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RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND RECKLESS ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a dissent, reversed defendant's convictions for reckless endangerment and reckless assault. Defendant had picked up a gun that his friend (Morales) had brought to his house. In handling the gun it went off injuring his friend's leg. His friend was asleep when the gun fired. Defendant immediately said he was sorry, put the gun in a garbage can and accompanied his friend to the hospital. The Second Department determined the convictions were against the weight of the evidence because there was insufficient proof that defendant acted recklessly:

… [T]he People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his conduct would cause physical injury to another person. The People did not introduce evidence that the defendant was familiar with weapons, or the particular gun. Indeed, the gun was brought to the defendant's home by Morales, and it is undisputed that the gun discharged as the defendant handled it out of curiosity. There was no evidence from which it could be inferred that the defendant knew the gun was loaded with live ammunition, or even knew how the particular gun operated. There was no evidence introduced that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk that the gun might misfire … . Indeed, Morales testified that the defendant appeared “scared” when the gun discharged and that the defendant immediately stated that he was “sorry.” The defendant attempted to dispose of the gun and helped the victim get medical care. Contrary to the People's contention, there was no testimony that the defendant was pointing the gun at Morales when it discharged, and there was no evidence introduced establishing that the only way the pellets could have struck Morales's leg was by pointing the gun directly at Morales. People v Marin, 2018 NY Slip Op 05942, Second Dept 8-29-18

CRIMINAL LAW (RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND RECKLESS ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND RECKLESS ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND RECKLESS ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/RECKLESSNESS (CRIMINAL LAW, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND RECKLESS ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND RECKLESS ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))

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ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court had, in effect, granted plaintiff's motion for reargument of his opposition to the city's motion for summary judgment and therefore the related order was appealable. The Second Department further determined it would hear the appeal, even though plaintiff's prior appeal of the original order had been abandoned rather than withdrawn. Plaintiff, a bicyclist, alleged he had been injured by a defect in the bicycle lane. The city demonstrated it did not have prior written notice of the defect. The Second Department rejected plaintiff's argument that the “special use” exception to the prior written notice requirement applied because the city did not derive a special benefit from the bicycle lanes unrelated to the public use:

“Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice law, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous roadway condition unless it has received prior written notice of the dangerous condition, or an exception to the prior written notice requirement applies” … . “Where the City establishes that it lacked prior written notice under [Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-201], the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to the rule—that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the locality”… . The special use exception is reserved for situations where a municipality derives a special benefit from the property unrelated to the public use … .

It is undisputed that the City demonstrated, prima facie, that it lacked prior written notice of the alleged defect. It is further undisputed that the record contains no evidence that the City created the condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff's accident. The plaintiff contends that this case falls within the special use exception because bicycle lanes provide a special benefit to the City by “enhancing its status” and “attracting residents and tourists.” However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the implementation of bicycle lanes on City roadways bestowed a special benefit upon the City unrelated to the public use or that it constituted a special use of the roadways … . Budoff v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05817, Second Dept 8-22-18

NEGLIGENCE (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS  (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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MATTER SENT BACK TO RECONSTRUCT THE RECORD ABOUT POSSIBLE BRADY MATERIAL THAT WAS TO BE REVIEWED BY THE JUDGE, CURRENT RECORD IS SILENT ON THE ISSUE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department sent the matter back for a hearing to reconstruct the record as to what, if any, material was provided to the court for in camera review. Defendant alleged statements which constituted Brady material were to be given to the judge for a determination whether the material should be provided to the defense. But the record gave no indication what the materials were:

On appeal, the defendant argues that the failure to disclose the requested material constituted a Brady violation. The People were unable to provide to this Court any material they provided to the trial court for in camera review. They indicate that they have no record in their files of what material may have been submitted to the trial court. The People assert that, nevertheless, the defendant's Brady claim is based on matter dehors the record, and thus cannot be reviewed on direct appeal. However, to the extent that material was produced to the trial court for in camera review, it is properly part of the record, and the defendant's Brady claim would thus be reviewable on direct appeal. Under these circumstances, we deem it appropriate to remit the matter for a hearing to reconstruct the record as to what, if any, material was provided to the trial court for in camera review … , and thereafter to report to this Court with all convenient speed. The appeal is held in abeyance in the interim, and we do not decide any other issues at this time. People v DeFelice, 2018 NY Slip Op 05781, Second Dept 8-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, RECORD, MATTER SENT BACK TO RECONSTRUCT THE RECORD ABOUT POSSIBLE BRADY MATERIAL THAT WAS TO BE REVIEWED BY THE JUDGE, CURRENT RECORD IS SILENT ON THE ISSUE (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, RECORD, MATTER SENT BACK TO RECONSTRUCT THE RECORD ABOUT POSSIBLE BRADY MATERIAL THAT WAS TO BE REVIEWED BY THE JUDGE, CURRENT RECORD IS SILENT ON THE ISSUE (SECOND DEPT))

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TOWN PLANNING BOARD PROPERLY RESCINDED A 1987 NEGATIVE SEQRA DECLARATION FOR A SUBDIVISION BECAUSE OF THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE LIMITED TO WHETHER THE BOARD SATISFIED SEQRA PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the town planning board's rescission of a 1987 negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) was proper. The board found that the regulatory landscape in 2013 constituted new information or a change in circumstances justifying rescission. The court noted that its review powers are limited to whether the board's action satisfied SEQRA procedurally and substantively, and cannot include determining whether the board was “correct:”

The record supports the Planning Board's conclusion that changes in the regulatory landscape for environmental matters constituted new information or a change in circumstances … . Moreover, in determining that the project may result in significant adverse environmental impacts, the Planning Board identified specific environmental concerns relevant to the criteria for determining significance … .

The petitioners argue that the Planning Board's conclusion was incorrect. However, “it is not the role of the courts to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives, but to assure that the agency itself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively” … . Our review is limited to “whether the agency procedures were lawful and whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination” … . Here, the Planning Board satisfied this standard. Leonard v Planning Bd. of the Town of Union Vale, 2018 NY Slip Op 05757, Second Dept 8-15-18

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (TOWN PLANNING BOARD PROPERLY RESCINDED A 1987 NEGATIVE SEQRA DECLARATION FOR A SUBDIVISION BECAUSE OF THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, COURT'S REVIEW POWERS ARE LIMITED TO WHETHER THE BOARD SATISFIED SEQRA PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY (SECOND DEPT))/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (TOWN PLANNING BOARD PROPERLY RESCINDED A 1987 NEGATIVE SEQRA DECLARATION FOR A SUBDIVISION BECAUSE OF THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, COURT'S REVIEW POWERS ARE LIMITED TO WHETHER THE BOARD SATISFIED SEQRA PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY (SECOND DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TOWN PLANNING BOARD PROPERLY RESCINDED A 1987 NEGATIVE SEQRA DECLARATION FOR A SUBDIVISION BECAUSE OF THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, COURT'S REVIEW POWERS ARE LIMITED TO WHETHER THE BOARD SATISFIED SEQRA PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TOWN PLANNING BOARD PROPERLY RESCINDED A 1987 NEGATIVE SEQRA DECLARATION FOR A SUBDIVISION BECAUSE OF THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, COURT'S REVIEW POWERS ARE LIMITED TO WHETHER THE BOARD SATISFIED SEQRA PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY (SECOND DEPT))

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APPELLATE COURT EXERCISED ITS POWER TO REDUCE A SENTENCE EVEN THOUGH THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, NOTING EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department exercised its power to reduce a sentence in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge. In the midst of difficult divorce proceedings defendant deposited a check made out to her and her husband. The evidence demonstrated the husband’s signature was forged and defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument. The Third Department did not explain the extraordinary circumstances but deemed the four-month sentence inappropriate and imposed a time-served sentence of 13 days:

“Ordinarily, we refrain from exercising our power to modify a sentence unless the sentencing court abused its discretion or extraordinary circumstances exist warranting such a modification” … . In our view, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and defendant herself are extraordinary and warrant the exercise of that power. Defendant has already served 13 days in jail and, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, we reduce the jail component of her sentence to time served … . People v Gretzinger, 2018 NY Slip Op 05716, Third Dept 8-9-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING, APPELLATE COURT EXERCISED ITS POWER TO REDUCE A SENTENCE EVEN THOUGH THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, NOTING EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (THIRD DEPT))/SENTENCING (APPELLATE COURT EXERCISED ITS POWER TO REDUCE A SENTENCE EVEN THOUGH THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, NOTING EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, SENTENCING, APPELLATE COURT EXERCISED ITS POWER TO REDUCE A SENTENCE EVEN THOUGH THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, NOTING EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (THIRD DEPT))

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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a Frye hearing concerning a computer program, the TrueAllele Caaswork system, used to interpret mixed DNA samples. The appeal was held in abeyance and the matter remitted for the hearing:

​Defendant asserts that his trial counsel should have challenged, by way of a Frye hearing, the reliability of the TrueAllele Casework system, the proprietary “computer program that use[d] mathematics and statistics to interpret” the electronic data generated from the DNA mixtures taken from the lavender gloves and determine the statistical probability of a match between defendant’s DNA and that found on the inside of the gloves. A Frye hearing ascertains the reliability of “novel scientific evidence” by determining “whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally”… . At the time of defendant’s pretrial proceedings in 2014, there were no reported trial court or appellate court decisions in this state establishing that the reliability of the TrueAllele Casework system had been assessed through a Frye hearing or that any court in the state had otherwise accepted expert testimony regarding that proprietary computer program… . Given these circumstances, we do not find that it would have been futile for defense counsel to have requested a Frye hearing to challenge the reliability of the TrueAllele Casework system or that such an application would have had little or no likelihood of success … . People v Wilson, 2018 NY Slip Op 05715, Third Dept 8-9-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DNA, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DNA, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DNA, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/DNA (CRIMINAL LAW, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/FRYE HEARING (CRIMINAL LAW, DNA, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/TRUEALLELE CASEWORK SYSTEM (CRIMINAL LAW, DNA, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DNA, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DNA, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, FRYE HEARING, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A FRYE HEARING CONCERNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO INTERPRET MIXED DNA SAMPLES, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))

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CONVICTION OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE ACQUITTALS ON THE REMAINING 27 COUNTS OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, COURT CANNOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN APPEAL BROUGHT BY THE PEOPLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s conviction of endangering the welfare of a child should not have been set aside based upon his acquittal on all 27 counts of criminal sexual act involving a 10-year-old child. Because the appeal was brought by the People, the court was statutorily prohibited from considering defendant’s argument that the indictment was jurisdictionally defective:

The Court of Appeals has held that a factual inconsistency in the verdict does not render “the record evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction” … . “Where a jury verdict is not repugnant, it is imprudent to speculate concerning the factual determinations that underlay the verdict because what might appear to be an irrational verdict may actually constitute a jury’s permissible exercise of mercy or leniency” … . Thus, in this case, the acquittals of the criminal sexual act and sexual abuse counts did not render the evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction of endangering the welfare of a child … .

Although the Court of Appeals has noted that reviewing courts may consider jury acquittals “in some instances on legal issues such as the sufficiency of the evidence or errors in the admissibility of evidence” … , such consideration is appropriate to the extent that the acquittal provides information about the basis of, or the theory underlying, the jury’s finding of guilt on another count … . With this understanding of the basis or theory of the conviction on that other count, the court may then determine whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support that conviction … . That determination is based on an independent review of the evidence presented at trial, and is not controlled by the jury’s acquittal on the other charge … . People v Sturges, 2018 NY Slip Op 05703, Second Dept 8-8-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CONVICTION OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE ACQUITTALS ON THE REMAINING 27 COUNTS OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, COURT CANNOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN APPEAL BROUGHT BY THE PEOPLE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CONVICTION OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE ACQUITTALS ON THE REMAINING 27 COUNTS OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, COURT CANNOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN APPEAL BROUGHT BY THE PEOPLE (SECOND DEPT))/ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD (CONVICTION OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE ACQUITTALS ON THE REMAINING 27 COUNTS OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, COURT CANNOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN APPEAL BROUGHT BY THE PEOPLE (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, PEOPLE’S APPEAL, COURT CANNOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN APPEAL BROUGHT BY THE PEOPLE (SECOND DEPT)

