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Defense Counsel’s Main Reason for the Peremptory Challenges To Which the Prosecutor Objected, i.e., the Potential Jurors Had Been Crime-Victims, Was Not Pretextual

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction because Supreme Court improperly applied the Batson doctrine and denied defense counsel’s peremptory challenges to two jurors.  The prosecutor raised a “reverse-Batson” objection to defense peremptory challenges alleging the defense was excluding “Asian persons.”  Defense counsel offered race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges, the principal reason being that the potential jurors had been crime victims. Supreme Court found the proffered race-neutral reasons were pretextual.  The Second Department determined they were not:

“In Batson, the United States Supreme Court formulated a three-step test to assess whether peremptory challenges have been used to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race, gender, or other protected categories. In step one, the moving party must make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the facts and circumstances of the voir dire raise an inference that the other party excused one or more jurors for an impermissible reason. If the moving party makes a prima facie showing, the inquiry proceeds to step two, and the burden shifts to the adversary to provide a facially neutral explanation for the challenge. If the nonmoving party offers facially neutral reasons supporting the challenge, the inference of discrimination is overcome. Once facially neutral reasons are provided, the inquiry proceeds to step three, and the burden shifts back to the moving party to prove purposeful discrimination, and the trial court must determine whether the proffered reasons are pretextual” … . A trial court’s step-three determination that the facially race-neutral reasons for a nonmoving party’s peremptory challenges to particular jurors were pretextual is entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed where such determination is supported by the record … . * * *

The record does not support the trial court’s step-three finding of fact as to the subject prospective juror, to wit, that other prospective jurors who were crime victims and who indicated that the incident would not affect them had nevertheless been seated. “[A]ssurances from a challenged prospective juror that he or she could assess the evidence in a fair manner even though he or she was a crime victim are irrelevant to the determination of whether the basis of a peremptory challenge is pretextual” … . Nonetheless, the record indicates that defense counsel treated such jurors consistently by exercising a peremptory challenge for another prospective juror who was not Asian but was a crime victim who provided assurance that nothing in her experience would affect her as a juror. In addition, although defense counsel did not exercise peremptory challenges for K.A.M. and G.A., defense counsel sufficiently distinguished the experiences of those jurors from that of the subject prospective juror, who had been robbed at gunpoint … . Consequently, the record supports a finding that defense counsel had legitimate, nonpretextual reasons for challenging prospective jurors based on their crime victim status … .People v Grant, 2015 NY Slip Op 04505, 2nd Dept 5-17-15

 

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Deliberate Joinder of Claims for Legal and Equitable Relief Arising from the Same Transaction Constitutes a Waiver of the Right to Demand a Jury Trial

The Second Department noted that the deliberate joinder of claims for legal and equitable relief arising from the same transaction constitutes a waiver of the right to demand a jury trial. In addition, the court dismissed the aspect of the appeal for which the relevant portions of the record were omitted from the appendix. With respect to the contents of the appendix submitted on appeal, the Second Department wrote:

” An appellant who perfects an appeal by using the appendix method must file an appendix that contains all the relevant portions of the record in order to enable the court to render an informed decision on the merits of the appeal'” … . “The appendix shall contain those portions of the record necessary to permit the court to fully consider the issues which will be raised by the appellant and the respondent” (22 NYCRR 670.10-b[c][1]; see CPLR 5528[a][5]). Here, the plaintiff omitted material excerpts from the transcripts of trial testimony and critical exhibits she relies on in seeking review of the dismissal of her disability discrimination cause of action. These omissions inhibit this Court’s ability to render an informed decision on the merits of the appeal … . Accordingly, the appeal from so much of the judgment as is in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, in effect, dismissing the second cause of action must be dismissed. Zutrau v ICE Sys., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 04479, 2nd Dept 5-1715

 

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Excessive Intervention and Improper Conduct of Judge Required New Trial in Medical Malpractice Case

The Second Department reversed and sent a medical malpractice case back for retrial on liability because of the excessive intervention and improper conduct by the trial judge.  The Second Department wrote:

…[T]he trial justice’s excessive intervention in the proceedings, as well as the cumulative effect of the trial court’s improper conduct, deprived the plaintiff of her right to a fair trial (see CPLR 5501[a][1]; 4017…). “[A]ll litigants, regardless of the merits of their case, are entitled to a fair trial” …. A trial justice plays a “vital role in clarifying confusing testimony and facilitating the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial,” but that “power is one that should be exercised sparingly” …. Accordingly, a trial justice may not ” so far inject himself [or herself] into the proceedings that the jury could not review the case in the calm and untrammelled spirit necessary to effect justice'” … .

