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ALTHOUGH THE NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING DEFENDANT’S LACK OF CAPACITY TO COMMIT ARSON WAS “1400 DAYS LATE,” THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT THE LATE NOTICE (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three-judge dissent, determined the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept late notice of the intent to present psychiatric evidence as a defense to the arson charge. The defendant had been evaluated and treated for mental illness since childhood. When a new attorney was assigned to the defense, the notice of the intent to present psychiatric evidence was served “1400 days late.” The defense sought to introduce expert testimony to demonstrate defendant did not have the capacity to commit arson at the time of the offense:

We … hold that the trial court’s application of CPL 250.10 precluding Mr. Sidbury’s [defendant’s] psychiatric defense was an abuse of discretion. We have been clear that the governing principle animating CPL 250.10 is “procedural fairness and orderliness” with the intention of “eliminating the element of surprise” for the prosecution … . The statute formulates a procedure for defendants to serve notice of their intent to present psychiatric evidence that is “prepared and presented manageably and efficiently,” such that it allows for “proper notification, adversarial examination, and preclusion when appropriate” … . * * *

Although the statute provides for service of the notice within 30 days of the defendant’s not-guilty plea, the court has discretion to permit service of a late notice “[i]n the interest of justice and for good cause shown” … . Late notice is permissible “at any time prior to the close of evidence”—including after trial has commenced  … .

The decision to permit late notice is within the discretion of the trial court … . That discretion, however, is “not absolute,” because “[e]xclusion of relevant and probative testimony as a sanction for a defendant’s failure to comply with a statutory notice requirement implicates a defendant’s constitutional right to present witnesses in [their] own defense” … . Instead, the trial court must “weigh [the defendant’s constitutional] right against the resultant prejudice to the People from the belated notice” … . People v Sidbury, 2024 NY Slip Op 03318, CtApp 6-18-24

Practice Point: Although service of notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence as a defense should be made within 30 days of the not-guilty plea, the court has the discretion to accept late notice at any time prior to the close of evidence (because the constitutional right to present a defense is at stake).

 

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