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DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION AFTER ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, WRONG ADVICE WARRANTED VACATING THE PLEA DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ARGUMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the wrong advice about whether defendant could appeal after pleading guilty warranted reversal, despite the failure to preserved the error. Defendant was told he could appeal the denial of his speedy trial motion:

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A defendant forfeits his right to appellate review of a CPL 30.30 motion upon a guilty plea … . However, here, the record is clear that the court misadvised defendant that he could pursue his 30.30 claim on appeal of a guilty plea … . Neither the defense counsel nor the prosecutor corrected the court’s misadvice. Moreover, defendant accepted a lengthier sentence, and declined to replead to a different offense with a shorter prison sentence, based on this misstatement that his 30.30 claim could be raised on appeal. Under the totality of these circumstances, defendant’s plea is vacated and the matter remanded … . As defendant had no practical ability to object to the error because he was sentenced on the date the misstatement occurred, … , he was not required to preserve his argument. People v Sanchez, 2017 NY Slip Op 08193, First Dept 11-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION AFTER ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, WRONG ADVICE WARRANTED VACATING THE PLEA DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ARGUMENT (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION AFTER ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, WRONG ADVICE WARRANTED VACATING THE PLEA DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ARGUMENT (FIRST DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA, VACATION OF (DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION AFTER ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, WRONG ADVICE WARRANTED VACATING THE PLEA DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ARGUMENT (FIRST DEPT))

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FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN ACQUITTAL ON THE TOP COUNT BASED UPON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED ACQUITTAL ON THE REMAINING CHARGES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, noted the jury should have been informed that an acquittal on the top count (second degree murder) based on the justification defense required an acquittal on the remaining charges. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Although the error was not preserved for appeal, the court exercised its interest of justice jurisdiction:

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As in cases such as People v Velez (131 AD3d 129 [1st Dept 2015]), the court’s charge failed to convey that an acquittal on the top count of second-degree murder based on a finding of justification would preclude consideration of the remaining charges. We find that this error was not harmless and warrants reversal in the interest of justice … . People v Santiago, 2017 NY Slip Op 08190, First Dept 11-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN ACQUITTAL ON THE TOP COUNT BASED UPON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED ACQUITTAL ON THE REMAINING CHARGES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN ACQUITTAL ON THE TOP COUNT BASED UPON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED ACQUITTAL ON THE REMAINING CHARGES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FIRST DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN ACQUITTAL ON THE TOP COUNT BASED UPON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED ACQUITTAL ON THE REMAINING CHARGES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FIRST DEPT))/JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT AN ACQUITTAL ON THE TOP COUNT BASED UPON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED ACQUITTAL ON THE REMAINING CHARGES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FIRST DEPT))

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2ND DEPT USED THE WRONG STANDARD FOR APPLYING THE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE EXEMPTION TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS, CASE REMITTED, PETITIONER SOUGHT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO A REVIEW OF HIS SEX OFFENSE CASE WHICH WAS PROSECUTED AMID NATIONWIDE HYSTERIA OVER ALLEGATIONS OF RITUAL ABUSE AT DAY CARE CENTERS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge partial dissent, determined that the standard for the confidentiality-source exemption for documents sought under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) in the 2nd Department was incorrect and remitted the matter. The requested documents relate to a review of petitioner’s conviction by a panel specifically created for that review. Petitioner had pled guilty to several sex offenses at a time when a hysteria surrounding allegations of ritual child abuse at day care centers was sweeping the country:

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The legislature’s policy of broad public access, as expressed in FOIL, dictates that the exemption for confidential sources and information be narrowly circumscribed. Therefore disclosure under FOIL can only be refused pursuant to section 87 (2) (e) (iii) if the agency presents a “particularized and specific justification for denying access” … , based on an express promise of confidentiality to the source, or by establishing that, under the circumstances of the particular case, the confidentiality of the source or information can be reasonably inferred.

Application of this rule is case and information specific, and depends on the particular facts and circumstances. In determining whether information obtained in the course of a criminal investigation should be treated as confidential or whether a source spoke on the assumption that the source’s identity or statements would remain confidential, courts may consider, as they deem relevant, such factors as the nature of the crime, the source of the information in relation to the crime, and the content of the statements or information. Where the content of a statement or information and the circumstances surrounding its compilation by law enforcement convince a court that its confidentiality can be reasonably inferred, it may be withheld or released with appropriate redactions pursuant to section 87 (2) (e) (iii). Otherwise, absent an explicit assurance of confidentiality, it may not be withheld or redacted under that FOIL exemption.