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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND THE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE RELEVANT STANDARDS FOR USE OF SLIDES IN SWIMMING POOLS, PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY STRUCK HER HEAD ON THE BOTTOM OF THE POOL AFTER SLIDING HEAD FIRST, THE RULING ON THE MOTION IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE IT DEALS WITH THE MERITS AND AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that defendants’ motion in limine to strike plaintiff’s expert witness disclosure and preclude the expert from testifying should not have been granted. The court noted that the evidentiary motion was appealable because it involved the merits of this swimming pool injury case and affected a substantial right. The disclosure indicated the expert would testify about New York State code provisions and ANSI/INSPI-4 standards for slides used in swimming pools. Plaintiff alleged she was injured when her head struck the bottom of the pool after sliding into the water head first:

… [T]he court erred in granting that part of the motion to strike the expert witness disclosure and to preclude the expert from testifying with respect to the 2010 Residential Code of New York State (Residential Code) and the ANSI/NSPI-4 standard for aboveground residential swimming pools, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Section 1.2 of that standard provides that “[a]boveground/onground residential swimming pools are for swimming and wading only. No . . . slides or other equipment are to be added to an aboveground/onground pool that in any way indicates that an aboveground/onground pool may be used or intended for . . . sliding purposes,” and the ANSI/NSPI-4 standard is incorporated in the Residential Code that was in effect at the time of plaintiff’s accident (see 2010 Residential Code of New York State §§ R102.6, G109.1). Inasmuch as the ANSI/NSPI-4 standard applies only to residential pools, and the Residential Code applies to family dwellings (see Residential Code § R101.2), we conclude that the Residential Code section adopting the ANSI/NSPI-4 standard applies to private homeowners. Thus, we further conclude that plaintiff’s expert may properly rely on any violation of the ANSI/NSPI-4 standard as “some evidence” of defendants’ negligence … . Redmond v Redmond, 2018 NY Slip Op 05417, Fourth Dept 7-25-18

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND THE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE RELEVANT STANDARDS FOR USE OF SLIDES IN SWIMMING POOLS, PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY STRUCK HER HEAD ON THE BOTTOM OF THE POOL AFTER SLIDING HEAD FIRST, THE RULING ON THE MOTION IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE IT DEALS WITH THE MERITS AND AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND THE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE RELEVANT STANDARDS FOR USE OF SLIDES IN SWIMMING POOLS, PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY STRUCK HER HEAD ON THE BOTTOM OF THE POOL AFTER SLIDING HEAD FIRST, THE RULING ON THE MOTION IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE IT DEALS WITH THE MERITS AND AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION  (PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND THE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE RELEVANT STANDARDS FOR USE OF SLIDES IN SWIMMING POOLS, PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY STRUCK HER HEAD ON THE BOTTOM OF THE POOL AFTER SLIDING HEAD FIRST, THE RULING ON THE MOTION IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE IT DEALS WITH THE MERITS AND AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT))/APPEALS  (PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND THE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE RELEVANT STANDARDS FOR USE OF SLIDES IN SWIMMING POOLS, PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY STRUCK HER HEAD ON THE BOTTOM OF THE POOL AFTER SLIDING HEAD FIRST, THE RULING ON THE MOTION IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE IT DEALS WITH THE MERITS AND AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND THE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE RELEVANT STANDARDS FOR USE OF SLIDES IN SWIMMING POOLS, PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY STRUCK HER HEAD ON THE BOTTOM OF THE POOL AFTER SLIDING HEAD FIRST, THE RULING ON THE MOTION IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE IT DEALS WITH THE MERITS AND AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT))

