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MARIJUANA AND GRAVITY-KNIFE CONVICTIONS VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE BECAUSE THE “OFFENSES” HAVE BEEN DECRIMINALIZED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department vacated defendant’s marijuana and gravity-knife convictions because the “offenses” had been decriminalized:

The defendant’s conviction of criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree “‘became a nullity by operation of law, independently of any appeal, and without requiring any action by this [c]ourt,'” pursuant to CPL 160.50(5) … . Consequently, the appeal from so much of the judgment as convicted the defendant of criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree must be dismissed as academic … . * * *

The defendant contends that the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree predicated on the defendant’s possession of a gravity knife should be vacated because Penal Law § 265.01(1) has since been amended to decriminalize the simple possession of a gravity knife. The People, in the exercise of their broad prosecutorial discretion, agree that the judgment should be modified by vacating that conviction. Even though the statute decriminalizing the simple possession of a gravity knife did not take effect until May 30, 2019 … , under the circumstances of this case, we vacate that conviction and the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of the indictment, as a matter of discretion in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction … . People v Lester, 2022 NY Slip Op 04977, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: Here the marijuana and gravity-knife convictions were vacated in the interest of justice because the offenses had been decriminalized. The gravity-knife conviction was vacated even though the offense was not decriminalized at the time of its commission.

 

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A JURY NOTE WHICH REQUIRES NO ACTION BY THE COURT NEED NOT BE SHARED WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was no need for the judge to notify defense counsel of a jury note which did not require any action by the court, Also, jury notes requesting exhibits did not need to be shared with counsel because counsel agreed at the outset of deliberations that the jury could request exhibits:

In the defendant’s view, the Supreme Court’s failure to read note 6 into the record constituted a mode of proceedings error. We disagree.

Note 6 did not request “further instruction or information with respect to the law, [or] with respect to the content or substance of any trial evidence” (CPL 310.30). Nor did it indicate that the jury was deadlocked or struggling to reach a verdict on any or all of the counts submitted to it, or otherwise apprise the court of a significant development in the deliberations … . All the note conveyed was that the jury was continuing to deliberate on all of the charges, and that they were nearing a verdict on the first count in the defendant’s case, as well as the two counts in the codefendant’s case. Plainly, then, there was no action for the Supreme Court to take, and, concomitantly, no input or participation from defense counsel was necessary to ensure that the defendant’s rights were “adequately protect[ed]” … . Note 6 was, in short, not a substantive communication from the jury. People v Edwards, 2022 NY Slip Op 04818, Second Dept 8-3-22

Practice Point: A jury note which does not require action by the judge need not be shared with defense counsel. Here the note informed the judge that they were near a verdict on certain counts.

 

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PETITIONER SEX OFFENDER’S APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF HIS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION WAS MOOT BECAUSE APPROPRIATE HOUSING HAD BEEN FOUND WHILE THE APPEAL WAS PENDING; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT CONSIDERED THE APPEAL UNDER THE EXCEPTION-TO-THE-MOOTNESS-DOCTRINE AND REITERATED THAT WHEN A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER HAS COMPLETED HIS MAXIMUM PRISON TIME AND SUITABLE HOUSING IS NOT AVAILABLE, HE MUST BE TRANSFERRED TO A RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY (RTF) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, finding the appeal from the denial of petitioner’s habeas corpus petitioner moot, over a dissent, considered the appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The Third Department held that when a level three sex offender has completed his maximum prison time, and Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) compliant housing cannot be found, the inmate must be placed in a residential treatment facility (RTF) to await housing. Here, while the appeal was pending, proper housing was found for petitioner. The dissent argued there was nothing novel about the case and invoking the exception-to-the-mootness-doctrine to hear the appeal was not necessary:

This Court has previously held, and we reiterate, that “when a risk level three sex offender reaches his or her maximum expiration date, [the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] must release the individual to either an approved residence or to an [appropriate] RTF” … . People ex rel. Jones v Collado, 2022 NY Slip Op 04768, Second Dept 7-28-22

Practice Point: Here the appeal from the denial of petitioner-sex-offender’s habeas corpus petition was moot because appropriate post-release housing had been found. The Third Department considered the appeal pursuant to the exception-to-the-mootness-doctrine to reiterate that when a level three sex offender has completed his maximum prison time he must be placed in SARA compliant housing or, or if housing is not available, in a residential treatment facility (RTF).