Here, because the [2nd] Department majority misconstrued the FOIL exemption asserted by respondent, the order below must be reversed and the matter remitted for consideration under the correct standard. Matter of Friedman v Rice, 2017 NY Slip Op 08167, CtApp 11-21-17

 

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (2ND DEPARTMENT USED THE WRONG STANDARD FOR APPLYING THE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE EXEMPTION TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS, CASE REMITTED, PETITIONER SOUGHT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO A REVIEW OF HIS SEX OFFENSE CASE WHICH WAS PROSECUTED AMID NATIONWIDE HYSTERIA OVER ALLEGATIONS OF RITUAL ABUSE AT DAY CARE CENTERS (CT APP))/CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE EXEMPTION (FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL), 2ND DEPARTMENT USED THE WRONG STANDARD FOR APPLYING THE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE EXEMPTION TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS, CASE REMITTED, PETITIONER SOUGHT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO A REVIEW OF HIS SEX OFFENSE CASE WHICH WAS PROSECUTED AMID NATIONWIDE HYSTERIA OVER ALLEGATIONS OF RITUAL ABUSE AT DAY CARE CENTERS (CT APP))

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TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT INQUIRE INTO DEFENDANT’S SERIOUS REQUEST FOR ANOTHER ATTORNEY, CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial because the trial judge did not conduct a sufficient inquiry into defendant’s request for another attorney:

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We agree with defendant that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into his “seemingly serious request[]” to substitute counsel … . Defendant’s request was supported by “specific factual allegations of ‘serious complaints about counsel'” … , and a “minimal inquiry” into “the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” was warranted … . Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct such an inquiry. People v Smith, 2017 NY Slip Op 08165, CtApp 11-21-17

Similar issue and result in People v Dodson, 2017 NY Slip Op 08171, CtApp 11-21-17

CRIMINAL LAW (ATTORNEYS, TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT INQUIRE INTO DEFENDANT’S SERIOUS REQUEST FOR ANOTHER ATTORNEY, CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW,  TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT INQUIRE INTO DEFENDANT’S SERIOUS REQUEST FOR ANOTHER ATTORNEY, CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP))

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WHOLLY ARBITRARY DECISION BY COOPERATIVE BOARD TO RESCIND PLAINTIFF’S PURCHASE CONTRACT NOT SHIELDED BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the cooperative board’s rescission of plaintiff’s purchase contract was wholly arbitrary and was not shielded by the business judgment rule:

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Plaintiffs’ application to purchase a unit in defendants’ cooperative residential complex was approved by defendant Board of Directors, and then rescinded two weeks later, based upon a Board member’s erroneous report that plaintiff Richard Kallop told her he did not intend to reside in the complex, as required by the purchase contract. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, to compel defendants to permit the sale to go forward. After defendants filed their answer, plaintiffs, by order to show cause, sought an order permitting the sale to close. An evidentiary hearing was held, at which the reporting Board member’s testimony revealed that Richard Kallop had not, as she claimed, informed her he intended to reside outside the cooperative complex. For his part, Richard testified that it had always been his plan to reside in the cooperative unit with his elderly mother, co-plaintiff Joan Kallop.

Under these facts, we conclude that defendants’ decision to rescind its approval of plaintiffs’ purchase application, being without any basis in reason and without regard to the facts, was wholly arbitrary, and thus not entitled to the protections generally provided to cooperative boards by the business judgment rule … . Kallop v Board of Directors for Edgewater Park Owners’ Coop. Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08174, First Dept 11-21-17

 

COOPERATIVES (WHOLLY ARBITRARY DECISION BY COOPERATIVE BOARD TO RESCIND PLAINTIFF’S PURCHASE CONTRACT NOT SHIELDED BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (FIRST DEPT))/BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (COOPERATIVES, WHOLLY ARBITRARY DECISION BY COOPERATIVE BOARD TO RESCIND PLAINTIFF’S PURCHASE CONTRACT NOT SHIELDED BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (FIRST DEPT))

