,

MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINTS AND INFORMATIONS CANNOT BE CORRECTED BY AMENDMENT; RATHER A SUPERSEDING INSTRUMENT SUPPORTED BY A SWORN STATEMENT WITH THE CORRECT FACTS MUST BE FILED; THE ISSUE WAS NOT WAIVED BY DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA TO THE AMENDED INSTRUMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the Appellate Term and overruling precedent from 1954, over a two-judge dissent and an additional dissent, determined the misdemeanor complaint and the information to which the complaint was converted should not have been amended to correct wrong dates. The Criminal Procedure Law does not include a provision allowing amendment of misdemeanor complaints and informations. The proper procedure is to file a superseding accusatory instrument with a sworn statement supporting the correct facts. This appellate issue was not waived by defendant’s guilty plea:

The text, structure, and legislative history of the CPL, as well as a straightforward application of our canons of statutory construction, all demonstrate that the CPL does not permit the kinds of factual amendments once countenanced by [People v Easton (307 NY 336 [1954])]. The CPL does provide its own pathway for correcting factual errors in complaints and informations, through the filing of a superseding accusatory instrument (CPL 100.50), not through a prosecutor’s amendment of facts averred by someone else. We recognize that the October 25, 2015 date in the accusatory instrument here cannot possibly be correct and that the correct date can be inferred from information outside the four corners of the accusatory instrument. However, in evaluating the sufficiency of an accusatory instrument we do not look beyond its four corners (including supporting declarations appended thereto) … . It is the People’s responsibility to obtain a sworn statement with the correct factual allegations and proceed on a superseding instrument. People v Hardy, 2020 NY Slip Op 05803, CtApp 10-15-20

 

, ,

EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT, ROBBERY AND BURGLARY FIRST CONVICTIONS REDUCED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reducing defendants’ convictions, determined the evidence of physical injury was legally insufficient:

Physical injury is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00[9]). The complainant stated that her injuries consisted of a laceration on her neck from the defendant pulling off her necklace and scratches on her wrist from the defendant pulling off her bracelets. She did not go to the hospital and testified that her neck was sore and her wrist felt a little sore and afterwards she had pain in her neck and wrist, although she did not specify when the pain began or as to its duration. The officer who responded to the scene testified that the complainant had a scratch on her neck. Under these circumstances, there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the complainant suffered substantial pain or impairment of her physical condition … . Accordingly, the defendant’s convictions of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the second degree should be reduced to burglary in the second degree and robbery in the third degree, respectively, which lesser crimes were proven at trial … . People v Smith, 2020 NY Slip Op 05782, Second Dept 10-14-20

 

, , ,

THE 2ND DEPARTMENT CRITICIZED THE PIECEMEAL DECISION-MAKING BY SUPREME COURT IN THIS COMPLEX DIVORCE PROCEEDING WHICH RESULTED IN AN INADEQUATE RECORD ON APPEAL; HOWEVER THE 2ND DEPARTMENT ADDRESSED MANY OF THE FACTUAL ISSUES IN A DETAILED OPINION WORTH READING BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO SUMMARIZE HERE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a detailed, fact-specific opinion by Justice Scheinkman, criticized the piecemeal approach to the decisions made by Supreme Court in this divorce proceeding, which resulted in an inadequate record for the appellate court. The Second Department took it upon itself to resolve the factual issues which could be gleaned from the record. The factual discussion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. With respect to the piecemeal decision-making and the inadequate record on appeal the court wrote:

These appeals and cross appeal, as well as the two other appeals in the same case also decided today, are a graphic illustration of the prolixity that may ensue when a complicated matrimonial case is cabined into constituent parts which are heard and decided piecemeal by the Supreme Court. The court bifurcated the trial into phases but, in the end, only conducted one of the two promised phases of the trial. Because some of the issues did not lend themselves to a neat division, the issues, and the court’s seriatim determination of them, overlap. As a consequence of the incremental approach to the serial determination of the significant issues raised, which were followed by sequential appeals and cross appeals from the various orders and the final judgment, which appeals are prosecuted on voluminous appendices and supplemental appendices, this Court has not been provided with either a clear, comprehensible, and accessible record or a unified, comprehensive analysis by each party as to what determinations were made by the Supreme Court and which of those decisions each party accepts or challenges. Moreover, with respect to equitable distribution of the parties’ substantial investment assets, the judgment of divorce entered by the court merely incorporated by reference its prior decisions, without specifying what is actually ordered, adjudged, and decreed, except that it set forth certain deviations from those prior decisions. Since the decisions conflict with each other in important respects, it is unclear what the court actually directed as to the equitable distribution of major and valuable assets. Kaufman v Kaufman, 2020 NY Slip Op 05732, Second Dept 10-14-20