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS SPEEDING AT THE TIME HE LOST CONTROL OF THE CAR, WENT DOWN AN EMBANKMENT AND STRUCK A TREE, KILLING A PASSENGER, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE “DANGEROUS SPEEDING;” THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE AND RECKLESS DRIVING CHARGES; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s criminally negligent homicide conviction in this traffic accident case, determined the evidence was not legally sufficient. Although the issue was not preserved, it was considered in the interest of justice. Defendant attempted to exit a highway at 74 miles per hour where the ramp speed limit was 45 miles per hour and the highway speed limit was 65 miles per hour. Defendant lost control, went down an embankment, and hit a tree. A passenger was killed:

… [T]he evidence was legally insufficient to establish “the kind of seriously condemnatory behavior” … in addition to speeding that is necessary to “transform ‘speeding’ into ‘dangerous speeding'” … . The People’s evidence established only that the defendant attempted to navigate the curved profile of the exit ramp at an excessive speed, and was late in attempting corrective measures by manually steering the wheel. While this conduct reflected poor judgment in the defendant’s operation of his vehicle given the roadway environment … , it failed to establish that the defendant engaged in “some additional affirmative act aside from driving faster than the posted speed limit,” as required to support a finding of criminal negligence or recklessness … . Accordingly, we vacate the convictions of criminally negligent homicide and reckless driving … . People v Cardona, 2022 NY Slip Op 04733, Second Dept 7-27-22

Practice Point: Defendant was speeding (74 miles per hour on an exit ramp) when he lost control of the car and struck a tree, killing a passenger. The evidence did not demonstrate “dangerous speeding.” Therefore the criminally negligent homicide and reckless driving convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence.

 

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ON REMAND FROM THE US SUPREME COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND THAT THE VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION WAS HARMLESS ERROR (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, on remand from the US Supreme Court, determined the evidentiary error was harmless and affirmed defendant’s conviction. The defendant was convicted of murder. The plea allocution of Morris, who was initially prosecuted for the same murder (but exonerated by DNA evidence). was allowed in evidence in defendant’s trial, a violation of defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. The Court of Appeals held the evidence against defendant was overwhelming rendering the violation of defendant’s right of confrontation harmless:

… “[T]here is no reasonable possibility” that the erroneously admitted plea allocution “might have contributed to defendant’s conviction” (People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]). The plea allocution neither exculpated Morris nor inculpated defendant as the shooter, thus allowing defendant to argue to the jury that Morris was the perpetrator. Indeed, it merely supported a conclusion that Morris possessed a .357 magnum revolver on the day in question, and [a witness] had already testified to that alleged fact. … [T]he prosecutor’s reliance on the plea was exceedingly minimal. Under these circumstances and in light of the other, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, the error below was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (id. at 237, citing Chapman v California , 386 US 18 [1967]). People v Hemphill, 2022 NY Slip Op 04663, CtApp 7-21-22

Practice Point: It is worth remembering that even a constitutional error, here the violation of defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him, is subject to a harmless-error analysis.

 

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THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS AGAINST DEFENDANT IN THIS FIRST DEGREE MURDER (MURDER-FOR-HIRE) TRIAL WAS AN ACCOMPLICE AS A MATTER OF LAW; IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO FAIL TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, IT WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; THE DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED SILENCE IN RESPONSE TO AN ACCUSATION (ADOPTIVE ADMISSION) WAS INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT HEARD THE ACCUSATION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s murder-first-degree conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the jury should have been instructed that the defendant’s paramour, Lovell, who was involved the plot to have the victim killed by a third-party, and who testified against the defendant at trial, was an accomplice as a matter of law. Despite defense counsel’s failure to preserve the error, the issue was considered on appeal in the interest of justice. The Second Department also held that the “adoptive admission” by the defendant should not have been admitted in evidence. It was alleged the defendant remained silent when her mother-in-law accused her of killing the victim. The People did not prove defendant actually heard the accusation:

Supreme Court failed to instruct the jury that Lovell was an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement. Although the court was “under a duty to charge . . . even without a request from the defendant … , the rule of preservation requires that defense counsel object to the court’s failure in order to preserve a question of law for appellate review … . Notwithstanding defense counsel’s failure to object at trial, under the circumstances of this case, we reach the unpreserved error in the interest of justice and find that the failure to properly instruct the jury constituted reversible error … …. [T]he evidence of the defendant’s guilt, which consisted principally of Lovell’s testimony, was not overwhelming … . * * *