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, over a dissent, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Plaintiff tripped over a cord tied to a barrel in a parking lot. The majority offered no factual explanation for the reversal. Lau v Margaret E. Pescatore Parking, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08170, CtApp 11-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (CT APP))/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (CT APP))

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GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing the appellate division, over a two-judge concurring opinion, determined a Georgia burglary statute was equivalent to a New York violent felony and therefore defendant was properly sentenced as and second violent felony offender. The Georgia statute does not explicitly include intent as an element. However, a lesser included offense (the Georgia criminal trespass statute) in the Georgia includes a “knowingly” element:

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Under Georgia statutory law, “[a] crime is included in another crime” … — i.e., a crime is a lesser included offense of another crime — when, among other things, “[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charged” … . …

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Georgia statutory law further provides that “[a] person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority . . . [e]nters upon the land or premises of another person . . . for an unlawful purpose” … . Georgia case law, in turn, provides that criminal trespass is (and was at the time defendant violated the subject Georgia statute) a lesser included offense of burglary … . Inasmuch as the “lesser” Georgia crime of criminal trespass contains a “knowingly” mens rea … , the “entry” component of the “greater” Georgia burglary statute in question … necessarily must have a culpable mental state of at least “knowingly.” In other words, the mental state for the greater crime logically cannot be less than the mental state for the lesser crime and, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Georgia crime corresponds to a New York violent felony … . People v Helms, 2017 NY Slip Op 08160, CtApp 11-20-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP))/SENTENCING (SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER, GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP))/SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SENTENCING, GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP))/

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CAYMAN ISLANDS RULE GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IS PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE DOES NOT BAR SUIT IN NEW YORK (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, reversing the appellate division, determined that a Cayman Islands rule (Rule 12A) governing prerequisites for bringing a shareholder derivative action was procedural, not substantive. Therefore the New York suit, which must apply Cayman Islands substantive law, should not have been dismissed for failure to comply with the rule. Whether plaintiff had standing to sue under substantive Cayman Islands law was not determined by the Court of Appeals:

 

In Tanges [93 NY2d 48] we … described general policy considerations that ought to be weighed when determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural. Specifically, we consider whether our determination would impose a burden on the foreign court (Connecticut in that instance) or federal courts operating under diversity rules and whether it would threaten to cause delay in the “conduct of judicial business and impair judicial efficiency” … . Here, these factors further weigh in favor of our conclusion that Rule 12A is procedural.

Holding that Rule 12A is procedural does not impose a burden on our courts, or the courts of the Cayman Islands (see Tanges, 93 NY2d at 58). However, were Rule 12A held to be substantive, it is unclear what procedural path a party seeking to bring a derivative action in New York on behalf of a Cayman company would follow to comply with Rule 12A. …

Therefore, a Tanges analysis also leads to the conclusion that Rule 12A is procedural in nature. Because the procedural law of the forum typically applies under our conflict of law rules … , plaintiff’s failure to first comply with Rule 12A’s leave application procedure does not bar his derivative claims … . Davis v Scottish Re Group Ltd., 2017 NY Slip Op 08157, CtApp 11-20-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION, CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW, CAYMAN ISLANDS RULE GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IS PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE DOES NOT BAR SUIT IN NEW YORK (CT APP))/CORPORATION LAW  (SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION, CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW, CAYMAN ISLANDS RULE GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IS PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE DOES NOT BAR SUIT IN NEW YORK (CT APP))/SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION (CORPORATION LAW, CAYMAN ISLANDS RULE GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IS PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE DOES NOT BAR SUIT IN NEW YORK (CT APP))/DERIVATIVE ACTION (SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION, CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW, CAYMAN ISLANDS RULE GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IS PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE DOES NOT BAR SUIT IN NEW YORK (CT APP))/CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION, CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW, CAYMAN ISLANDS RULE GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IS PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE DOES NOT BAR SUIT IN NEW YORK (CT APP))