 

, ,

THE ELEMENT OF THE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF AMMUNITION STATUTE WHICH REQUIRES PROOF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO POSSESS A PISTOL OR REVOLVER IS AN EXCEPTION, NOT A PROVISO; CONVICTION VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE DESPITE LACK OF PRESERVATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition pursuant to NYC Administrative Code 10-131[i][3], determined the language of the statute required that the People prove defendant was not authorized to possess a pistol or a revolver, which was not established by the evidence:

… [T]he language of the ammunition possession statute (Administrative Code § 10-131[i][3]) concerning authorization to possess a pistol or revolver within the City is an exception, not a proviso (Tatis, 170 AD3d at 48). Therefore, the People were required to prove, as an element of the offense, that defendant was not authorized to possess a pistol or revolver, regardless of whether defendant raised the issue in the first instance (id.). The evidence at trial did not establish that fact. Accordingly, we exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to vacate that conviction. People v Anonymous, 2020 NY Slip Op 05689, First Dept 10-13-20

 

, ,

ALTHOUGH THE INCONSISTENT VERDICT ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE FAILURE TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING, IN THE FACE OF AWARDING DAMAGES FOR PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING AND FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES, REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL ON THAT ISSUE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, setting aside the verdict for future damages and ordering a new trial on that issue, determined the awards for past pain and suffering and future medical expenses rendered the failure to award damages for future pain and suffering a material deviation from reasonable compensation:

Plaintiff failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the verdict was inconsistent because the claim was raised after the jury had been discharged. However, where the jury verdict awards plaintiff damages for past pain and suffering and future medical expenses, but declines to award damages for future pain and suffering, the verdict on future pain and suffering is contrary to a fair interpretation of the evidence and constitutes a material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation … . Paucay v D.P. Group Gen. Contrs./Devs., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05611, First Dept 10-8-20

 

, ,

ROBBERY AND ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing defendant’s convictions, determined the robbery and assault second degree convictions were against the weight of the evidence because of the weakness of the evidence of physical injury. The convictions were reduced to robbery and assault third degree:

“Physical injury” is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00[9]). …

Here, the victim gave testimony about an incident in which the defendant attacked her and forcibly stole property from her. During the incident, the defendant pushed the victim down onto a bed, bound her wrists with a coaxial cable, placed the cable around her neck, and placed her in a choke hold with his arm across her throat. After the incident, the victim had an indentation on her wrist where the cord had been tied, her wrist was sore and had redness, and she had a red mark on her neck. She was “pretty numb” at the time and was not experiencing pain. She declined to go to the hospital. A few days later, she had difficulty swallowing and her throat was “kind of sore” for “[j]ust a couple of days.” When she testified before the grand jury, approximately one week after the incident, she was asked if she had any pain or discomfort, and she answered, “just the muscle in my arm.” Under these particular facts, the weight of the evidence does not support a finding that the victim suffered impairment of physical condition or substantial pain. Accordingly, we reduce the conviction of robbery in the second degree to robbery in the third degree … . People v Tactikos, 2020 NY Slip Op 05535, Second Dept 10-7-20

 

, ,

ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE WAS DEEMED LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS STEMMING FROM AN ATTACK ON THE COMPLAINANT, THOSE CONVICTIONS WERE DEEMED AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OR ABSENCE OF IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined: (1) the evidence of a sexual touching of complainant by defendant captured on video in the laundromat was legally insufficient; (2) the evidence that defendant attacked the complainant after she left the laundromat was legally sufficient; (3) but the convictions stemming from the attack on the complainant after she left the laundromat were against the weight of the evidence because of the weakness or absence of identification evidence. So this is a rare decision where the evidence was explicitly found legally sufficient but the related convictions were found to be against the weight of the evidence:

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, here, there was legally sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions of sexual abuse in the first degree and criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation. The surveillance video footage showed the defendant leaving the laundromat just after the complainant had left. Both the complainant and the defendant were shown walking down Woodhaven Boulevard, and the defendant’s clothing matched the complainant’s description of the clothes worn by her assailant. Therefore, a rational juror could have concluded that the defendant was the perpetrator of the assault on the complainant that occurred near her home.

