may have shot himself. The police found the defendant at a hospital, suffering from a gunshot wound in his leg. Defendant’s belongings were searched at the hospital and items taken in the robbery were seized. The police spoke with the defendant and his girlfriend and eventually searched the apartment where defendant lived with his uncle, with the uncle’s consent. The majority held that the investigation would have continued even if the illegal search at the hospital had not been conducted. The dissent argued the police would have had no reason to continue the investigation without the items found in the illegal search:

“[W]here the evidence sought to be suppressed is the product of an independent source entirely free and distinct from proscribed police activity, it should be admissible and not subject to a per se rule of exclusion based solely on the unlawful conduct” … . “[T]he independent source rule is applicable . . . [where] there is no causal connection, direct or indirect, proximate or attenuated, between the illegality and the subsequent seizure. In cases where this causal nexus is lacking, the exclusionary rule simply does not apply” … . A key consideration in determining whether this rule applies is whether “the prosecution has somehow exploited or benefitted from its illegal conduct, [whether] there is a connection between the violation of a constitutional right and the derivative evidence” … .

Here, the challenged searches were attenuated from the illegal search of defendant’s clothing bags. When the detective entered the hospital room, his theory of the crime was that it had been committed by a black male who had a gunshot wound to the leg. Defendant fit that description. Thus, we disagree with the dissent’s statement that, even if the search of the clothing bags turned up no evidence, the police “would have had little cause to pursue the investigation, let alone . . . search defendant’s vehicle and home.” To the contrary, regardless of what the detective were to find in defendant’s possession, he was likely to continue investigating defendant as a possible suspect. Such investigation would have included the routine and natural investigatory step of interviewing defendant and his girlfriend, which is what led him to learn about the car and the apartment. Further, none of the items recovered during the illegal search was used to procure defendant’s uncle’s consent to search the apartment, so the police did not engage in “exploitation of [the] illegality” as charged by the defense. People v Hill, 2017 NY Slip Op 0592, First Dept 8-1-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, PURSUANT TO THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE, THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BELONGINGS AT THE HOSPITAL DID NOT TAINT THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH NEAR DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PURSUANT TO THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE, THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BELONGINGS AT THE HOSPITAL DID NOT TAINT THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH NEAR DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE, THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BELONGINGS AT THE HOSPITAL DID NOT TAINT THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH NEAR DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))/INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE (CRIMINAL LAW, PURSUANT TO THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE, THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BELONGINGS AT THE HOSPITAL DID NOT TAINT THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH NEAR DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))

August 01, 2017

/ Criminal Law, Evidence

ADMISSION OF BUSINESS RECORDS WITHOUT THE PROPER FOUNDATION REQUIRED REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a detailed decision describing all the evidence, determined the defendant's attempted murder conviction survived a weight of the evidence analysis, but the admission of documentary evidence was error which required reversal. The victim, Russo, had been shot in the head and could not remember who shot him. Before the grand jury, Russo testified that both the defendant (Bell) and a man named Diaz were in the apartment at the time of the shooting. At trial, however, Russo testified Diaz was not in the apartment. A detective testified Diaz had been interviewed in Florida and provided time sheets on his employer's corporate letterhead indicating he was in Florida at the time of the shooting. Those time sheets were erroneously admitted in evidence without meeting the criteria for the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

… [W]e find that the court committed reversible error in admitting Diaz's time sheets into evidence. The business records of Diaz's employer were admitted without a proper foundation, and the court failed to clearly instruct the jury that the time sheets could not be considered for the truth of their content. The jury was not told that the time sheets could not be relied upon to conclude that Diaz was not in the apartment at the time of the shootings. The business records exception to the hearsay rule is codified in CPLR 4518(a), and it also applies in criminal cases (CPL 60.10) … . For a business record to be admissible, it must be made in the regular course of business, it must be the regular course of business to make the record, and “the record must have been made at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter, assuring that the recollection is fairly accurate and the entries routinely made” … . Business records are customarily offered through a foundation witness, such as the custodian of the records or an employee who is familiar with the record-keeping procedures of the record maker … . …

The People argue that the time sheets were admitted not for the truth of their content, but only to rebut defense counsel's extensive challenges to the adequacy of the police investigation, and that the court's limiting instruction was adequate. The limiting instruction that the court gave was imprecise and confusing. The court only instructed the jury that the time sheets were “being received in evidence as documents which [Detective Hennessey] says reflect what efforts he did and what information he received on a very particular subject matter . . . .” The court did not clearly instruct the jurors that they were not to consider the time sheets in determining whether Diaz was in the apartment at the time of the shootings. This error was not harmless. There was a substantial disputed issue about whether Diaz was the additional person in the apartment, whom [a co-defendant] identified as the shooter. This conclusion was also supported by Russo's grand jury testimony, even though Russo later repudiated it. The time sheets established an alibi for Diaz, that he was in Florida on October 25, 2007. Bell's defense was that he did not shoot Russo, and someone else in the apartment did the shooting. Allowing the time sheets into evidence was not harmless error because there was “a significant probability . . . that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error” … . People v Bell, 2017 NY Slip Op 05919, First Dept 8-1-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, ADMISSION OF BUSINESS RECORDS WITHOUT THE PROPER FOUNDATION REQUIRED REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, BUSINESS RECORDS, ADMISSION OF BUSINESS RECORDS WITHOUT THE PROPER FOUNDATION REQUIRED REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT))/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, BUSINESS RECORDS, ADMISSION OF BUSINESS RECORDS WITHOUT THE PROPER FOUNDATION REQUIRED REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS (CRIMINAL LAW, HEARSAY, ADMISSION OF BUSINESS RECORDS WITHOUT THE PROPER FOUNDATION REQUIRED REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT))

August 01, 2017

/ Criminal Law

THE PEOPLE WERE AWARE OF THEIR WITNESS’S PLANS TO VACATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THE WITNESS’S ABSENCE WAS NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING AN EXCLUSION OF TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the motion court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because of a violation of the speedy trial statute should have been granted. The People were aware of a key witness's plan to vacation out of the country. Therefore, the witness's unavailability could not be considered an “exceptional circumstance” justifying the exclusion of time under the speedy trial statute:

… [T]he mere fact that a necessary witness plans to go on a vacation does not relieve them of their speedy trial obligation … .

… The People knew that their cooperative witness was planning a vacation to the Dominican Republic, yet they failed to call him or to otherwise secure his presence before he left the country. The prosecutor admitted that although learning of the witness's proposed vacation plans on July 25, 2013, and being specifically asked by the witness to contact him the next day to discuss the trial schedule and his proposed vacation, no one from the District Attorney's office tried to contact the witness until July 30, 2013, at which time they learned he had already left on vacation. Although the witness indicated a willingness to work with the prosecutor on scheduling his vacation and had not yet bought his ticket to the Dominican Republic, the prosecutor never subpoenaed the witness, sought a material witness order, or even communicated with him prior to his departure. People v Ricart, 2017 NY Slip Op 05922, First Dept 8-1-17

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, THE PEOPLE WERE AWARE OF THEIR WITNESS'S PLANS TO VACATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THE WITNESS'S ABSENCE WAS NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING AN EXCLUSION OF TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (FIRST DEPT))/SPEEDY TRIAL (THE PEOPLE WERE AWARE OF THEIR WITNESS'S PLANS TO VACATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THE WITNESS'S ABSENCE WAS NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING AN EXCLUSION OF TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (FIRST DEPT))

August 01, 2017

/ Criminal Law

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD RECEIVE JAIL TIME IF HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HE WAS NOT TOLD HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department vacated defendant's guilty plea because, although the court told the defendant he could receive “jail time” if he violated the plea agreement, the defendant was not informed he could be sentenced to state prison:

The court improperly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The record, viewed as a whole, demonstrates that defendant lacked sufficient information about the potential scope of sentencing in the event he violated the plea agreement … . Although the court clearly told defendant that he was pleading guilty to a class D felony, reckless endangerment in the first degree, its repeated statements, over the course of multiple court appearances, that defendant's sentence would involve “jail” time, and its failure to clearly apprise defendant that he could receive a state prison sentence, and the potential maximum term thereof, if he violated the plea agreement, taken together, rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary … . People v Renvill, 2017 NY Slip Op 05921, First Dept 8-1-17

CRIMINAL LAW (GUILTY PLEA, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD RECEIVE JAIL TIME IF HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HE WAS NOT TOLD HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD RECEIVE JAIL TIME IF HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HE WAS NOT TOLD HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT))/PLEA AGREEMENT (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD RECEIVE JAIL TIME IF HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HE WAS NOT TOLD HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT))

