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THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE INFORMATION DEMONSTRATING THE TEMPORARY TEXAS REGISTRATION WAS INVALID AT THE TIME THEY IMPOUNDED THE CAR; THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS IMPROPER AND THE HANDGUNS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the officers who stopped defendant’s vehicle did not have any information that the temporary Texas registration was invalid at the time the vehicle was impounded. Therefore the inventory search was invalid and the handguns should have been suppressed:

“An inventory search is exactly what its name suggests, a search designed to properly catalogue the contents of the item searched” … . Inventory searches may not be used as “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence” … and, unlike a traffic stop, “will be constitutionally invalid where the search was merely a pretext to search for evidence of a crime” … . “Only a lawfully impounded vehicle may be subjected to an inventory search” … , and “[t]he People bear the threshold burden of demonstrating that the subject vehicle was lawfully impounded at the time of the inventory search” … . People v Boatwright, 2026 NY Slip Op 04071, Fourth Dept 6-26-26

Practice Point: Without a valid reason to impound a car, an inventory search of the car is not justified.​

 

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THE REFEREE DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THE FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION; NEITHER MOTHER NOR THE RESPONDENT HUSBAND (WHO DID NOT APPEAR) CONSENTED TO THE REFEREE’S HEARING THE MATTER; THE POWERS OF A REFEREE ARE EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversal the order by the referee dismissing the family offense proceeding, determined the referee was without jurisdiction to decide the matter because neither mother nor respondent husband (who did not appear) consented the referee hearing the matter:

“A referee derives authority from an order of reference by the court (see CPLR 4311), which can be made only upon consent of the parties, except in limited circumstances” … . “Absent the parties’ consent to the reference, the . . . [r]eferee ha[s] the power only to hear and report [their] findings” … . An appropriate order of reference is thus an “essential jurisdictional predicate” to the authority of the referee to act … , and a referee “who attempts to determine matters not referred to [them] by the order of reference acts beyond and in excess of [their] jurisdiction” … .

Here, as noted, petitioner never consented to the Referee hearing the matter. Although CPLR 4317 (b) permits a referee to hear and determine an issue without the consent of the parties where the trial of the issue “will require the examination of a long account,” where the issue is one “of damages separately triable and not requiring a trial by jury,” or “where otherwise authorized by law,” none of those exceptions to the consent requirement applies here. Thus, the Referee “lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the petition” … , even without prejudice. We note in any event that, absent a fact-finding hearing, which did not take place, the Referee had no grounds to dismiss the petition based on insufficient evidence. Matter of Fournier v Perez, 2026 NY Slip Op 04063, Fourth Dept 6-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise explanation of the powers of a Family Court referee.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS OBSERVED WALKING UP AND DOWN DRIVEWAYS IN A RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD; WHEN THE POLICE ASKED HIM TO STOP, HE RAN AND THE POLICED PURSUED; THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” JUSTIFYING PURSUIT; THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the conviction by plea, determined the police did not have “reasonable suspicion” defendant was committing a crime at the time the defendant ran from them. The police were justified in exercising the “common law right of inquiry” because defendant was seen walking in different yards in a residential neighborhood. But the police were not justified in pursuing the defendant when he ran. The gun defendant discarded that the statements made to the police should have been suppressed:

… [T]he encounter began as a level two intrusion, with the officers parking and exiting their vehicle, stating “police,” and asking the defendant to stop … . The officers’ pursuit of the defendant constituted a level three intrusion, requiring a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in a felony or misdemeanor … .. Here, however, the circumstances, which included the defendant’s actions of walking up and down the driveways of 105-31 and 105-33 Farmers Boulevard and across a lawn and toward the rear of a residence on 109th Avenue, “although not inconsistent with culpable [conduct,] are also susceptible of many innocent interpretations” … , and were, “[a]t most . . . equivocal and suspicious” … . Importantly, the officers did not observe the defendant looking into any houses or backyards, and did not observe him carrying or attempting to conceal any tools or weapons. Therefore, the defendant’s actions preceding his interaction with the officers and his flight therefrom did not support a reasonable suspicion of particularized criminal action … . People v Bryant, 2026 NY Slip Op 03976, Second Dept 6-24-25

Practice Point: Walking up and down residential driveways, carrying nothing and not looking into houses, justified exercise of the common law right of inquiry by the police. But defendant’s immediate flight from the police did not justify pursuit.

