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COMPLEX DECISION EXPLAINING BLACK LETTER LAW ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION, CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION, AND INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court in a complex action involving Labor Law 240(1), 241(6), 200 and common law negligence causes of action, as well as several contractual and implied indemnification issues, and insurance coverage and duty to defend and indemnify issues. The decision lays out the black letter law on all the issues, illustrates how the appellate courts analyze summary judgment motions, and is well worth reading for an overview of the complexity of a construction accident case involving property owners, several insurance policies, and layers of contractors. Plaintiff fell off a ladder that had been placed on an uneven floor. There are too many substantive issues to fairly summarize them here. With respect to the Labor Law issues, the court wrote:

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The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the defendants’ liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. … The plaintiff used the last available ladder in his work area. According to the plaintiff, this ladder was missing two of its rubber feet, and was missing the lowest rung. The plaintiff testified that the floor was “not finished” and that it was partially covered in concrete and partially covered in rubble. The plaintiff indicated that there were “all types of things” strewn on the ground and that the floor “was not level.” The plaintiff stated that, as he was standing on the ladder to perform his work, the ladder “shook,” and he “lost [his] balance” and fell.

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The … defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as it was based on Industrial Code … . Contrary to their contention, the …defendants did not make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . …

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“Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories: namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” … . “These two categories should be viewed in the disjunctive” … . Where, as here, “an accident is alleged to involve both a dangerous condition on the premises and the means and methods’ of the work, a defendant moving for summary judgment with respect to causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards” … .

Here, in moving for summary judgment, the defendants failed to address the allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff was injured due to the dangerous or defective premises conditions at the work site. Furthermore, contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the plaintiff was not ultimately required to demonstrate that the Mall defendants actually exercised supervisory control.

“[W]hen the manner and method of work is at issue in a Labor Law § 200 analysis” the issue is “whether the defendant had the authority to supervise or control the work” … . “A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” … .

Here, the defendants failed to establish that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the work performed by the plaintiff. Poalacin v Mall Props., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08027, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (COMPLEX DECISION EXPLAINING BLACK LETTER LAW ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION, CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION, AND INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/INSURANCE LAW (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, COMPLEX DECISION EXPLAINING BLACK LETTER LAW ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION, CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION, AND INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, COMPLEX DECISION EXPLAINING BLACK LETTER LAW ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION, CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION, AND INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, COMPLEX DECISION EXPLAINING BLACK LETTER LAW ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION, CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION, AND INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS ATTEMPTING TO PUSH A HEAVY DOLLY UP A RAMP WHEN IT ROLLED BACK AND INJURED HIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing in part Supreme Court, determined defendants were not entitled to  summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff was attempting to push a dolly carrying sheet rock weighing 1000 pounds up a ramp when the dolly rolled back, injuring him. The Second Department also held that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action were properly granted because defendants did not have supervisory control over the manner of plaintiff’s work:

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Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the elevation differential between the worker and the loaded dolly while on a four-to-five-foot-high ramp “cannot be viewed as de minimis, particularly given the weight of the object and the amount of force it was capable of generating” … . Indeed, in opposition to the defendants’ original motion, the plaintiff’s expert averred that the 16 pieces of sheetrock loaded onto the dolly weighed more than 1000 pounds. Here, given the amount of force generated by the dolly rolling uncontrollably down the temporary ramp, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that Labor Law § 240(1) is not applicable on the ground that the injury did not result from a gravity-related or elevation-related hazard … . Kandatyan v 400 Fifth Realty, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 07984, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS ATTEMPTING TO PUSH A HEAVY DOLLY UP A RAMP WHEN IT ROLLED BACK AND INJURED HIM (SECOND DEPT))

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PARTY IS DEEMED TO HAVE READ A SIGNED DOCUMENT, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE ON THIS CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE PROPERLY GRANTED, BANKING LAW REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the judgment of foreclosure and sale was properly granted. Defendant claimed he was tricked into signing the construction mortgage. The Second Department noted that a construction mortgage is not subject to the requirements of Banking Law §§ 6-l and 590. And the Second Department held that a party is deemed to have read a signed document:

 

“A party who executes a contract is presumed to know its contents and to assent to them”… .Thus, “[a] party who signs a document without any valid excuse for having failed to read it is conclusively bound by its terms” … , “unless there is a showing of fraud, duress, or some other wrongful act on the part of any party to the contract” … . “The elements of a cause of action sounding in fraud are a material misrepresentation of an existing fact, made with knowledge of the falsity, an intent to induce reliance thereon, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damages” … . Here, the defendant failed to establish the element of justifiable reliance on alleged misrepresentations … , since the documents were provided to him, and he and his attorney could have read them. Nor has the defendant established any other valid excuse for his purported failure to read the construction mortgage and related documents before signing them. Prompt Mtge. Providers of N. Am., LLC v Zarour, 2017 NY Slip Op 08028, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

