You are here: / DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN...

Search Results

/

DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to vacate his judgment of conviction (by guilty plea) should not have been denied without a hearing. Defendant presented evidence he would not have pled guilty had he known his state and federal sentences would not run concurrently:

 

A hearing will be appropriate where a defendant comes forward with “allegations that raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to challenge the presumed validity of a judgment of conviction” … . Here, as the People concede, the evidence submitted by the defendant was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he believed, prior to pleading guilty, based on the advice of his attorney, that his state sentence would run concurrent with his federal sentence and whether he would have rejected the plea agreement in the absence of concurrent sentences … . People v Oquendo, 2017 NY Slip Op 08018, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING  (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/CONVICTION, MOTION TO VACATE  (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))

/

THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined firing 13 shots from a rooftop into a group of people, killing one and wounding two, resulting in a murder and two assault convictions, were not separate events which would support consecutive sentences:

​

Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant’s acts underlying the crimes were separate and distinct. Accordingly, the imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment was improper … . People v Lopez, 2017 NY Slip Op 08016, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT))

/ , ,

PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank should have been allowed to amend its complaint in this foreclosure action to add parties and extend the reach of the action to the entire premises. There was evidence a party acquired title to the entire premises by adverse possession:

​

In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted “unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . Moreover, pursuant to CPLR 1003, “[p]arties may be added at any stage of the action by leave of court” … .

Here, the plaintiff’s proposed cause of action was not “palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . RPAPL 1501 provides that any person who “claims an estate or interest in real property’ may maintain an action against any other person . . . to compel the determination of any claim adverse to that of the plaintiff which the defendant makes, or which it appears from the public records, . . . the defendant might make'”… . Pursuant to RPAPL 1501(5), the interest held by any mortgagee of real property is an “interest in real property” as that phrase is used in article 15… . Thus, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the plaintiff, as mortgagee of the subject premises, asserted a cause of action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL 1501 based on its claim that the mortgage encumbered the entire premises because the mortgagor acquired title to the entire premises by adverse possession … . Moreover, the plaintiff properly sought leave to amend the summons and complaint to add as defendants certain persons who might claim interests in the premises that are adverse to its own interest. Emigrant Sav. Bank v Walters, 2017 NY Slip Op 07976, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMEND COMPLAINT, FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/ADVERSE POSSESSION (FORECLOSURE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))

/ ,

NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined New York Labor Law worker-pay requirements do not apply to work done outside the state:

​

Under New York Law, it is a “settled rule of statutory interpretation, that unless expressly stated otherwise, no legislation is presumed to be intended to operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state enacting it” … .

Article 6 of the New York Labor Law, which contains the unlawful deductions, notice, and record keeping provisions which plaintiffs claim were violated, contains no indication that the provisions were intended to apply when the work in question is performed outside the state. Article 19 of the New York Labor Law, which contains the minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours provisions identified in the complaint, includes a “Statement of Public Policy” which states, in relevant part: “There are persons employed in some occupations in the state of New York at wages insufficient to provide adequate maintenance for themselves and their families…. Employment of persons at these insufficient rates of pay threatens the health and well-being of the people of this state and injures the overall economy” (Labor Law § 650).

Since these statutes do not expressly apply on an extraterritorial basis, plaintiffs’ claims under these provisions, based on labor performed exclusively outside New York, do not state a cause of action under Article 6 or Article 19 of the New York Labor Law … . Rodriguez v KGA Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 07948, First Dept 11-14-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/LABOR LAW (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/JURISDICTION (LABOR LAW STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTES (JURISDICTION, LABOR LAW, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))

/ ,

LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the landlord was not required to insulate the pipe leading to the radiator because the pipe was part of the heating system (which would have been impeded by insulation). Therefore the personal injury action stemming from infant plaintiff’s contact with the hot pipe was properly dismissed:

​

Dismissal of the complaint was warranted in this action for personal injuries sustained when infant plaintiff slipped off the bed and fell against hot pipes that conveyed steam to the radiators in the apartment. The court properly concluded that defendant did not violate its common-law duty to plaintiffs in failing to insulate the hot pipes … . Plaintiffs argue that because the pipes were not the primary source of heat to the apartment, insulation would not have interfered with the functionality of the heating system … . However, even plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that the pipes were part of the heating system and supplied some heat to the room. P.R. v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 07955, First Dept 11-14-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LANDLORD-TENANT, LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT))/HEATING SYSTEMS  (LANDLORD-TENANT, LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT))