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INSURANCE LAW 3240 ALLOWS A DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST INSURERS IF THE INSUREDS AND RISKS ARE IN NEW YORK, NOT ONLY WHEN THE POLICY IS ISSUED OR DELIVERED IN NEW YORK (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three judge dissenting opinion, reversing the appellate division, determined several motions to dismiss in this insurance-coverage dispute should not have been granted. Plaintiff’s decedent was killed when a DHL delivery truck driven by an employee of another company crossed the center line, causing a head-on crash. At issue was the reach of Insurance Law 3240 with respect to an insurance policy issued to DHL by AAIC. The appellate division held that Insurance Law 3240 did not allow suit because the policy was not “issued or delivered in this state.” The Court of Appeals held the suit is allowed under Insurance Law 3240 because the insureds and risks are located in New York (two other issues, whether the DHL truck was a “hired auto” and whether it was driven with “permission” are not summarized here):

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AAIC adopts the Appellate Division’s rationale that because AAIC’s policy was issued in New Jersey and delivered in Washington and then in Florida, it was neither issued nor delivered in New York, and therefore plaintiff cannot recover from AAIC pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420. …

Insurance Law § 3420 allows a limited cause of action on behalf of injured parties directly against insurers. Section 3420 applies to policies and contracts “issued or delivered in this state” … . Insurance Law § 3420 does not define the term “issued or delivered in this state,” but other provisions of the Insurance Law are instructive: “[T]he proper interpretation of the term ‘issued or delivered in this state’ refers both to a policy issued for delivery in New York, and a policy issued for delivery outside of New York” … . In Preserver, we interpreted section 3420 (d), which then required insurers to provide written notice when disclaiming coverage under policies “issued for delivery” in New York. We held that “[a] policy is ‘issued for delivery’ in New York if it covers both insureds and risks located in this state” (10 NY3d at 642). Thus, under Preserver, “issued for delivery” was interpreted to mean where the risk to be insured was located — not where the policy document itself was actually handed over or mailed to the insured. We interpreted section 3420 to provide a benefit — deliberately in derogation of the common law — to New Yorkers whenever a policy covers “insureds and risks located in this state” … . Applying the Preserver standard to the facts of this case, it is clear that DHL is “located in” New York because it has a substantial business presence and creates risks in New York. It is even clearer that DHL purchased liability insurance covering vehicle-related risks arising from vehicles delivering its packages in New York, because its insurance agreements say so. Carlson v American Intl. Group, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08163, CtApp 11-20-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (INSURANCE LAW 3240 ALLOWS A DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION IF THE INSUREDS AND RISKS ARE IN NEW YORK, NOT ONLY WHEN THE POLICY IS ISSUED OR DELIVERED IN NEW YORK (CT APP))/INSURANCE LAW 3240  (INSURANCE LAW 3240 ALLOWS A DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION IF THE INSUREDS AND RISKS ARE IN NEW YORK, NOT ONLY WHEN THE POLICY IS ISSUED OR DELIVERED IN NEW YORK (CT APP))

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ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the appellate division, determined that, with respect to a child who has been removed from the home and placed in foster care based upon a pending neglect petition, once the underlying neglect petition has been dismissed, Family Court loses jurisdiction of the matter and cannot entertain permanency hearings to continue the foster care placement:

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Here, the Department seizes on a hyperliteral reading of [Family Court Act] section 1088, divorced from all context, to argue that Family Court’s pre-petition placement of Jamie J. under (Family Court Act] section 1022 triggered a continuing grant of jurisdiction that survives the eventual dismissal of the neglect petition. In other words, even if the Family Court removes a child who has not been neglected or abused, it has jurisdiction to continue that child’s placement in foster care until and unless it decides otherwise. Section 1088’s place in the overall statutory scheme, the legislative history of article 10-A, and the dictates of parents’ and children’s constitutional rights to remain together compel the opposite conclusion: Family Court’s jurisdiction terminates upon dismissal of the original neglect or abuse petition. Matter of Jamie J. (Michelle E.C.), 2017 NY Slip Op 08161, CtApp 11-20-17

 

FAMILY LAW (ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP))/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP))/FOSTER CARE (FAMILY LAW, ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP))/PERMANENCY HEARINGS (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAMILY LAW, JURISDICTION, ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP))/JURISDICTION (CIVIL PROCEDURE, FAMILY LAW, (ONCE THE NEGLECT PETITION WHICH LED TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD IN FOSTER CARE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, FAMILY COURT LOSES JURISDICTION AND CANNOT ENTERTAIN PERMANENCY HEARINGS TO CONTINUE FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT (CT APP))

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