A trial justice must maintain an atmosphere of impartiality. Here, while the plaintiff’s counsel may have been overly aggressive, and at times even antagonized the trial justice, nonetheless, a trial justice should ” at all times maintain an impartial attitude and exercise a high degree of patience and forebearance’ “…. Indeed, our review of the record convinces us that the repeated conflict between the court and the plaintiff’s counsel, at all phases of the trial-and often times in the presence of the jury-unnecessarily injected personality issues into the case, which militated against a fair trial. The trial justice demonstrated a propensity to interrupt, patronize, and admonish the plaintiff’s counsel, and gave the plaintiff’s counsel significantly less leeway with regard to examination and cross-examination of witnesses than that which was afforded the defendants’ counsel. *  *  *

Under the circumstances of this case, by virtue of the cumulative effect of the improper conduct of the trial justice, the plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial. As a result, the jury could not have considered the issues at trial in a fair, calm, and unprejudiced manner ….  Porcelli v Northern Westchester Hosp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03467, 2nd Dept 5-15-13

 

 

 

No Substantial Basis in the Record for Custody Determination

After the parents’ deaths the maternal and paternal grandmothers petitioned for custody of the child. The Second Department reversed Family Court, which had awarded custody to the maternal grandmother after a three-day hearing, and granted custody to the paternal grandmother, finding no sound and substantial basis for Family Court’s ruling in the record:

The essential consideration in any custody dispute is the best interests of the child … . In determining the best interests of the child, the court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances… . This Court’s authority in custody determinations is as broad as that of the hearing court …, and while we are mindful that the hearing court has an advantage in being able to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of witnesses, we “would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a Trial Judge,” we allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record … .  Matter of Iams v Estate of Iams, 2013 NY Slip Op 03482, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

Defect Was Trivial As a Matter of Law—Criteria Explained

The Second Department determined the slip an fall case should have been dismissed.  The defect was trivial as a matter of law: “… [P]roperty owners may not be held liable for trivial defects, not constituting a trap or nuisance, over which a pedestrian might merely stumble, stub his or her toes, or trip … . There is no minimal dimension test or per se rule that the condition must be of a certain height or depth to be actionable … . In determining whether a defect is trivial as a matter of law, the court must examine all of the facts presented, “including the width, depth, elevation, irregularity and appearance of the defect along with the time, place and circumstance’ of the injury … . “Photographs which fairly and accurately represent the accident site may be used to establish that a defect is trivial and not actionable … “. [internal quotations omitted]  Santacruz v Taco Bell of Am., LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 04111, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

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Counts Rendered Duplicitous by Trial Testimony/Prosecution Held to Erroneous Jury Charge to Which No Objection Was Made/Prosecutorial Misconduct Mandated a New Trial

The Second Department determined: (1) many counts of the indictment were rendered duplicitous because the complainant in this sex-offense case testified to more than one offense within the time-periods encompassed by indictment counts; (2) the prosecution must be held to the erroneous jury charge to which no objection was made (stating proof complainant was less than 14 was required when the statute says less than 15); (3) the prosecution did not prove complainant was less than 14—relevant counts dismissed; and (4) prosecutorial misconduct during summation (prosecutor acted as an unsworn witness, invited the jury to speculate, shifted the burden of proof, and made inflammatory remarks) mandated a new trial on the remaining counts:

Each count of an indictment may charge one offense only” (CPL 200.30[1]). A count in an indictment is void as duplicitous when that “single count charges more than one offense” … . Where, as here, the crime charged ” is completed by a discrete act, and where a count in the indictment is based on the repeated occurrence of that act over a course of time, the count includes more than a single offense and is duplicitous'” … . ” Even if a count is valid on its face, it is nonetheless duplicitous where the evidence presented . . . at trial makes plain that multiple criminal acts occurred during the relevant time period, rendering it nearly impossible to determine the particular act upon which the jury reached its verdict'” … . * * *

… [S]ince the People did not object to the erroneous jury charge, they were “bound to satisfy the heavier burden” … of proving, for counts 1 through 40, that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a person less than 14 years old. Since the evidence demonstrated that the complainant was 14 years old during the time periods encompassed by counts 17 through 40 of the indictment, the People failed to satisfy this burden as to those counts. * * *

“[S]ummation is not an unbridled debate in which the restraints imposed at trial are cast aside so that counsel may employ all the rhetorical devices at his [or her] command” … . Rather, “[t]here are certain well-defined limits” (id. at 109). Among other things, “[the prosecutor] must stay within the four corners of the evidence’ and avoid irrelevant and inflammatory comments which have a tendency to prejudice the jury against the accused” … . A prosecutor would be well-advised not to test these limits, both so as to stay within his or her proper truth-seeking role … and so as to avoid the waste of time and expense that occurs when a new trial must be conducted solely on the basis of summation misconduct. Here, the prosecutor surpassed the “well-defined limits” … .