FORECLOSURE (PARTY IS DEEMED TO HAVE READ A SIGNED DOCUMENT, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE ON THIS CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGES (FORECLOSURE, BANKING LAW REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/BANKING LAW (FORECLOSURE, BANKING LAW REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FORECLOSURE, PARTY IS DEEMED TO HAVE READ A SIGNED DOCUMENT, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE ON THIS CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MORTGAGES (CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGES, FORECLOSURE, BANKING LAW REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE (SECOND DEPT))

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SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the separation agreement should not have been interpreted to require that the cost of college tuition be split 50-50. The agreement simply capped each party’s contribution at 50%. Family Court must determine the proper contribution based upon resources. The wife’s failure to pay anything, however, violated the agreement:

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Here, the parties agreed to “share in the costs of the child’s higher education,” with such contribution being capped at 50% of tuition at a state university, plus the cost of reasonable living expenses. By its plain language, the disputed provision unequivocally demonstrates that the parties intended to encourage and facilitate the child’s pursuit of a college degree and to make some financial contribution — up to, but not necessarily equaling, 50% of the total cost of tuition at a state university — toward that pursuit. In agreeing to contribute, the parties did not use language such as “split” or “50-50,” despite such language appearing elsewhere in the separation agreement, including in the sections addressing dependent care expenses and the cost of health insurance coverage. Given the appearance of such language elsewhere in the agreement, its absence in the relevant provision is telling, as it suggests that the parties did not intend, as Family Court found, to equally split the total cost of the child’s college tuition — subject to the cap — and living expenses … .. Furthermore, while the separation agreement provided that each party’s financial exposure would not exceed the tuition cap, it stopped short of defining the parties’ respective obligations. The absence of language defining their obligations does not render the provision ambiguous. Rather, by its omission, it is apparent that the parties contemplated a later agreement between themselves and, failing that, a subsequent determination by the court as to their respective contributions … .Thus, while we agree that the mother’s failure to contribute anything toward the cost of the child’s college education constituted a willful violation of the separation agreement, Family Court erred in concluding that the parties intended to equally share the total cost of the child’s college tuition and living expenses, subject to the tuition cap, and entering a judgment against the mother in the amount of $28,377.50. Matter of Dillon v Dillon, 2017 NY Slip Op 08062, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

FAMILY LAW (SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW,  SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO , OLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))/SEPARATION AGREEMENT (FAMILY LAW, CONTRACT LAW, SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))/COLLEGE EXPENSES (FAMILY LAW, SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))

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GUARANTOR OF A CRIMINALLY USURIOUS LOAN WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION SEEKING PAYMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant Jarvis, who guaranteed payment on a note, was entitled to summary judgment because the loan was criminally usurious. The plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel in pais:

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Jarvis established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that the interest rate on the loan was criminally usurious; a loan that is criminally usurious is void … . In opposition to that prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The doctrine of estoppel in pais provides that “a borrower may be estopped from interposing a usury defense when, through a special relationship with the lender, the borrower induces reliance on the legality of the transaction. . . . Otherwise, a borrower could void the transaction, keep the principal, and achieve a total windfall, at the expense of an innocent person, through his own subterfuge and inequitable deception'” … . Here, the plaintiff did not submit any evidence of a special relationship … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in finding that triable issues of fact exist regarding the doctrine of estoppel in pais. Kingsize Entertainment, LLC v Martino, 2017 NY Slip Op 07986, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

DEBTOR-CREDITOR (USURY, GUARANTOR OF A CRIMINALLY USURIOUS LOAN WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION SEEKING PAYMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/USURY (GUARANTOR OF A CRIMINALLY USURIOUS LOAN WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION SEEKING PAYMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/ESTOPPEL IN PAIS (USURY, GUARANTOR OF A CRIMINALLY USURIOUS LOAN WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION SEEKING PAYMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to vacate his judgment of conviction (by guilty plea) should not have been denied without a hearing. Defendant presented evidence he would not have pled guilty had he known his state and federal sentences would not run concurrently:

 

