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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AND VACATED THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, ALTHOUGH A SUA SPONTE ORDER IS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS DEEMED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, held that Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, dismissed plaintiff’s complaint and vacated the default judgment as untimely, Plaintiff had timely moved for a default judgment. Although sua sponte orders are not appealable as of right, the First Department deemed the notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal:

An order issued sua sponte is not appealable as of right (see Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333, 335 [2003]). However, given the nature of the motion court’s sua sponte relief in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), we deem the notice of appeal to be a motion for leave to appeal, and grant such leave (…CPLR 5701[c]).

The record is clear that plaintiff had moved for a default judgment within one year, and thus, the motion court’s sua sponte vacature of the judgment and dismissal of the complaint as untimely was in error … . In view of this decision, the merits of defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment are no longer moot and it is remanded back to the trial court for consideration on the merits. New Globaltex Co., Ltd. v Zhe Lin, 2019 NY Slip Op 04456, First Dept 6-6-19

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ROUTINE MAINTENANCE SO HIS FALL FROM A LADDER WAS NOT ACTIONABLE PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 240 (1), A MUNICIPALITY’S MAINTENANCE OF LIGHT POLES IS A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION TO WHICH THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY, THE MUNICIPALITY’S ‘LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE’ DEFENSE COULD NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance when he was injured, which is not actionable pursuant to Labor Law 240 (1). The Third Department further determined that a municipality’s maintenance of light poles is a proprietary function subject to ordinary standards of negligence which is not protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity. The court further held that the “lack of written notice” defense was not a question of law which the municipality could raise for the first time on appeal. The plaintiff was repairing burned out lights which were on strands of decorative lights attached to a light pole. The strands of decorative lights were not fixtures within the meaning of the Labor Law:

… Merchants [a non-profit which had wrapped decorative lights around city light poles] hired plaintiff, as an independent contractor, to replace light strands located on 36 light poles because many of the light bulbs had become inoperable. Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a 16-foot aluminum-rung extension ladder when the pole that it was leaning on suddenly fell over. …

… [R]replacement of the light strands, which was necessary because numerous bulbs had burned out, constituted routine maintenance that is outside the protection of Labor Law § 240 (1) … . …

… [A]lthough replacement of a light fixture on a lighting pole is a repair within the protection of Labor Law § 240 (1) … , under the facts herein, the light strands cannot be considered a fixture. …

Although a municipality may enjoy qualified immunity from liability arising from highway planning and design decisions … , that doctrine does not shield a municipality from liability arising from negligent maintenance. Gutkaiss v Delaware Ave. Merchants Group, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 04527, Third Dept 6-6-19

 

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DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WAS PROPERLY DENIED AND THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming defendant’s conviction, determined the defendant’s request to proceed pro se was properly denied and there was support in the record for the existence of probable cause to arrest. The Court of Appeals did not discuss the facts. The link to the 2nd Department decision is here:

The trial court concluded—based upon, among other things, its own observations of defendant’s conduct throughout these lengthy proceedings and the testimony of defendant’s attending physician—that defendant engaged in malingering insofar as he was competent to proceed but persisted in his efforts to avoid trial. Inasmuch as defendant “engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues,” we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to proceed pro se …. Moreover, the existence of record support for the determination of the courts below that the pursuit of defendant by the police was justified by a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity forecloses our further review of that issue … . People v Gregory, 2019 NY Slip Op 04450, CtApp 6-6-19

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REQUIRING A FORECLOSURE AFFIRMATION AND A CERTIFICATE OF MERIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED RETROACTIVELY, A STIPULATION AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IGNORED, THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER RAISED A MATTER OF LAW THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the plaintiff bank’s motion to vacate a dismissal of a foreclosure action should have been granted. Supreme Court had improperly applied an administrative order (AO 548/10) requiring a “Foreclosure Affirmation/Certificate of Merit” that was not in effect at the time the bank made its motion for summary judgment. The parties had entered a stipulation which awarded the bank summary judgment in return for waiver of its right to seek a deficiency judgment. The court noted that the improper retroactive application of AO 548/10 could be raised for the first time on appeal because it is a question of law that could not be avoided if it had been raised at the proper time:

“[A] court may vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interest of substantial justice”… . “A foreclosure action is equitable in nature and triggers the equitable powers of the court” … . “Once equity is invoked, the court’s power is as broad as equity and justice require” … .

Here, equity and justice require vacatur of the dismissal order in the interests of substantial justice … . Countrywide Bank, FSB v Singh, 2019 NY Slip Op 04353, Second Dept 6-5-19

 

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ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD CAN APPEAL A CHANGE OF CUSTODY TO WHICH THE CHILD IS OPPOSED, THE CHILD IS AGGRIEVED FOR APPELLATE PURPOSES, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD A FULL CUSTODY HEARING WITHOUT FIRST ASSESSING THE ALLEGATIONS OF A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, AN APPELLATE COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PRIOR MODIFICATION PETITIONS, AND FAMILY COURT MUST GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE CHILD’S WISHES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scheinkman, that mother’s petition for a change in custody should not have been granted. The opinion is too comprehensive to be fairly summarized here. Of particular interest is the Second Department’s conclusion that Family Court should have not have held a full custody hearing without first determining whether the allegations warranted it. The Second Department took judicial notice of two prior petitions for modification which were dismissed, the last petition being very close in time to the instant petition.  The opinion is well worth reading in its entirety. It addresses several substantive issues and distinguishes some 4th Department authority. The Second Department summarized the issues and holdings as follows:

This appeal raises several important issues pertinent to child custody determinations. We conclude that: (a) the attorney for the child has the authority to pursue an appeal on behalf of the child from an order determining the custody of the child; (b) the child is aggrieved, for appellate purposes, by an order determining custody; (c) the Family Court should not have held a full custody hearing without first determining whether the mother had alleged and established a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant an inquiry into whether the child’s best interests were served by the existing custodial arrangement; and (d) the Family Court erred in failing to give due consideration to the expressed preferences of the child, who is a teenager. Matter of Newton v McFarlane, 2019 NY Slip Op 04386, Second Dept 6-5-19

 

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WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID, COURT NOT BOUND BY PURPORTED COMMITMENT TO A PARTICULAR SENTENCE AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA, PRESENTENCE REPORT INADEQUATE, SENTENCE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s sentence and remitting for resentencing, determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid and the sentencing court did not have sufficient information about the defendant at the time of sentencing. The presentence investigation report was incomplete, in part because there was no interpreter available. The Second Department further determined that the sentencing court could not be bound by a purported commitment to the prosecutor at the time of the plea to impose a particular sentence:

Given the defendant’s inexperience with the criminal justice system, the Supreme Court’s terse colloquy at the plea allocution was insufficient to advise the defendant of the nature of the right to appeal … . There is no indication in the record that the defendant understood the distinction between the right to appeal and the other trial rights that are forfeited incident to a plea of guilty … . Although the defendant signed a written waiver of the right to appeal, nothing in the record demonstrates that the document was translated for the defendant, who required the use of a Sinhala interpreter, before it was presented to him for signature … . …

“…. [A] sentence negotiated prior to the plea, and in most cases prior to receipt of a presentence report, does not automatically become the sentence of the court” … . The determination of an appropriate sentence requires the court to exercise its discretion “after due consideration given to, among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence” … . …

Most troubling … is that in preparing the presentence investigation report for the Supreme Court in advance of sentencing, the Department of Probation did not interview the defendant because it was “unable to secure an interpreter” on two scheduled dates for an interview. Thus, the presentence investigation report does not contain any information regarding the defendant’s mental status, educational background, employment history, or military background. The report indicates that the defendant’s physiological health was “unknown,” and that his psychological condition was “unavailable.” Even though the Department of Probation did not interview the defendant, the report indicates that the defendant “reported no use of controlled substances and/or alcohol.”

Under the circumstances here, the information contained in the record of the plea proceeding, the sentencing proceeding, and the presentence investigation report was insufficient for a sentencing court to exercise discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. People v Pelige, 2019 NY Slip Op 04204, Second Dept 5-29-19

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS), PARENTAL NEGLECT AND DANGER FROM GANGS IN HONDURAS WAS DEMONSTRATED, APPELLATE COURT CAN MAKE ITS OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS ON A SUFFICIENT RECORD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the child’s motion for findings enabling him to petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) should have been granted:

“This Court’s power to review the evidence is as broad as that of the hearing court, and where, as here, the record is sufficiently complete to make our own factual determinations, we may do so” … . Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not a viable option based upon parental neglect … . The record reflects that the child’s parents did not provide him with adequate supervision or medical care, and that they failed to meet the child’s educational needs. Furthermore, the record also supports a finding that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return to Honduras, his previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence. The child indicated that he was assaulted by gang members in Honduras on multiple occasions, once leaving him with a broken rib and a scar on his head, and that he had witnessed a drive-by shooting at his school which resulted in the death of his schoolmate. In addition, the child stated that the gang members tried to recruit him, but he refused to join, and that the gang members were “killing people if they didn’t want to join.” The child stated that he “felt scared all the time and could no longer live a normal life,” and that he “basically stayed inside [his] house all the time” out of fear that he “was going to be attacked again” … . Matter of Victor R. C. O. v Canales, 2019 NY Slip Op 03789, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

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JURY NOTE FOUND IN THE COURT FILE BY APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS, AFTER A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING, DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN A DRAFT WHICH WAS DISCARDED BY THE JURY, AS OPPOSED TO A NOTE OF WHICH COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED, THEREFORE THE PROHIBITION OF RECONSTRUCTION HEARINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE HANDLING OF JURY NOTES DID NOT APPLY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a substantive concurrence, determined, based upon a reconstruction hearing held by Supreme Court at the direction of the Appellate Division, a jury note found in the court file by appellate counsel was a draft that was discarded by the jury. Therefore the strict requirements surrounding notification of counsel of the contents of notes from the jury, and the prohibition of reconstruction hearings in that context, did not apply:

We recently held that where the record does not establish that counsel was provided meaningful notice of the contents of a substantive jury note, “the sole remedy is reversal and a new trial,” not a reconstruction hearing (People v Parker, 32 NY3d 49, 62 [2018]). However, the purpose of the reconstruction hearing at issue here was not to determine whether the court complied with the counsel notice requirements of CPL 310.30 and People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270, 276 [1991]). Instead, the hearing was to determine whether, in the first instance, Exhibit XIV reflected a “jury . . . request [to] the court for further instruction or information” (CPL 310.30) such that those obligations were triggered. Moreover, the finding of the courts below, following the reconstruction hearing, that Exhibit XIV was a draft note that the jury discarded is supported by the record and, thus, beyond our further review. People v Meyers, 2019 NY Slip Op 03658, CtApp 5-9-19

 

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JUDGE’S SUA SPONTE ASSESSMENT OF POINTS ON A GROUND OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NOTIFIED VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court’s SORA risk assessment, determined that the judge’s assessing points on a ground of which defendant was not given prior notice was a violation of due process. The issue was considered on appeal in the interest of justice (there was no objection at the SORA hearing):

“The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment” . As a result, “[a] defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to notice of points sought to be assigned” … , and “a court’s sua sponte departure from the Board’s recommendation at the hearing, without prior notice, deprives the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to respond” … . Here, neither the Board nor the People requested the assessment of points for a continuing course of sexual misconduct on the ground that defendant engaged in three or more acts of sexual contact with the victim over a period of at least two weeks … . At the conclusion of the SORA hearing, however, the court proceeded to assign additional points under that category on the ground that the grand jury testimony of the victim’s mother established that there was a third uncharged incident of sexual contact. Defendant was never provided any notice that points would be assessed as a result of a third uncharged incident and thus was not given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the court’s risk level assessment. People v Chrisley, 2019 NY Slip Op 03505, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

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ALTHOUGH THE ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, DEFENDANT INDICATED HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE CRIME TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY BUT THE JUDGE MADE NO FURTHER INQUIRY, THE PLEA WAS THEREFORE NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction in the interest of justice, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered:

We agree with defendant that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered … . Although defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review because “his motion to withdraw his plea was made on grounds different from those advanced on appeal” … , and this case does not fall within the “narrow exception” to the preservation rule … , we exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice … .

“A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences” … . After Supreme Court accepted defendant’s guilty plea, defendant stated that he was confused by the plea proceeding, and the court asked him if he had any questions about the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant then made a series of remarks from which it became apparent that he did not understand the nature of the crime to which he had entered his guilty plea. Although defendant was “obviously confused,” the court made no further inquiry whether he understood the plea or its consequences … . People v Hector, 2019 NY Slip Op 03504, Fourth Dept 5-3-19