/ ,

LEASE WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER DID NOT REQUIRE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE YARD OUTSIDE THE BUILDING, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE STEPPED INTO A HOLE DUG BY PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER IN THE YARD, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the defendant landlord’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted in this personal injury action. The property was leased to plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff’s employer was doing construction work in the yard outside the building. Plaintiff fell into a hole dug by his employer in the yard. The lease imposed repair responsibilities on the landlord for the building only, not the yard:

​

The subject lease provided that defendant “shall maintain and repair the public portions of the building, both interior and exterior [and that]. . .[t]enant shall, throughout the term of this lease, take good care of the demised premises. . .and at its sole cost and expense, make all non-structural repairs. . .when needed to preserve them in good working order and condition.” Here, testimony established that the accident did not occur in a public portion of the building, but rather in the backyard that was exclusively controlled by plaintiff’s employer, thereby not implicating an area that defendant had retained the responsibility to maintain … . Similarly, the evidence demonstrated that, in actual practice, defendant did nothing to show that it had the authority to maintain or repair the accident premises … .

Furthermore, although the lease states that defendant had the right to reenter the premises to make repairs, plaintiff has failed to show that defendant violated a specific statutory safety provision, or that the hole in which he stepped was a structural defect … .

Plaintiff’s reference to an OSHA provision that was allegedly violated by defendant is unavailing, because defendant was not plaintiff’s employer … . Martinez v 3801 Equity Co., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 07938, First Dept 11-14-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LANDLORD-TENANT, LEASE WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER DID NOT REQUIRE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE YARD OUTSIDE THE BUILDING, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE STEPPED INTO A HOLE DUG BY PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER IN THE YARD, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, LEASE WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER DID NOT REQUIRE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE YARD OUTSIDE THE BUILDING, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE STEPPED INTO A HOLE DUG BY PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER IN THE YARD, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

/

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S TRUCK WAS IN THE WRONG LANE, THE POSITION OF THE TRUCK FURNISHED A CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS WEAVING IN AND OUT OF TRAFFIC ON HIS MOTORCYCLE AT HIGH SPEED WHEN HE STRUCK A CAR, AND WAS THROWN UNDER THE TRUCK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant trucking company’s motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case was properly granted. Plaintiff’s decedent was weaving in and out of traffic at high speed on his motorcycle when he struck the rear of a car, was thrown under and tractor trailer, and run over by the rear wheels. The truck was in a lane where truck traffic was prohibited. The court held the position of the truck furnished the condition for the accident but was not the proximate cause of the accident:

​

Defendants made a prima facie showing that decedent’s negligent operation of the motorcycle caused the accident… . Further, although defendants acknowledge that the tractor-trailer was unlawfully in the left lane at the time of the accident … , there is no evidence in the record that would support a finding that the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the accident. The presence of the tractor-trailer in the left lane merely furnished the condition that led to decedent’s death, and was not a proximate cause of the accident … . Nor is there any nonspeculative basis for finding that defendant driver could have avoided the accident.

Plaintiffs failed to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether any negligence on the part of defendants was a substantial factor in causing the accident. Although plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to depose defendant driver, they failed to demonstrate the existence of any testimony by defendant driver relevant to defendant’s summary judgment motion. Caro v Chesnick, 2017 NY Slip Op 07940, First Dept 11-14-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S TRUCK WAS IN THE WRONG LANE, THE POSITION OF THE TRUCK FURNISHED A CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS WEAVING IN AND OUT OF TRAFFIC ON HIS MOTORCYCLE AT HIGH SPEED WHEN HE STRUCK A CAR, AND WAS THROWN UNDER THE TRUCK (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PROXIMATE CAUSE, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S TRUCK WAS IN THE WRONG LANE, THE POSITION OF THE TRUCK FURNISHED A CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS WEAVING IN AND OUT OF TRAFFIC ON HIS MOTORCYCLE AT HIGH SPEED WHEN HE STRUCK A CAR, AND WAS THROWN UNDER THE TRUCK (FIRST DEPT))/CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PROXIMATE CAUSE, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S TRUCK WAS IN THE WRONG LANE, THE POSITION OF THE TRUCK FURNISHED A CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS WEAVING IN AND OUT OF TRAFFIC ON HIS MOTORCYCLE AT HIGH SPEED WHEN HE STRUCK A CAR, AND WAS THROWN UNDER THE TRUCK (FIRST DEPT))/PROXIMATE CAUSE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PROXIMATE CAUSE, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S TRUCK WAS IN THE WRONG LANE, THE POSITION OF THE TRUCK FURNISHED A CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS WEAVING IN AND OUT OF TRAFFIC ON HIS MOTORCYCLE AT HIGH SPEED WHEN HE STRUCK A CAR, AND WAS THROWN UNDER THE TRUCK (FIRST DEPT))