August 01, 2017

/ Criminal Law, Workers' Compensation

EMPLOYER DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT CLAIMANT RECEIVED UNREPORTED INCOME FROM THE SALE OF DRUGS, THEREFORE CLAIMANT WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department determined claimant was entitled to resume receiving workers’ compensation benefits when he left prison for offenses related to the sale of drugs. The employer argued claimant should be disqualified because he received benefits while he had unreported income from selling drugs. The Third Department found that the plea allocutions were not sufficient evidence that claimant received income from drug sales:

In support of its assertion that claimant violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a (1), the employer submitted the transcripts of the 2012 plea allocutions resulting in claimant’s convictions for a violation of probation, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. As a result of recording or transcription errors, the transcript of the Alford plea proceeding is, at times, indecipherable. In addition, both transcripts of the 2012 criminal convictions were insufficient to establish that claimant received income while receiving workers’ compensation benefits or that he otherwise concealed his work status. Further, the employer did not submit the certificate of conviction for claimant’s 2010 convictions or the transcript of that underlying plea allocution. Although we agree with the employer that the Board incorrectly analyzed the 2012 criminal proceedings, we do not find that these inaccuracies warrant reversal and remittal to the Board, given that the Board primarily found that there was insufficient evidence to find a violation of Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a … . Matter of Pompeo v Auction Direct USA LP, 2017 NY Slip Op 05910, 3rd Dept 7-27-17

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, EMPLOYER DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT CLAIMANT RECEIVED UNREPORTED INCOME FROM THE SALE OF DRUGS, THEREFORE CLAIMANT WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS 3RD DEPT)/CRIMINAL LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, EMPLOYER DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT CLAIMANT RECEIVED UNREPORTED INCOME FROM THE SALE OF DRUGS, THEREFORE CLAIMANT WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS 3RD DEPT)

July 27, 2017

/ Unemployment Insurance

DESPITE CLAIMANT’S SIGNING A STIPULATION AGREEING TO RESIGN, A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT PROVIDED GOOD CAUSE FOR HER RESIGNATION 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department determined claimant was properly awarded unemployment insurance benefits, despite her signing a stipulation agreeing to resign. The stipulation did not mention any misconduct by the claimant. Claimant’s testimony demonstrated a hostile work environment which provided good cause for her leaving:

As a general proposition, a claimant who voluntarily leaves his or her employment without good cause will not be entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits … , and the same holds true for a claimant who engages in disqualifying misconduct … . That said, “[a] claimant who voluntarily leaves his or her position in the face of disciplinary charges may qualify for unemployment benefits if the actions did not amount to misconduct” … . “Whether a claimant has engaged in disqualifying misconduct is a factual question for the Board to resolve and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence” … .

Claimant and the employer’s witnesses presented competing accounts of claimant’s work history, her work product, her general demeanor and her interaction with others in her office. Without recounting the extensive testimony offered on these points, suffice it to say that the employer portrayed claimant as an insubordinate malcontent who failed to timely and appropriately complete assignments or respond to various emails or directives. Claimant, on the other hand, testified at length as to the “bullying” and harassment that she endured at the hands of her supervisors, recounted the manner in which she was verbally threatened by certain individuals in her office and disputed the employer’s account of her overall work performance. This conflicting testimony presented factual and credibility issues for the Board to resolve … . As noted previously, the stipulation of settlement entered into between claimant and the employer contained no finding or admission of wrongdoing on the part of claimant. Further, upon crediting claimant’s testimony as to the nature of her work environment and her reasons for resigning, the Board agreed with the ALJ’s findings that claimant’s actions did not rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct but, rather, were undertaken in direct response to her “hostile” and “untenable” work environment — an environment that, in turn, provided “a compelling reason for her to resign.” Matter of Cohen (Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 05885, 3rd Dept 7-27-17

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (GOOD CAUSE, DESPITE CLAIMANT’S SIGNING A STIPULATION AGREEING TO RESIGN, A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT PROVIDED GOOD CAUSE FOR HER RESIGNATION 3RD DEPT)/HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DESPITE CLAIMANT’S SIGNING A STIPULATION AGREEING TO RESIGN, A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT PROVIDED GOOD CAUSE FOR HER RESIGNATION 3RD DEPT)

July 27, 2017

/ Trusts and Estates

THE TRUST AGREEMENT INDICATED THE DECEDENT INTENDED A CHARITABLE GIFT BE MADE TO A PARTICULAR LOCAL CATHOLIC SCHOOL WHICH HAD CLOSED, NOT TO THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH HAD OPERATED THE CLOSED SCHOOL 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department determined the intent of the decedent was to support a particular local (Oneonta) Catholic school with a charitable gift. The school had closed in 2011. The trustee wanted to distribute the gift equally to the two other named beneficiaries of the trust. Respondents, St. Mary’s Roman Catholic Church, New York and Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York, which operated the closed school, argued the gift should be made to them. The court looked at the nature of the trust as a whole and determined the intent of the gift was to benefit the particular school which closed, not the larger Roman Catholic church generally:

The gift to the school was “charitable in nature and, for cy pres relief [to be appropriate], it was further necessary that the instrument[] establishing the gift[] revealed a general charitable intent and that circumstances had changed rendering impracticable or impossible strict compliance with the terms of the gift instrument[]”… . Strict compliance with the terms of the trust agreement was impossible due to the closure of the school. We accordingly turn to whether the evidence evinces a general charitable intent on the part of decedent, defined “as a desire to give to charity generally, rather than merely to give to a particular object or institution” … . In answering that question, we will read the trust agreement in its entirety and afford its words “their ordinary and natural meaning” … .

Turning to that agreement, all of the institutions to which decedent made gifts are in the City of Oneonta, Otsego County, suggesting an intent to limit her largesse to organizations in that area. When viewed in that context, a direction to distribute part of the residuary trust corpus “to the [school at] 5588 State Route 7, Oneonta, New York 13820” indicates a desire to support a school at that location rather than religious education projects in general. This reading is bolstered by the silence of the trust agreement as to decedent’s Catholic faith and the absence of gifts to the parish or other Roman Catholic institutions. Matter of Gurney, 2017 NY Slip Op 05902, 3rd Dept 7-27-17

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (CY PRES, THE TRUST AGREEMENT INDICATED THE DECEDENT INTENDED A CHARITABLE GIFT BE MADE TO A PARTICULAR LOCAL CATHOLIC SCHOOL WHICH HAD CLOSED, NOT TO THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH HAD OPERATED THE CLOSED SCHOOL 3RD DEPT)/CY PRES (THE TRUST AGREEMENT INDICATED THE DECEDENT INTENDED A CHARITABLE GIFT BE MADE TO A PARTICULAR LOCAL CATHOLIC SCHOOL WHICH HAD CLOSED, NOT TO THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH HAD OPERATED THE CLOSED SCHOOL 3RD DEPT)/CHARITABLE GIFTS (TRUSTS, CY PRES, THE TRUST AGREEMENT INDICATED THE DECEDENT INTENDED A CHARITABLE GIFT BE MADE TO A PARTICULAR LOCAL CATHOLIC SCHOOL WHICH HAD CLOSED, NOT TO THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH HAD OPERATED THE CLOSED SCHOOL 3RD DEPT)

July 27, 2017

/ Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)

RECORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE HEARING, DETERMINATION ANNULLED AND EXPUNGED 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department annulled and expunged the misbehavior determination because the record did not reflect the petitioner’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be present at the hearing:

“[A]n inmate has a fundamental right to be present at his or her disciplinary hearing and, in order for an inmate to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of that right, he or she must be informed of that right and of the consequences of failing to appear at the hearing” … . Here, while there was testimony at the continuation of the hearing that the correction officers assigned to transport petitioner advised him that the hearing would continue in his absence, a videotape of the interaction between petitioner and the officers that resulted in his refusal to attend the hearing reveals no such advisement. Notably, the correction officer did not elaborate on the reason for petitioner’s refusal, and the Hearing Officer did not inquire … . Although the record also contains a written form, signed by one of the correction officers assigned to transport petitioner to the hearing, attesting to the fact that petitioner was aware of the consequences of his refusal, petitioner did not sign the form and there is no indication on the form or anywhere else in the record as to the steps taken to either “ascertain the legitimacy of petitioner’s refusal or to inform him of . . . the consequences of his failure to [attend]” … to assert that petitioner forfeited his right to be present is unavailing because the hearing was not nearing completion at the time of the refusal. In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that petitioner knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily relinquished his right to attend the hearing … . Matter of Micolo v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 05893, 3rd Dept 7-27-17

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (RECORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE HEARING, DETERMINATION ANNULLED AND EXPUNGED 3RD DEPT)

July 27, 2017

/ Negligence

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S COLLIDING WITH THE REAR OF DEFENDANT’S CAR 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact about a nonnegligent explanation for his colliding with the rear of defendant’s car. Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle when the car in front of him (driven by Daunais) suddenly swerved to the left and plaintiff struck the defendant’s car, which was in front of Daunais. Daunais alleged the defendant suddenly stopped dead in the road and Daunais swerved to the left to avoid colliding with defendant:

It is undisputed that defendant has satisfied his initial summary judgment burden inasmuch as “[a] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle” … . The burden therefore shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . As relevant here, “[e]vidence that the vehicle which was rear-ended came to a sudden and abrupt stop will defeat summary judgment” … .