“To use a defendant’s silence or evasive response as evidence against the defendant, the People must demonstrate that the defendant heard and understood the assertion, and reasonably would have been expected to deny it” … . Here, the People failed to establish that the defendant actually heard the mother-in-law’s accusations or that the defendant had an opportunity to respond to the accusations prior to the mother-in-law disconnecting the phone call. Therefore, the court should not have admitted the evidence. People v Noel, 2022 NY Slip Op 04647, Second Dept 7-20-22

Practice Point: The testimony of defendant’s paramour, who was involved in the murder-for-hire, was the principal evidence against the defendant. The failure to instruct the jury that the paramour was an accomplice as a matter of law whose testimony must be corroborated was reversible error. Although the error was not preserved the Second Department considered it ion appeal in the interest of justice. The defendant’s silence in the face of an accusation (an adoptive admission) should not have been admitted in evidence because the People did not prove the defendant heard the accusation.

 

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AN APPEAL FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DECISION WHICH IS INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE MUST BE DISMISSED; THE DECISION MAY BE REVIEWED IN AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DETERMINATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department held that the Workers’ Compensation Board decision was interlocutory in nature and could only be considered in an appeal from the final determination:

“In order to avoid piecemeal review of workers’ compensation cases, a Board decision that is interlocutory in nature and does not dispose of all substantive issues nor reach legal threshold issues that may be determinative of the claim is not the proper subject of an appeal” … . “As none of the arguments raised on this appeal address potentially dispositive threshold legal questions, and ‘the nonfinal decision may be reviewed upon an appeal from the Board’s final determination, this appeal must be dismissed'” … . Matter of Polizzano v Medline Indus., 2022 NY Slip Op 04604, Third Dept 7-14-22

Practice Point: A decision from the Workers’ Compensation Board which does not reach issues that may be determinative of the claim is interlocutory in nature and will not be considered on appeal. However, the interlocutory decision may be reviewed in an appeal from the final determination.

 

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THE EVIDENCE OF “WITNESS ELIMINATION MURDER” WAS INSUFFICIENT; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE VICTIM, DEFENDANT’S WIFE, WITNESSED THE DEFENDANT’S SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS DAUGHTER AND NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT FEARED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WERE IMMINENT; MURDER FIRST DEGREE REDUCED TO MURDER SECOND DEGREE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over two separate concurrences, determined the evidence that the defendant murdered his wife to eliminate her as a witness was legally insufficient. Therefore defendant’s first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder. Defendant was in a sexual relationship with his minor daughter. The People alleged defendant killed his wife to prevent her from testifying about his sexual relationship with his daughter. But there was no evidence defendant’s wife had witnessed the sexual relationship:

There was no evidence that the deceased victim observed defendant and the minor victim engage in sexual relations or sexual conduct, and the minor victim did not disclose the sex offenses to the deceased victim. At most, the deceased victim may have been a “coincidental witness” since she had suspicions of the sex offenses, but she would not have been in a position to provide “powerful, direct evidence” of defendant’s criminal sexual acts … . Second, there was no evidence that defendant feared that criminal proceedings were imminent or that he was otherwise cognizant of the fact that the deceased victim might be called to testify against him. The People point to defendant’s statement — in a recorded jail telephone conversation that took place with his mother after defendant was indicted on murder in the second degree — wherein he states that if the prosecution had recorded his jail telephone conversations with the minor victim after the murder (and thus become aware of the sexual relationship between them), the People would be “using murder one.” In our opinion this conclusory statement does not constitute an admission to witness elimination murder. Aside from its speculative nature, there is simply no evidence in the record that defendant was even aware of the elements of murder in the first degree, let alone that he had this concern at the time of the stabbing. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence is simply insufficient to establish a witness elimination murder … . People v Agan, 2022 NY Slip Op 04581, Third Dept 7-14-22

Practice Point: Here two elements of “witness elimination murder” were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. There was no evidence the victim, defendant’s wife, was a witness to defendant’s sexual relationship with his daughter. And there was no evidence defendant feared an imminent criminal prosecution based upon his sexual relationship with his daughter. The first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder.

