Failure to Comply with a Time-Limit for a Buy-Out in a Shareholders’ Agreement Was Trumped by the Overall Purpose of the Agreement—Shareholder Properly Compelled to Sell His Shares

The Third Department determined a shareholders’ agreement. although it did not address the particular problem at issue, must be read to avoid a result which would be at odds with the clear purposes of the agreement.  One of the three shareholders of the closely held corporation (the defendant) was convicted of a felony and the other shareholders terminated his employment and sought to buy his shares. The defendant sought to prohibit the buy-out by arguing it was untimely under the terms of the shareholders’ agreement.  Because the corporation distributed alcoholic beverages, if the defendant remained a shareholder the corporation would lose its distributor’s license:

A shareholders’ agreement — like any other contract — should be enforced according to its terms … . In so doing, “[t]he contract must be read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent, and it should be interpreted in a way [that] reconciles all its provisions, if possible” … . To that end, “the goal should be a practical construction of the language used so that the reasonable expectations of the parties are realized” …, and “the contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to, not nullify, its general or primary purpose” … .

Here, the shareholders’ agreement reflects “[t]he shareholders[‘] desire to establish a market value for their shares, to effectively control the management of the company, for their mutual best interests, and to protect against divisive relationships which would arise if outsiders with incompatible management philosophies gained interests in the company.” Consistent with that stated objective, the agreement further recognizes that “[t]he company is dependent upon and derives substantial benefit from the continued active interest and participation of those shareholders who participate in the management of the company.” In an attempt to preserve the closely-held nature of the corporation, the agreement provides that when a shareholder’s employment with the corporation ceases, “he or she shall be treated as though he or she were selling all of his or her shares under paragraph A of . . . [s]ection [t]wo [of the agreement],” which outlines the procedures to be followed when a shareholder, during the course of his or her lifetime, “transfer[s] any of his or her shares to anyone other than a family member.” In such case, the shareholder is to give notice of his or her intention to sell and, “[f]or a period of thirty [30] days after the notice is delivered, the [corporation] shall have an option to purchase all or any part of the offered shares on the payment terms specified in [s]ection [f]our [of the agreement].” If the corporation does not exercise such option, then the remaining shareholders are granted an additional 30-day option to purchase any or all of the available shares. * * *

…[R]eading the agreement as a whole and affording it a practical construction that is consistent with and gives proper effect to the parties’ stated intentions …, we are satisfied that Supreme Court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel [defendant] to sell his shares to the corporation — even if that option to purchase was not timely exercised. To hold otherwise and permit [defendant] to retain his shares due to the asserted noncompliance with the time period set forth in the shareholders’ agreement not only would effectively rewrite the parties’ agreement and undermine its stated purpose, i.e., to retain managerial control within the closely-held family corporation, but would place the corporation at risk of losing its distributor’s license, thereby rendering its stock worthless… . A Cappione Inc v Cappione, 2014 NY Slip Op 05230, 3rd Dept 7-10-14