Although defendant contends that he was attempting to turn into a driveway when plaintiff rear-ended him and that he had appropriately slowed his vehicle and activated his turn signal prior to turning, Daunais contradicted him, testifying that defendant “stopped dead in the road.” Daunais averred that he then “took a chance” and swerved left into the oncoming traffic lane to avoid colliding with defendant’s vehicle. Plaintiff explained that he was unable to do the same because another motorcyclist was by then blocking him from safely veering to the left. Other motorcyclists traveling with plaintiff also testified that they observed Daunais’ van swerve into the oncoming traffic lane to reveal defendant’s vehicle stopped in the road. This proof, when viewed “in the light most favorable to plaintiff and affording him the benefit of every favorable inference”… , demonstrates a triable issue of fact as to whether a nonnegligent explanation exists for the rear-end collision … . Bell v Brown, 2017 NY Slip Op 05898, 3rd Dept 7-27-17

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-END COLLISION, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S COLLIDING WITH THE REAR OF DEFENDANT’S CAR 3RD DEPT)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-END COLLISION, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S COLLIDING WITH THE REAR OF DEFENDANT’S CAR 3RD DEPT)/REAR-END COLLISION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S COLLIDING WITH THE REAR OF DEFENDANT’S CAR 3RD DEPT)

July 27, 2017

/ Insurance Law

THE PROOF OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOST EARNINGS WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NO-FAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s evidence of lost earnings was insufficient to support his claim for no-fault benefits. The insurer’s motion for summary judgment should, therefore, have been granted. The dissenters argued that there was enough evidence of lost earnings to raise a question of fact:

… {The potential employer’s and] plaintiff’s subjective beliefs about the financial health of the parts business and/or their subjective beliefs about plaintiff’s skills are immaterial to the resolution of whether it is reasonable to project that the parts business would have employed plaintiff at a salary of $2,000 a week. In contrast, the uncontradicted evidence that the parts business was failing, that it had not made any efforts to acquire or open an automobile repair shop, and that, even if it had, plaintiff had a demonstrated history of being unable to run a profitable automobile repair shop all bear on the reasonableness of such a projection. That material evidence established as a matter of law that the projection that plaintiff would have received $2,000 a week from the parts business is unreasonable … . Freligh v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05911, 3rd Dept 7-27-17

INSURANCE LAW (NO-FAULT, LOST EARNINGS, THE PROOF OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOST EARNINGS WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NO-FAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 3RD DEPT)/NO-FAULT BENEFITS (LOST EARNINGS, THE PROOF OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOST EARNINGS WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NO-FAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 3RD DEPT)

July 27, 2017

Search Results

PURSUANT TO THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE RULE, THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BELONGINGS AT THE HOSPITAL DID NOT TAINT THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH NEAR DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

ADMISSION OF BUSINESS RECORDS WITHOUT THE PROPER FOUNDATION REQUIRED REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT).

THE PEOPLE WERE AWARE OF THEIR WITNESS’S PLANS TO VACATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THE WITNESS’S ABSENCE WAS NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING AN EXCLUSION OF TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (FIRST DEPT).

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD RECEIVE JAIL TIME IF HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HE WAS NOT TOLD HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

EMPLOYER DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT CLAIMANT RECEIVED UNREPORTED INCOME FROM THE SALE OF DRUGS, THEREFORE CLAIMANT WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS 3RD DEPT.

DESPITE CLAIMANT’S SIGNING A STIPULATION AGREEING TO RESIGN, A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT PROVIDED GOOD CAUSE FOR HER RESIGNATION 3RD DEPT.

THE TRUST AGREEMENT INDICATED THE DECEDENT INTENDED A CHARITABLE GIFT BE MADE TO A PARTICULAR LOCAL CATHOLIC SCHOOL WHICH HAD CLOSED, NOT TO THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH HAD OPERATED THE CLOSED SCHOOL 3RD DEPT.

RECORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE HEARING, DETERMINATION ANNULLED AND EXPUNGED 3RD DEPT.

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S COLLIDING WITH THE REAR OF DEFENDANT’S CAR 3RD DEPT.

THE PROOF OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOST EARNINGS WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NO-FAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 3RD DEPT.

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