The prosecutor acted as an unsworn witness when, in response to defense counsel’s summation comments regarding the lack of corroborative medical evidence and the failure to call certain witnesses, the prosecutor told the jury that the uncalled witnesses had “nothing to offer” and that the medical records the prosecution failed to offer into evidence were “either irrelevant or cumulative” … . The prosecutor also improperly invited the jury to speculate as to certain matters, despite advance warning by the trial court not to engage in that line of comment … . Further, the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof by telling the jury, and repeatedly returning to this theme, that it had not “heard” any “compelling reason” for the complainant to lie, and by suggesting that the jury would have to convict the defendant if it did not “buy” the defendant’s explanation of certain evidence … . The prosecutor further improperly suggested that the jury would have to conclude that the complainant was “evil” in order to acquit the defendant … . The prosecutor repeatedly vouched for the complainant, while denigrating the defense and expressing his personal opinion as to the defendant’s lack of credibility … . Finally, the prosecutor made a number of inflammatory references to the defendant using the complainant as his “personal sex toy” … . People v Singh, 2015 NY Slip Op 04157, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

Unopposed Motions to Enter a Default Judgment Properly Denied—Insufficient Proof of Facts Constituting the Claim

In finding the denial of plaintiff’s unopposed motions to enter a default judgment was proper, the Second Department explained the documentary requirements: “A party’s right to recover upon a defendant’s failure to appear or answer is governed by CPLR 3215… . Thus, a plaintiff moving for a default judgment against a defendant must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of the defaulting defendant’s failure to appear or answer… . … The plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of the facts constituting the claim (see CPLR 3215[f]). While a verified complaint may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim (see CPLR 3215[f]), it must contain evidentiary facts from one with personal knowledge … . [A] pleading verified by an attorney pursuant to CPLR 3020(d)(3) is insufficient to establish its merits…” [internal quotations omitted]. DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v United Gen. Tit. Ins. Co., 2015 NY Slip Op 04087, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

Inadequate Excuse for Delay In Answering Complaint—Motion to Vacate Default Judgment Should Have Been Denied

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted the bank’s (BAC’s) motion to vacate a default judgment in a foreclosure action.  The bank’s excuse (clerical error) was conclusory and belied by a pattern of neglect:

“To defeat a facially adequate CPLR 3215 motion, a defendant must show either that there was no default, or that it has a reasonable excuse for its delay and a potentially meritorious defense” … . “Whether a proffered excuse is reasonable is a sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” … .

Here, BAC’s proffered excuse, that its default in appearing and answering the complaint was due to a clerical error, was unsubstantiated, conclusory, and inadequately explained, and, therefore, did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the default … . Moreover, the record demonstrates that the alleged mistake was not an isolated error, but part of a pattern of “repeated neglect” … . In that regard, BAC failed to present a reasonable excuse for its further delay, after being apprised of its default, in cross-moving to vacate its default. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Krauss, 2015 NY Slip Op 04123, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

Leave to Amend Complaint Should Have Been Granted—Criteria Explained

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint. Leave to amend should only be denied if the added causes of action are patently insufficient or devoid of merit.  Defendant would suffer no prejudice or surprise:

“In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . Under this standard, a party seeking leave to amend a pleading need not make an evidentiary showing of merit … , and leave to amend will be granted unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt … . * * * …[The] proposed causes of action are neither patently insufficient nor palpably devoid of merit. Moreover, the parties against whom those causes of action are sought to be asserted will not suffer undue prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the plaintiff’s delay in seeking to amend the complaint … . Stein v Doukas, 2015 NY Slip Op 04115, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

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Questions of Fact Re: Whether a Deed Was Forged and Whether a Will Was Duly Executed

The Second Department determined there existed questions of fact whether a deed was a forgery and whether a will was duly executed.  In the course of the decision, the court explained: (1) there can be no bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers of real property based on a forged deed; (2) the transfer of title of real property devised under a will title vests on death not probate; (3) forged deeds are null and void ab initio; and (4) there was insufficient proof due execution of the will—no proof an attorney drafted the will or supervised its execution–no proof decedent possessed testamentary capacity:

Pursuant to Real Property Law § 266, a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value is protected in his or her title unless he or she had previous notice of the alleged prior fraud by the seller … . However, a person cannot be a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value through a forged deed, as it is void and conveys no title … . …

Generally, “title to real property devised under the will of a decedent vests in the beneficiary at the moment of the testator’s death and not at the time of probate” … . Here, however, since the validity of the will is being challenged by the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondents, as the proponents of the will, to prove due execution of the will and testamentary capacity … . …

… [T]he … evidence was insufficient to establish that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law (see EPTL 3-2.1), and that the decedent was of sound mind and memory when he executed the will and understood the nature and consequences of executing the will … . While there is a presumption of regularity where the drafting attorney supervised the will’s execution …, here, there was no evidentiary support for the respondents’ conclusory contention that the will was drafted by [the attorney] or that he supervised the execution ceremony. Moreover, the respondents failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity when he signed the will. Matter of Raccioppi, 2015 NY Slip Op 04135, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

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