However, the evidence was not legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of sexual abuse in the third degree. …

… [O]ur viewing of the video recording taken inside the laundromat did not establish that the contact between the defendant and the complainant as he was exiting the laundromat was of a sexual nature. At best, the video was ambiguous as to the nature of the touching depicted. * * *

In the face of the markedly disparate descriptions offered by the detectives and the complainant, and in the absence of an in-court identification, the verdict of the jury finding the defendant guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree and criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation was against the weight of the evidence … . People v Kassebaum, 2020 NY Slip Op 05529, Second Dept 10-7-20

 

, ,

PLAINTIFF WAS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT WITH THE ARCHITECTS; THEREFORE THE ARCHITECTURAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ACCRUED WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION WAS COMPLETE, RENDERING THE ACTION TIME-BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the architectural malpractice action accrued when the construction was complete, despite the fact that plaintiff was not a party to the contract with the architects. Therefore the action was time-barred. The court noted that Supreme Court should have settled the record on appeal by including the transcript of the motion to dismiss the complaint as well as the accompanying memorandum of law to demonstrate preservation of the issues for appeal:

Before breaking ground on the project, plaintiff entered into an agreement with an engineering firm, pursuant to which the engineering firm agreed to provide professional engineering services on the project. The engineering firm, in turn, entered into a contract with defendant, pursuant to which defendant agreed to provide professional architectural services on the project.  * * *

A claim against an architect accrues upon the completion of performance … . “This rule applies ‘no matter how a claim is characterized in the complaint’ because ‘all liability’ for defective construction ‘has its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties’ ”  … . “Even if the plaintiff is not a party to the underlying construction contract, the claim may accrue upon completion of the construction where the plaintiff is not a ‘stranger to the contract,’ and the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is the ‘functional equivalent of privity’ ” … .

Despite the lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff was “not a stranger to the contract” … . Indeed, we conclude that plaintiff was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract … . * * *

Because plaintiff “is not a ‘stranger to the contract,’ ” its professional malpractice cause of action accrued upon completion of performance by defendant … . Town of W. Seneca v Kideney Architects, P.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 05323, Fourth Dept 10-2-20

 

,

THE APPEAL WAS HELD IN ABEYANCE AND THE MATTER WAS SENT BACK FOR A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL CONSENTED TO ANNOTATIONS ON THE VERDICT SHEET; THE RECONSTRUCTION HEARING WAS HELD BUT SUPREME COURT DID NOT MAKE A RULING; THE MATTER WAS REMITTED AGAIN FOR THE RULING (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, holding the appeal in abeyance, had sent the matter back for a reconstruction hearing on whether defense counsel consented to annotations on the verdict sheet. The hearing was held but Supreme Court did not make a ruling. So the matter was remitted for that purpose:

We previously held this case, reserved decision, and remitted the matter to Supreme Court “to determine, following a hearing if necessary, whether defense counsel consented to the annotated verdict sheet” … . Upon remittal, the court convened a reconstruction hearing, heard testimony of the parties’ trial counsel, and closed the hearing without making any determination. That was error. The intent of our prior decision was for the court to make a determination, not merely to conduct a hearing … . It is of course better for the hearing court, which has the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their testimony, to make the determination following a reconstruction hearing, particularly where, as here, witness credibility is at issue … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine whether defense counsel consented to the annotated verdict sheet … . People v Wilson, 2020 NY Slip Op 05385, Fourth Dept 10-2-20

 

,

WAIVER OF APPEAL OF THE UNDERLYING PLEA DOES NOT PROHIBIT APPEAL OF THE SENTENCE FOR A SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF PROBATION; NO PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; APPELLATE COURT HAS POWER TO MODIFY A LEGAL SENTENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reducing defendant’s sentence, noted that a waiver of appeal at the underlying plea proceeding did not prohibit the appeal of the severity of the sentence for a subsequent violation of probation. The court further noted there is no preservation requirement for the appeal of an excessive sentence:

… [E]ven if defendant executed a valid waiver of the right to appeal at the underlying plea proceeding, it would not encompass his challenge to the severity of the sentence imposed following his violation of probation … . Contrary to the People’s contention, defendant’s challenge to the severity of the sentence is not subject to a preservation requirement … . “A claim that a sentence is excessive is, by definition … , addressed to this Court’s interest of justice jurisdiction, and does not need to be preserved as a question of law … . Contrary to the People’s further contention, in reviewing that challenge, “it is inappropriate for this Court to address whether the sentencing court abused its discretion” … . Rather, this Court “has broad, plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe under the circumstances, even though the sentence may be within the permissible statutory range,” and such “sentence-review power may be exercised, if the interest of justice warrants, without deference to the sentencing court” … . We agree with defendant that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe under the circumstances of this case, and we therefore modify the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice to a determinate term of imprisonment of five years … . People v Kibler, 2020 NY Slip Op 05365, Fourth Dept 10-2-20