 

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HERE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY BROUGHT A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO PROHIBIT THE ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER PRECLUDING EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE’S PRODUCTION OF DISCOVERY WAS DEEMED UNTIMELY; A WRIT OF PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE FOR THIS PURPOSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Quirk, determined that the trial judge’s preclusion of evidence based upon the district attorney’s untimely production of discovery was not subject to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition. The petition for a writ of prohibition was brought by the then district attorney:

Granting prohibition here would constitute improper collateral interlocutory review. This point is underscored by the Legislature’s amendment of CPL 450.20 to permit the People to appeal as of right from the portion of an order dismissing an accusatory instrument or some of its counts pursuant to CPL 245.80(2). In enacting this amendment, the Legislature chose to limit the types of appeals available to the People and did not permit the People to appeal from orders granting other remedies or sanctions under CPL 245.80(2), including orders precluding evidence, regardless of whether such orders would prevent the People from prosecuting a case. Contrary to the petitioner’s contentions, although the nonappealability of an order may be considered as a factor in favor of prohibition as part of the second step of the two-tiered analysis, “nonreviewability by way of appeal alone, does not provide a basis for reviewing error by collateral proceeding in the nature . . . of prohibition”  … .

Since a writ of prohibition does not lie, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the petition which was to prohibit the enforcement of the order of preclusion.  Matter of Rocah v McCarthy, 2026 NY Slip Op 03967, Second Dept 6-24-26

Practice Point: A writ of prohibition does not lie to prohibit the enforcement of an order precluding evidence becasue the production of discovery by the People was deemed untimely.

 

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IN THESE TWO DISTINCT CASES, THE DEFENDANTS CHALLENGED THE CONSENT-TO-SEARCH CONDITION OF THEIR PROBATION; IN “BRAZEAL” THE COURT HELD THE CONDITION WAS NOT WARRANTED BY DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY; IN “LORA” THE COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE ARGUMENT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE SENTENCING COURT (CT APP).

​The Court of Appeals, reviewing two decisions, with multiple concurring and dissenting opinions, determined (1) in People v Brazeal the probation condition allowing searches by probation officers was deemed inappropriate given defendant’s criminal history, and (2) in People v Lora the defendant made the same challenge to the consent-to-search probation condition, but since the issue was not preserved, merits were not reached:

We conclude that the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing the consent-to-search condition on Brazeal. Although his conviction was for a crime of violence, at no point was Brazeal shown to otherwise possess firearms or illegal weapons, and the knife used in his crime was an ordinary kitchen knife. The Appellate Division referenced his “history of violence” … , but that characterization overstates the defendant’s relatively remote criminal history. He had a previous conviction for property destruction in Las Vegas, a harassment conviction with “physical contact” in the Bronx, and a youthful offender adjudication for assault in Yonkers, the most recent of which was almost a decade before the present offense. The 2007 youthful offender adjudication is the only other incident that references the use of an unspecified “weapon/instrument,” and only the 2007 and 2009 proceedings included assault charges. None of Brazeal’s arrests in Georgia resulted in further prosecution apart from an outstanding warrant for failure to appear. Aside from these facts, the record reflects no basis for the imposition of the condition. Brazeal has not been assessed as being in need of alcohol or substance abuse treatment, the People concede that substance abuse is not implicated in his case, and his admission of occasional marijuana use in the past does not support further supervision. On this record, the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a condition that was not “individually tailored in relation to the offense[ ]” or to Brazeal’s “rehabilitation” … .

Because she did not object to the consent-to-search condition before the sentencing court, Lora’s statutory and constitutional challenges are unpreserved for our review … . People v Brazeal, 2026 NY Slip Op 03910, CtApp 6-23-26

Practice Point: To appeal a consent-to-search condition of probation (to the Court of Appeals), the issue must be preserved by raising it in the sentencing court.

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL PURSUED A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY IN MOVING TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS THAT DID NOT REQUIRE AN INVESTIGATION INTO DEFENDANT’S MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE; THEREFORE DEFENSE COUNSEL’S PURPORTED FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined defense counsel’s purported failure to investigate defendant’s mental health and substance abuse history in order to challenge the voluntariness of defendant’s statements to police did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel’s decision to employ an alternative strategy was reasonable:

Defendant’s assigned counsel later moved to suppress defendant’s statements. At a pretrial hearing, counsel argued that defendant provided those statements while operating under a reasonable belief that he would be given immunity in exchange for his information, and therefore the statements were involuntary. Counsel supported that argument with a variety of evidence, including, among other things, defendant’s refusal to offer any statements until he could speak with an assistant district attorney (ADA), an unrecorded conversation with an ADA, and a note in the police file in defendant’s handwriting stating that he would need immunity and payment in exchange for his information. Counsel also relied upon defendant’s Miranda waiver form, on which he crossed out “defendant” and wrote in “C.I.,” for confidential informant. Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing that he had been offered immunity by the ADA during the unrecorded conversation.  * * *