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HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND, EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENT NOT RAISED BELOW OR ON APPEAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a dissent, affirmed defendant’s conviction for possession of a weapon. In a comprehensive decision too detailed to fairly summarize here the court ruled: the stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger was justified by traffic infractions; the officer’s noticing pictures of firearms on defendant’s phone and the butt of a handgun on defendant’s hip justified asking defendant to step out of the car; defendant’s statement as he got out of the car that he had a handgun on him was admissible; defendant was not entitled to put in evidence his prior statements about his intent to turn the weapon in at the police station; pictures of handguns from defendant’s phone that did not relate to the handgun which was the subject of the possession charge should not have been admitted (harmless error); and defense counsel should have been allowed to cross-examine one of the arresting officers about a federal civil rights suit which had been settled which alleged misconduct with regard to an arrest (harmless error). The court rejected the arguments that the prior statements about turning the handgun in should have been admitted as prior consistent statements or under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule:

… [A]s an essential part of its case-in-chief, the prosecution elicited, through the testimony of a police officer, the defendant’s statement regarding his intent to surrender the gun. As was his right, the defendant elected not to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination, instead relying upon the officer’s testimony to establish his defense of temporary lawful possession of the weapon. Having so elected, he foreclosed any possibility that the prosecutor would cross-examine him and challenge his defense as a recent fabrication during such questioning. Thus, since the requisite claim of a recent fabrication was absent, the defendant could not adduce evidence of a prior consistent statement to rebut it … . * * *

… [O]our dissenting colleague instead primarily argues that [the] proffered testimony regarding the defendant’s alleged statement to her of his intention to surrender the gun should have been admitted as evidence of the defendant’s state of mind rather than for the truth of its contents, thereby obviating any hearsay objection. However, the defendant never advanced this “state of mind” argument at the trial level, nor does he currently contend on this appeal that his purported statement to Armstrong should have been admitted as evidence of his state of mind. Accordingly, this issue is both unpreserved for appellate review … and not before this Court for consideration on the present appeal … . People v Watson, 2018 NY Slip Op 05342, Second Dept 7-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND, EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENT NOT RAISED BELOW OR ON APPEAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT))/PRIOR CRIMES  (EVIDENCE, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/MOLINEUX HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (CROSS-EXAMINATION, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/STATE OF MIND (HEARSAY, , HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))

,

WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S SIGNING OF A WRITTEN WAIVER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal was invalid, despite his signing a written waiver. The court noted that an appellate court cannot exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction where there is a valid waiver of appeal:

The Supreme Court did not provide the defendant with an adequate explanation of the nature of the right to appeal or the consequences of waiving that right … . The court failed to advise the defendant that he would ordinarily retain the right to appeal even after pleading guilty, but that in this case he was being asked to voluntarily relinquish that right as a condition of the plea agreement … . Moreover, the court never elicited an acknowledgment that the defendant was voluntarily waiving his right to appeal … .

Although the record on appeal reflects that the defendant signed a written appeal waiver form, a written waiver “is not a complete substitute for an on-the-record explanation of the nature of the right to appeal”… . While the written waiver in this case “expressly provided that the court had informed the defendant about the nature of his right to appeal, that representation is contradicted by the oral colloquy”… . Rather, the record reflects that the Supreme Court’s colloquy regarding the written waiver amounted to nothing more than “a simple confirmation that the defendant signed [it]”… . The transcript of the plea proceedings shows that the court did not ascertain on the record whether the defendant had read the written waiver or discussed it with defense counsel, or whether he was even aware of its contents… . Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to appeal … . People v Alston, 2018 NY Slip Op 05327, Second Dept 7-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S SIGNING OF A WRITTEN WAIVER (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S SIGNING OF A WRITTEN WAIVER (SECOND DEPT))/WAIVER (APPEALS, CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S SIGNING OF A WRITTEN WAIVER (SECOND DEPT))