A hearing will be appropriate where a defendant comes forward with “allegations that raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to challenge the presumed validity of a judgment of conviction” … . Here, as the People concede, the evidence submitted by the defendant was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he believed, prior to pleading guilty, based on the advice of his attorney, that his state sentence would run concurrent with his federal sentence and whether he would have rejected the plea agreement in the absence of concurrent sentences … . People v Oquendo, 2017 NY Slip Op 08018, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING  (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))/CONVICTION, MOTION TO VACATE  (DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT))

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THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined firing 13 shots from a rooftop into a group of people, killing one and wounding two, resulting in a murder and two assault convictions, were not separate events which would support consecutive sentences:

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Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant’s acts underlying the crimes were separate and distinct. Accordingly, the imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment was improper … . People v Lopez, 2017 NY Slip Op 08016, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING THE KILLING OF ONE PERSON AND WOUNDING OF TWO BY FIRING 13 SHOTS INTO A GROUP OF PEOPLE FROM A ROOFTOP WERE NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES, SENTENCES MUST BE CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank should have been allowed to amend its complaint in this foreclosure action to add parties and extend the reach of the action to the entire premises. There was evidence a party acquired title to the entire premises by adverse possession:

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In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted “unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . Moreover, pursuant to CPLR 1003, “[p]arties may be added at any stage of the action by leave of court” … .

Here, the plaintiff’s proposed cause of action was not “palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . RPAPL 1501 provides that any person who “claims an estate or interest in real property’ may maintain an action against any other person . . . to compel the determination of any claim adverse to that of the plaintiff which the defendant makes, or which it appears from the public records, . . . the defendant might make'”… . Pursuant to RPAPL 1501(5), the interest held by any mortgagee of real property is an “interest in real property” as that phrase is used in article 15… . Thus, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the plaintiff, as mortgagee of the subject premises, asserted a cause of action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL 1501 based on its claim that the mortgage encumbered the entire premises because the mortgagor acquired title to the entire premises by adverse possession … . Moreover, the plaintiff properly sought leave to amend the summons and complaint to add as defendants certain persons who might claim interests in the premises that are adverse to its own interest. Emigrant Sav. Bank v Walters, 2017 NY Slip Op 07976, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMEND COMPLAINT, FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/ADVERSE POSSESSION (FORECLOSURE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF BANK SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING PARTIES AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE ACTION TO THE ENTIRE PREMISES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))

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NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined New York Labor Law worker-pay requirements do not apply to work done outside the state:

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Under New York Law, it is a “settled rule of statutory interpretation, that unless expressly stated otherwise, no legislation is presumed to be intended to operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state enacting it” … .

Article 6 of the New York Labor Law, which contains the unlawful deductions, notice, and record keeping provisions which plaintiffs claim were violated, contains no indication that the provisions were intended to apply when the work in question is performed outside the state. Article 19 of the New York Labor Law, which contains the minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours provisions identified in the complaint, includes a “Statement of Public Policy” which states, in relevant part: “There are persons employed in some occupations in the state of New York at wages insufficient to provide adequate maintenance for themselves and their families…. Employment of persons at these insufficient rates of pay threatens the health and well-being of the people of this state and injures the overall economy” (Labor Law § 650).

Since these statutes do not expressly apply on an extraterritorial basis, plaintiffs’ claims under these provisions, based on labor performed exclusively outside New York, do not state a cause of action under Article 6 or Article 19 of the New York Labor Law … . Rodriguez v KGA Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 07948, First Dept 11-14-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/LABOR LAW (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/JURISDICTION (LABOR LAW STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTES (JURISDICTION, LABOR LAW, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATUTES, APPLICATION OUT-OF-STATE, NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT))

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LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the landlord was not required to insulate the pipe leading to the radiator because the pipe was part of the heating system (which would have been impeded by insulation). Therefore the personal injury action stemming from infant plaintiff’s contact with the hot pipe was properly dismissed:

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Dismissal of the complaint was warranted in this action for personal injuries sustained when infant plaintiff slipped off the bed and fell against hot pipes that conveyed steam to the radiators in the apartment. The court properly concluded that defendant did not violate its common-law duty to plaintiffs in failing to insulate the hot pipes … . Plaintiffs argue that because the pipes were not the primary source of heat to the apartment, insulation would not have interfered with the functionality of the heating system … . However, even plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that the pipes were part of the heating system and supplied some heat to the room. P.R. v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 07955, First Dept 11-14-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LANDLORD-TENANT, LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT))/HEATING SYSTEMS  (LANDLORD-TENANT, LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSULATE A PIPE BECAUSE IT WAS PART OF THE HEATING SYSTEM, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY CONTACT WITH THE HOT PIPE (FIRST DEPT))

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