In 2019, while his direct appeal was still pending, defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his history of mental health disorders and substance abuse. The court ordered a hearing, at which defendant’s trial counsel testified. Counsel asserted that although he was aware of defendant’s mental health and substance abuse history, defendant “had given [counsel] such a clear picture” of what happened that “was supported by documentary evidence” and that in counsel’s “50 years of practicing [he had] never had a case where [he had] seen, or known of a case where [he had] seen that a person” who shared defendant’s mental health diagnosis successfully suppress a statement on that ground. People v Fernandez, 2026 NY Slip Op 03915, CtApp 6-23-26

Practice Point: Although defendant’s mental health and substance abuse history may have been used to argue his statements to police were not voluntary, defense counsel felt that argument would fail and pursued a reasonable alternative strategy which did not require a mental-health and substance-abuse investigation. Defense counsel was therefore not “ineffective.”

 

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THE APPELLATE DIVISION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING TWO APPEALS FOR “FAILURE OF TIMELY PROSECUTION OR PERFECTION;” CRITERIA EXPLAINED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, without discussing the facts, determined the appellate division abused its discretion in dismissing two appeals for “failure of timely prosecution or perfection:”

We have identified as relevant factors (1) the length of the appellant’s delay; (2) the reasonableness of any excuse for the delay, including whether the appellant received clear instructions on how to pursue an appeal and whether the delay was strategic or resulted from a belated change in strategy; and (3) the specific prejudice, if any, the respondent has suffered from the delay (Perez, 23 NY3d at 99-101; Taveras, 10 NY3d at 233; People v West, 100 NY2d 23, 27-28 [2003]). Under the circumstances of these cases, including the People’s concession, the Appellate Division abused its discretion in dismissing defendants’ appeals. People v Matthews, 2026 NY Slip Op 03908, CtApp 6-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the criteria the appellate division should apply to the dismissal of an appeal for “failure of timely prosecution or perfection.”

 

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WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL REALIZED THE STIPULATION SHE HAD SIGNED EFFECTIVELY EQUATED POSSESSION OF THE LAPTOP WITH POSSESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FOUND ON THE LAPTOP SHE MOVED FOR A MISTRIAL ARGUING SHE HAD PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS AGREED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, affirming the Appellate Division, and agreeing with defense counsel’s own trial argument that her signing the stipulation constituted ineffective assistance, determined the stipulation in this child pornography case essentially equated possession of the laptop with possession of child pornography found on the laptop. Defendant asserted that he found the laptop in the garbage and that any child pornography was placed there by someone else:

Defense counsel’s decision to sign paragraphs 4 and 5 of the stipulation … deprived the defendant of meaningful representation. On their face, paragraphs 4 and 5 may be read to eliminate the crimes’ mens rea requirements—the very elements on which the defense theory rested—contrary to the court’s instruction that to convict the defendant of possessing the CSAM [child sexual abuse material], the jury had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the requisite “affirmative acts.” So understood, the stipulation would have undermined the defendant’s core contention that he possessed the laptop without knowing it contained the CSAM. … [P]aragraphs 4 and 5, which provide that “whoever possessed” the videos “promoted” a sexual performance by a child “with knowledge of the character and content of the videos,” and that “whoever possessed” the images did so “knowingly,” went further than was necessary … . … [T]he record reveals no other strategic reason for agreeing to those paragraphs’ vital legal concessions. * * *

… [I]n the specific circumstances of this case, where the defendant conceded physical possession of the laptop and the images in the unallocated space were repeatedly described as “on the laptop” by the parties, the witnesses, and the stipulation itself, the stipulation could have allowed the jury to conclude that the defendant’s physical possession of the laptop equated to his knowing possession of the images in the unallocated space. As for the video counts, although defense counsel contended that the defendant had never possessed the videos at all, the theory of the People’s case was that the same person shared and downloaded both the videos and images. Thus, the stipulation’s concession as to the image counts could well have tainted the jury’s deliberations on video counts.  People v Guerra, 2026 NY Slip Op 03905, CtApp 6-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into what the People must prove to demonstrate the possessor of a laptop “possesses” child pornography found on the laptop. Merely viewing is not possessing. The People must prove defendant “exercised dominion and control” over the pornography by downloading or printing it for example. Here the defendant asserted he found the laptop in the garbage and any pornography found on the laptop was not put there by him.