 

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THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE BASED UPON STRIKING THE VICTIM WITH HER CAR; IN SUMMATION THE PROSECUTOR CHARACTERIZED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS AS INTENTIONAL, DENIGRATED THE DEFENSE THEORIES, REFERRED TO IRRELEVANT CONDUCT, AND ASSUMED FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE; DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BY THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT; THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct. Although some of the errors were not preserved, the appeal was considered in the interest of justice:

The charge of criminally negligent homicide arose from an incident in which the defendant, while operating her motor vehicle, struck Evelyn Rodriguez, who had been standing next to the defendant’s vehicle, thereby causing Rodriguez’s death. The remaining charges were related to the defendant’s conduct of removing and damaging certain personal property placed by Rodriguez and her partner, Freddy Cuevas, on the sidewalk outside a residence owned by the defendant’s mother. The items were part of a memorial to Rodriguez’s and Cuevas’s daughter, Kayla, who had been murdered two years earlier and whose body had been discovered on the defendant’s mother’s property. * * *

The prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence relating to the charge of criminally negligent homicide and confused the jury by repeatedly using language to suggest that the defendant’s conduct in striking Rodriguez with the vehicle was intentional or reckless. … [T]he prosecutor used language such as “conscious, blameworthy choices,” “knowingly commit blameworthy acts,” “took a risk that took [Rodriguez’s] life,” “you don’t get to knowingly choose to do something wrong,” “[y]ou don’t get to drive over someone because you feel a mother’s memorial is a nuisance,” and, illogically, “[s]he failed to perceive that risk, and she chose to go ahead anyway” … .

The prosecutor continually denigrated the defense, referring to defense theories, repeatedly, as “excuses,” and also as “garbage,” and he falsely and provocatively claimed that the “defense repeatedly argued that the death of Kayla . . . was an inconvenience and a nuisance” … . The prosecutor continually evoked sympathy for Rodriguez using strong emotional terms, such as referring to her, and to her and Cuevas together, numerous times, as “the grieving mother” and the “grieving parents” and referring to Kayla repeatedly as Rodriguez’s “murdered daughter” or “murdered teenage daughter” … .

… [I]n arguing that the defendant engaged in “blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk” so as to meet the standard of criminally negligent homicide … , the prosecutor, throughout the course of his summation, referred to conduct not relevant to the driving conduct that formed the basis of the criminally negligent homicide charge. Specifically, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to consider the defendant’s actions in removing the memorial, which he recurrently characterized as “blameworthy,” when determining whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently blameworthy to constitute criminally negligent homicide. The prosecutor compounded the prejudicial effect of this error by repeatedly using inflammatory and emotional language, and assuming facts not in evidence, to describe the defendant’s conduct of removing the memorial. People v Drago, 2022 NY Slip Op 04561, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: Even if the errors are not preserved, prosecutorial misconduct during summation may require reversal. The defendant was charged with criminal negligence, yet in summation the prosecutor kept characterizing her conduct as intentional. In addition, the prosecutor denigrated the defense theories, referred to defendant’s conduct which was not relevant to the charge and assumed facts not in evidence.

 

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ONE OF MOTHER’S CHILDREN OPENED A LOCKED WINDOW, TOOK OUT THE SCREEN AND DROPPED HIS SIBLING TWO STORIES WHILE MOTHER WAS HOME; MOTHER COULD NOT HAVE FORESEEN THE INCIDENT; THE NEGLECT FINDING WAS REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence did not support the neglect findings. Although mother knew one of her children was sometimes aggressive, she could not have known he would open a locked window, take out the screen, and drop his sibling two stories. Apparently mother was in the bathroom with the door open when this happened. In addition, neither the children’s hygiene nor the condition of the apartment established neglect. The Fourth Department noted that, although no appeal lies from a decision, as opposed to an order, the paper here met the essential requirements of an order:

… [T]here was nothing intrinsically dangerous about leaving two of the children to eat and watch television while the mother was in the bathroom with the door open … . The record establishes that the mother knew that one of her children was sometimes aggressive towards his younger siblings, but there is no evidence in the record that she was aware that he may open a locked window, remove the screen, and drop his sibling from a height of two stories … . In making that determination, we note that the window involved in the incident was not deemed dangerous by a caseworker during a home visit less than a month before the incident.

… [P]etitioner’s evidence regarding the hygiene of the children and the condition of the apartment, which petitioner’s caseworker testified met “minimal standards,” was not sufficient to establish neglect … . Further, although a “finding of neglect may be entered where, though [being] financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so, a parent fails to provide the child[ren] with adequate clothing and basic medical care” … , here, “[n]o evidence was presented at the fact-finding hearing concerning the financial status of the mother” … . Matter of Silas W., 2022 NY Slip Op 04506, Fourth Dept 7-8-22

Practice Point: Mother was in the bathroom with the door open when one of her children opened a locked window, took out the screen and dropped his sibling two stories. That scenario did not support the neglect finding. Neither the children’s hygiene nor the condition of the apartment warranted a neglect finding.