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THE PROBATION CONDITION REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO CONSENT TO SEARCHES FOR DRUGS AND WEAPONS WAS NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO HIS REHABILITATION FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT; THE APPEAL WAIVER WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was not valid and went on to find that the probation condition requiring defendant to consent to “search of his person, vehicle, and place of abode, and the seizure of any illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, gun/firearm, or other weapon or contraband” was not reasonably related to his rehabilitation for disorderly conduct:

… [The record does not demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal … . The Supreme Court’s oral explanation of the appeal waiver and its consequences was unclear and incomplete, and the written waiver cannot be relied upon to cure the deficiency because “the court did not ascertain on the record whether the defendant had read the written waiver, discussed it with his attorney, or was aware of its contents” … .

… [T]he conditions of probation “shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him [or her] to do so” (Penal Law § 65.10[1]). In addition to specific conditions enumerated in the statute, the court may, in its discretion, impose “any other conditions reasonably related to [the defendant’s] rehabilitation” … and “any other reasonable condition as the court shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the incarceration of the defendant” … . Therefore, sentencing courts may require a defendant to consent to searches by his or her probation officer for weapons, illegal drugs, or other contraband so long as the condition is “individually tailored in relation to the offense” and “the defendant’s particular circumstances, including his or her background, history, and proclivities” … .

Here, the defendant’s only prior conviction was for disorderly conduct, a violation … , the offense at issue did not involve the use of a weapon or alcohol or other substances, and the defendant was not under the influence of any substances at the time of the offense. … [T]he Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing Condition No. 28, as that condition “was not individually tailored in relation to the offense, and was not, therefore, reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation, or necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life” … . People v Gibson, 2025 NY Slip Op 06724, Second Dept 12-3-25

Practice Point: Here the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct which did not involve a weapon or drugs. The probation condition requiring defendant to submit to searches for drugs or weapons was struck.

 

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DEFENDANT’S FACIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE CONCEALED CARRY STATUTE AS IT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF HIS INDICTMENT (A PROVISION OF THE STATUTE WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE US SUPREME COURT JUST PRIOR TO DEFENDANT’S INDICTMENT) SURVIVED HIS WAIVER OF APPEAL; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT NEVER APPLIED FOR A FIREMARM LICENSE, HE HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE STATUTE BASED ON HIS CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A WEAPON; THE CHALLENGED PORTION OF THE STATUTE IS SEVERABLE FROM THE OTHER PROVISIONS; DEFENDANT WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION RENDERED THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ALL CONCEIVABLE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FACIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a three-judge concurrence, determined: (1) the defendant’s challenge to the facial constitutionality of the state’s firearm licensing scheme survived his waiver of appeal; (2) the defendant, who was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a weapon, has standing to challenge the state’s firearm licensing scheme as it was codified at the time of his indictment; (3) although one of the requirements for licensure in the relevant statute (Penal Law 400.00(2)(f) was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court just before defendant’s indictment, that requirement is severable and did not render the entire statutory scheme unconstitutional. In 2022 the US Supreme Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen (597 US 1, found unconstitutional the statute’s “proper cause” language, which required an individual seeking a concealed-carry license for a pistol or revolver to “demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community,” Although since removed, the “proper cause” language remained in the statute at the time of defendant’s indictment:

We hold that a facial constitutional challenge such as the one presented here likewise falls into the narrow class of non-waivable appellate claims. Hornbook law underscores the very high bar for this type of challenge: a litigant must contend that “in any degree and in every conceivable application, the law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment” … . In the rare circumstances where a facial challenge is successful, “the law is invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid application” … , and thus the State will lack authority to prosecute or punish the defendant or anyone else for the conduct at issue. … [A]facial challenge goes squarely to the “fairness in the process itself” … , and transcends an individual defendant’s concerns to implicate “a larger societal interest in its correct resolution” …  . Accordingly, a waiver that precludes appellate review of a facial constitutional challenge to a criminal statute should not be enforced. * * *

Both the People and the Attorney General argue that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the licensing scheme because he never applied for a firearm license. We disagree. * * *

We find the “proper cause” requirement severable. The text and structure of the licensing scheme evince a clear legislative intent to regulate the lawful purchase, possession, and use of firearms. The licensing scheme is detailed and multi-faceted; the “proper cause” provision was just one aspect of a much broader scheme that includes a variety of distinct requirements. People v Johnson, 2025 NY Slip Op 06528, Ct App 11-24-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute will survive a waiver of appeal, when a defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute, when a portion of a challenged statute will be deemed severable from the other provisions, and whether an unconstitutional statutory provision renders the entire statute unconstitutional in every conceivable circumstance (a requirement for facial unconstitutionality).

 

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BECAUSE THERE IS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY PURCHASED BY A CHURCH WAS NOT BEING USED AS A RETREAT IN VIOLATION OF THE ZONING LAWS AND THEREFORE IS TAX EXEMPT, THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONSTRAINED TO AFFIRM; THERE WAS A THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three-judge dissent, determined Supreme Court and the Appellate Division properly ruled that the property in Sullivan County purchased by a church in Queens was not being used in violation of the zoning laws and was tax-exempt. The factual question was whether the property was being used as a retreat for church members, which would violate the zoning laws, or whether the property was being used to grow vegetables, which would not violate the zoning law. The majority held it was constrained to affirm because there was support in the record for the factual findings made by Supreme Court:

These proceedings under the Real Property Tax Law present a factual dispute about how a church based in Flushing, Queens, actually used a property it purchased in the Town of Callicoon. Because the lower courts committed no legal error, and because we may not reweigh facts or redetermine issues of credibility, we affirm. * * *

Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of the hearing court but rather to determine whether there is record support for the decision it reached. Here, the trial record supports Supreme Court’s finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that although petitioner may have purchased the property with the intention of using it as a “retreat,”[FN4] its actual use of the property was to clear approximately one acre of the parcel and, on that cleared area, grow vegetables for charitable distribution to low-income Queens residents. The only other trial evidence about actual use of the property was that the Town Supervisor, who lived across the street from the subject property, regularly harvested hay from the property and never saw any overnight use of the property for “retreat” purposes. Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v Assessor, Town of Callicoon, 2025 NY Slip Op 06526. CtApp 11-24-25

Practice Point: The Court of Appeals is constrained to accept the lower courts’ factual findings if there is support for them in the record.

 

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THE DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE JUDGE FAILED TO ADVISE DEFENDANT (1) THAT THE STATE WOULD BEAR THE COSTS OF AN APPEAL IF THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT AFFORD THEM; AND (2) THE WAIVER DID NOT ENCOMPASS THE LOSS OF RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND THE WAIVER OF COSTS, FEES, AND EXPENSES; IN ADDITION THE JUDGE DID NOT ASCERTAIN WHETHER DEFFENDANT READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE WRITTEN WAIVER FORM, OR WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD DISCUSSED THE WAIVER WITH COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid:

… [T]he defendant’s purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid. Among other things, during the appeal waiver colloquy, the Supreme Court failed to advise the defendant that if he could not afford the costs of an appeal or of an attorney to represent him on appeal, then the State would bear those costs … or to advise the defendant that the waiver of the right to appeal did not encompass the loss of attendant rights to counsel and the waiver of costs, fees, and expenses … . Although the defendant executed a written appeal waiver form, the court failed to ascertain on the record whether the defendant had read the written waiver, was aware of all of its contents, and had discussed the entire written waiver with counsel, including the portion of the written waiver addressing the attendant rights to counsel and the waiver of costs, fees, and expenses … . Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to appeal, and the purported appeal waiver does not preclude appellate review of any of the defendant’s contentions … . People v Mingo, 2025 NY Slip Op 06335, Second Dept 11-19-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what a judge must advise and ask the defendant to ensure the waiver of appeal is knowing and intelligent.

 

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THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HAD REVERSED ON APPEAL, DETERMINING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; WHEN SUPREME COURT WROTE A JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BASED ON THE SECOND DEPARTMENT’S DECISION IT IMPROPERLY ADDED A SENTENCE WHICH WAS NOT IN THE DECISION; A JUDGMENT BASED UPON AN APPELLATE DECISION MUST STRICTLY CONFORM TO THE DECISION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the judgment entered by Supreme Court after reversal on apply did not strictly conform to the Second Department’s decision. Presumable the extra sentence added by Supreme Court was struck on appeal:

… [T]he judgment should not have included the provision directing “that Plaintiff is permitted to file a new action as against [the defendant] in accordance with Brothers v. Florence, 95 NY2d 290 (2000),” as the judgment was entered upon this Court’s decision and order dated December 28, 2022 … , which did not grant such relief to the plaintiff … . “A ‘written order [or judgment] must conform strictly to the court’s decision,’ and in the event of an inconsistency between a judgment and a decision or order upon which it is based, the decision or order controls” … . “Such an inconsistency may be corrected either by way of a motion for resettlement or on appeal” … . Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v Smith, 2025 NY Slip Op 06308, Second Dept 11-19-25

Practice Point: After reversal on appeal, any judgment written by the lower court must strictly conform to the language of the appellate decision. Here Supreme Court wrote a judgment dismissing the complaint but improperly added a sentence (which was not in the appellate decision) to the effect that plaintiff was permitted to file a new action.

 

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THE PETITION ALLEGED THE DECEASED CO-TRUSTEE CONCEALED THE TRUST AND DISTRIBUTIONS TO THE TRUST BENEFICIARIES; PETITIONERS HAD STANDING TO SEEK DISGORGEMENT OF THE COMMISSIONS PAID TO THE DECEASED CO-TRUSTEE UNDER “BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY” AND “FAITHLESS SERVANT” THEORIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition alleging Kendall Chen, the deceased co-trustee of his father’s trust, breached his fiduciary duty to the trust and to the trust beneficiaries, and alleging a “faithless servant” claim, should not have been dismissed. Kendall allegedly concealed the existence of the trust from the beneficiaries (his children). Petitioners had standing to seek disgorgement of the commissions paid to Kendall:

The petition alleged that Kendall actively subverted the trust’s stated purpose insofar as, from 2000 until 2016, he concealed from his children the existence of the trust and the joint bank accounts into which distributions from the trust were made for each grandchild, and converted a significant portion of those funds for his personal financial benefit. If proven, Kendall’s conduct constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty to the trust (as well as to his children), and the trust may recover the commissions paid to him at a time when he was a faithless servant, even if the trust suffered no damages … .

Indeed, the trust was damaged by Kendall’s receipt of commissions at a time when he allegedly breached his fiduciary duty to the trust, and it is for that reason that petitioners have standing to seek disgorgement of the commissions paid to Kendall from 2000 to 2015. The corpus of the trust was diminished by the payment of the commissions when Kendall was diverting to himself the distributions intended for his children. …

We reject the estate’s argument that the faithless servant claim is unpreserved. The doctrine has a “close relationship and overlap” with breach of fiduciary duty, which petitioners did raise before the motion court … .  Matter of Chen, 2025 NY Slip Op 06255, First Dept 11-13-25

Practice Point: Here it was alleged the co-trustee concealed the existence of the trust and distributions from the trust from his children, the beneficiaries of the trust. The petitioners had standing to seek disgorgement of the commissions paid to the co-trustee under “breach of fiduciary duty” and “faithless servant” theories.

 

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RESPONDENT THREATENED SELF HARM AND WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW; THE JUDGE DECLINED TO ISSUE A TEMPORARY “EXTREME RISK PROTECTION ORDER” (ERPO) AND SET THE MATTER DOWN FOR A HEARING; SUBSEQUENTLY THE JUDGE, SUA SPONTE, CANCELED THE HEARING AND DISMISSED THE PETITION, ACTIONS FOR WHICH THE JUDGE HAD NO AUTHORITY; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the judge, who had declined to issue a temporary “extreme risk protection order” (ERPO) for respondent and had set the matter down for a hearing, did not have the authority to, sua sponte, cancel the hearing and dismiss the petition. After respondent had threatened self harm he was taken into custody pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law:

… [O]ne day prior to the scheduled hearing, Supreme Court, sua sponte, issued a decision canceling the hearing and dismissing the petition. As grounds for the dismissal, the court found that dismissal best served the interest of preserving judicial and law enforcement resources given respondent’s inability to purchase a firearm due to the arrest pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41, purported hospital admission pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) and the lack of any indication that respondent owned any firearms in New York at the time of the proceeding. …

To begin, as the order on appeal was issued on a sua sponte basis, no appeal lies as of right (see CPLR 5701 [a] [2]). Nevertheless, “we treat the notice of appeal as a request for permission to appeal and grant the request” … .

… Supreme Court’s sua sponte order dismissing the petition must be reversed. “[S]ua sponte dismissals are to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant them” … . Here, there is no indication that such extraordinary circumstances exist. The grounds relied upon by Supreme Court — that the relief that would be provided by an ERPO was “duplicative and an inefficient use of judicial and law enforcement resources” — to the extent that they could constitute meritorious grounds for dismissal, require that petitioner be given the opportunity to respond and object … . Moreover, CPLR 6343 (1) clearly mandates that if a temporary ERPO is denied, such as occurred here, the court hold a hearing, no later than 10 business days after the application for the ERPO is served on the respondent, to determine whether an ERPO should be issued. Supreme Court’s sua sponte dismissal on grounds that are entirely absent from the statute was improper, and we therefore reverse and remit to conduct a hearing as required. Matter of Hogencamp v Matthew KK., 2025 NY Slip Op 06106, Third Dept 11-6-25

Practice Point: Sua sponte orders are not appealable as of right. Permission to appeal must be requested.​

Practice Point: Here the respondent threatened self harm and was taken into custody pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law. A judge’s authority is constrained by the Mental Hygiene Law. Once an “extreme risk protection order” (ERPO) is denied by the judge and the matter is set down for a hearing, the judge cannot, sua sponte, cancel the hearing and deny the petition for reasons not prescribed in the Mental Hygiene Law.

 

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THE “REFRAIN FROM GANG-RELATED ASSOCIATIONS” PROBATION CONDITIONS WERE STRUCK BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH GANGS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a probation condition imposed by the court must be stricken because it was not shown to be related to “defendant’s rehabilitative prospects:”​

Defendant’s challenges to two of his probation conditions as unrelated to his rehabilitation do not require preservation and survive his waiver of the right to appeal … . * * *

… [T]he probation condition requiring defendant to “[r]efrain from wearing or displaying gang paraphernalia and having any association with a gang or members of a gang if directed by the Department of Probation” must be stricken, as there is no evidence that defendant’s crime was connected to any gang activities or that he has any history of gang membership or gang … . Accordingly, this condition was not reasonably necessary to further defendant’s rehabilitative prospects based on his background and proclivities …. . People v Holguin, 2025 NY Slip Op 06141, First Dept 11-6-25

Practice Point: Challenges to probation conditions need not be preserved for appeal and survive a waiver of appeal.

Practice Point: The appellate courts will strike probation conditions which are not demonstrated to be relevant to the defendant’s offense. Two other decisions, not summarized here, were released this week in which the probation condition requiring defendant to financially support dependents was struck because it was not shown to be relevant to defendant’s rehabilitation for the charged offense. (People v Bonfante, 2025 NY Slip Op 06068, Second Dept 11-6-25;  People v Larkin, 2025 NY Slip Op 06077, Second Dept 11-6-25)

 

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POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) CAN PROPERLY BE IMPOSED WHERE A DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA); DEFENDANT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO APPEAL THE SENTENCE AS EXCESSIVE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined five years post-release supervision (PRS) was properly imposed as part of defendant’s sentence and defendant waived the right to appeal her sentence as excessive. Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to ten years incarceration under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA):​

Defendant does not challenge the carceral component of her sentence. Instead, she asserts that the court had no statutory authority to impose five years’ PRS on a defendant convicted of a class A felony and sentenced under the DVSJA. We may review defendant’s claim that her sentence is illegal even though, as we explain, her appeal waiver is valid … . However, defendant misinterprets the statutory scheme, and her claim boils down to a policy argument best suited for the legislature, not the judiciary. * * *

The legislative history of the DVSJA supports our straightforward reading of the Penal Law, and our conclusion that the legislature only intended to give judges discretion to reduce the periods of incarceration for certain defendants who are domestic violence survivors, not to wholly eliminate PRS in such cases … . * * *

… [T]he court specifically advised defendant that certain issues would survive the waiver, and counsel confirmed that they had reviewed those issues with defendant. The written waiver further clarified that, as explained in defendant’s conversation with the court and counsel, defendant was waiving any claim that her sentence is excessive. Under these circumstances, the Appellate Division properly concluded that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived her excessive sentence claim. People v Hernandez, 2025 NY Slip Op 05874, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: Post-release supervision (PRS) can properly be imposed where a defendant is sentenced under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA).

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT NOTIFIED THAT IF HE FAILED TO PAY RESTITUTION HIS SENTENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED; ENHANCED SENTENCE VACATED AND AGREED-UPON SENTENCE IMPOSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s enhanced sentence and imposing the agreed-upon sentence, determined defendant was not given notice that his failure to pay restitution would result in an enhanced sentence. The agreed sentence was 2 to 6 years and the enhanced sentence was 4 to 12 years:

Defendant argues that County Court erred in imposing a prison sentence in excess of that promised in the plea agreement and requests that this Court resentence him to the agreed-upon term of 2 to 6 years in prison, without remanding the matter to County Court. Defendant contends that while payment of restitution was contemplated prior to sentencing, County Court never advised him that if he failed to pay restitution by the sentencing date it could impose an enhanced prison sentence. We agree. Defendant’s argument survives his unchallenged appeal waiver … . However, given that the court’s enhanced sentence was pronounced at the very end of the sentencing proceeding, without advance warning that it was considering an enhanced sentence or even a clear finding that defendant had violated an express condition of the plea agreement, we find that he had no practical ability to raise an objection and, thus, preservation was not required … . Under settled law, “the violation of an explicit and objective plea condition that was accepted by the defendant can result in the imposition of an enhanced sentence, and, conversely, a sentencing court may not impose an enhanced sentence unless it has informed the defendant of specific conditions that the defendant must abide by or risk such enhancement, or give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea before the enhanced sentence is imposed” … . People v Nestler, 2025 NY Slip Op 05852, Third Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the criteria which allow a judge to ignore an agreed-upon sentence and impose an enhanced sentence.​