 

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DEFENDANT HAD REQUESTED NEW COUNSEL AND ARGUED THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE PROPER INQUIRY BEFORE DENYING THE REQUEST; DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY REPRESENTED BY HIS ORIGINAL COUNSEL; THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT RULED THE DEFENDANT “ABANDONED” HIS “INVOLUNTARY PLEA” ARGUMENT BY REMAINING REPRESENTED BY THE SAME ATTORNEY AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA; THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED DEFENDANT NEVER ABANDONED THE “INVOLUNTARY PLEA” ARGUMENT AND THE LINE OF FOURTH DEPARTMENT DECISIONS TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division and invalidating a line of Fourth Department decisions, determined the defendant did not waive the argument that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. Defendant had argued the trial judge did not make the required findings after defendant requested new counsel. The Fourth Department ruled that argument was abandoned because defendant pled guilty while represented by his original defense attorney. The Court of Appeals held the defendant had never waived the “involuntary plea” argument:

The Fourth Department’s holding, the most recent in a line of cases to the same effect, is wrong for several reasons. First, as the Appellate Division acknowledged, a claim challenging the voluntariness of a plea survives even a valid appeal waiver … . A challenge to voluntariness cannot be extinguished because the same counsel about whom a defendant has complained, unsuccessfully, continued to represent the defendant at plea and sentencing. Second, in any event, these circumstances do not constitute waiver of defendant’s voluntariness claim … . Waiver “occurs when a defendant intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes or abandons a known right that would otherwise survive a guilty plea” … . Here, the fact that defendant pleaded guilty while represented by the same attorneys does not evince an intentional choice to abandon review of the voluntariness of his plea. Defendant contends that his guilty plea was an effort to mitigate the harm resulting from the court’s denial of his request for new counsel, not an abandonment of his request. To the extent that the Appellate Division relied on the fact that, during the plea colloquy, defendant did not renew his complaints about counsel, his silence does not indicate waiver. Finally, the Fourth Department’s line of cases adopting this erroneous rule originates in People v Hobart (286 AD2d 916 [4th Dept 2001]), which cited no case law or authority for its rule, nor does it explain the rule’s origins. The other Departments have not adopted that rule. People v Kelley, 2026 NY Slip Op 03904, CtApp 6-18-26

Practice Point: Here defendant requested new counsel and the request was denied. Then defendant pled guilty while represented by his original counsel. Defendant did not waive his “involuntary plea” argument by pleading guilty with his original counsel. The line of Fourth Department decisions which held a guilty plea in this context abandons defendant’s “involuntary plea” argument is no longer valid. The abandonment or waiver of an “involuntary plea” argument must be explicit.

 

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THE DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED; ANALYTICAL CRITERIA EXPLAINED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming defendant’s conviction, determined the trial judge properly denied the defense request for a missing witness charge. The Court explained the analytical criteria:

A jury convicted defendant of attempted murder in the second degree …  arising from an altercation at a traffic signal where defendant shot and permanently paralyzed the victim. Defendant asserted a justification defense. Defendant, defendant’s son, the victim, and one of the two other men travelling in the victim’s car testified to the events. Because the People did not call the third man travelling in the victim’s car to testify, defendant requested a missing witness instruction. * * *

The proponent of a missing witness charge must first “promptly notify the court that there is an uncalled witness believed to be knowledgeable about a material issue pending in the case, that such witness can be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party and that such party has failed to call him to testify” … . Once the proponent has satisfied that initial burden, the burden shifts to the opponent “to account for the witness’ absence or otherwise demonstrate that the charge would not be appropriate” … . … [T]he opposing party may establish that the missing witness charge would be inappropriate because the missing witness’s testimony would be cumulative … . If the opponent successfully rebuts the proponent’s prima facie showing, “the proponent retains the ultimate burden to show the charge would be appropriate” … .

… The People met their burden to show that the missing witness’s testimony would have been cumulative by specifically directing the court to the trial testimony and the supporting deposition of the missing witness, which offered a reasonable expectation of how the witness would testify by recounting the witness’s observations of the charged conduct. When the court asked defense counsel if she had anything to add to its review, counsel said, “[n]o,” thus failing to point to any deficiencies in the missing witness’s deposition, inconsistencies with the testimony of the other witnesses, or evidence in the record or elsewhere that might establish noncumulative testimony the missing witness might give … . People v Khiamdavanh, 2026 NY Slip Op 03903, CtApp 6-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the analytical criteria to be applied when the defense requests a missing witness jury instruction.