/

STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT MET IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate it had met the statutory notice requirements of the Real Property Actions and Proceeding Law (RPAPL). Therefore the bank’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied:

​

RPAPL 1304 notice “shall be sent by [the] lender, assignee (including purchasing investor) or mortgage loan servicer to the borrower, by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail to the last known address of the borrower, and to the residence that is the subject of the mortgage” (RPAPL 1304[2]). Proper service of a RPAPL 1304 notice containing the statutorily-mandated content is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action, and plaintiff has the burden of establishing its strict compliance with this condition … .

​

Plaintiff failed to establish that it strictly complied with RPAPL 1304. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit of its loan servicer, supported by copies of the 90-day notice it alleges was served and a copy of the unsigned, undated return receipt. These documents were insufficient to establish plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. In the affidavit, the loan servicer’s vice president of loan documentation fails to demonstrate a familiarity with the servicer’s mailing practices and procedures. Therefore, plaintiff did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure … . Moreover, portions of the receipt in the record are blank, and an undated and unsigned return receipt is not sufficient to establish proof of the actual mailing … . HSBC Bank USA v Rice, 2017 NY Slip Op 07936, First Dept 11-14-17

 

FORECLOSURE (STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT MET IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/NOTICE (FORECLOSURE, STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT MET IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT MET IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

/ , , ,

WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff’s whistleblower (Labor Law 740) cause of action in the amended complaint was not time-barred because defendant had timely notice of the facts underlying the claim in the original complaint. The relation-back doctrine applied. The court further held that the gender discrimination action under the Human Rights Law was separate and distinct from the whistleblower cause of action:

​

The court properly applied the relation back doctrine (CPLR 203[f]) to plaintiff’s whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Law § 740, which requires such actions to be commenced within one year of the alleged retaliatory action (Labor Law § 740[4][a]). Although that claim was not asserted until the Second Amended Complaint, filed on October 19, 2015, more than one year after her termination on February 4, 2014, the original complaint, filed on January 31, 2015, alleged that on February 3, 2014, plaintiff reported to the defendants’ Business Practices Office defendants’ improper practices regarding its procurement of chemicals to manufacture its highest grossing drug, and that those practices did not comply with FDA regulations. It further alleged that she was terminated the next day in retaliation for that conduct. …

​

The motion court correctly concluded that Labor Law § 740(7), the “election-of-remedies” provision, does not waive plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) (Executive Law § 296) because, in alleging discrimination on account of plaintiff’s gender, national origin, and religion, plaintiff does not seek the same rights and remedies as she does in connection with her whistleblowing claim, notwithstanding that both claims allege that she was wrongfully terminated … . Demir v Sandoz Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 07961, First Dept 11-14-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/LABOR LAW (WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 203 (RELATION BACK, WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/DISCRIMINATION (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW, WHISTLEBLOWER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE AND DID NOT WAIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))

/

PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR A WITNESS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing because the witness he requested could have provided relevant information. The request should not have been denied by the hearing officer:

 

… [P]etitioner was improperly denied a witness. The Hearing Officer denied petitioner’s request to question a correction officer who searched the empty cell on the day prior to that upon which petitioner was alleged to have thrown the bottle, and petitioner claimed that the officer could confirm that the bottle was already in the empty cell. Contrary to the Hearing Officer’s conclusion, the testimony of this correction officer regarding whether the bottle was already in the empty cell would not have been irrelevant. Matter of Castillo v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 07922, Third Dept 11-9-17

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR A WITNESS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy