,

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have relieved mother’s attorney as counsel and entered a default judgment on mother’s failure to appear. Mother was not notified of her attorney’s intent to withdraw and, therefore, Family Court should not have entered an order on mother’s default. Because the order should not have been entered, an appeal, rather than a motion to vacate the default, was the proper remedy:

Generally, no appeal lies from an order made upon the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511…). Rather, the proper procedure is to move to vacate the default and, if necessary, appeal from any denial of that motion (see CPLR 5015[a][1]…). Here, however, there was no proper order entered upon default. An attorney of record may withdraw as counsel only upon sufficient cause and upon notice to the client (see CPLR 321[b][2]…). Indeed, a purported withdrawal without proof of proper notice to the client is ineffective …, and a court may not enter a default order in the absence of a proper withdrawal … . There is no indication on the record that the mother’s attorney informed her that he was seeking to withdraw as counsel. Accordingly, the Family Court should not have relieved the mother’s attorney as counsel or entered an order on the mother’s default… . Inasmuch as no order was properly entered upon default, the mother’s appeal is not precluded … . Matter of Menghi v Trotta-Menghi, 2018 NY Slip Op 04324, Second Dept 6-13-18

​FAMILY LAW (ATTORNEYS, DEFAULT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, DEFAULT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (ATTORNEYS, DEFAULT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT (ATTORNEYS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (APPEALS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5511  FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5015 FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 321 (FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIEVED MOTHER’S COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE TO MOTHER, THEREFORE FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UPON MOTHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR, BECAUSE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED, APPEAL WAS THE PROPER REMEDY (SECOND DEPT))

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FOURTEEN YEAR OLD CHILD HAD THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO WAIVE HIS PRESENCE AT THE PERMANENCY HEARING AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO APPEAR, APPEAL HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, determined the 14-year-old child had the statutory right to waive his presence at the permanency hearing and the judge should not have ordered his presence. Although the hearing had been held, the appeal was heard under as an exception to the mootness doctrine because the issue was likely to recur:

The child was freed for adoption in 2014. A permanency hearing was scheduled for March 30, 2017, and notice of the hearing was provided to the child, who was then 14 years old. One week before the scheduled hearing date, the Attorney for the Child (AFC) filed a form indicating that the child, after consultation with the AFC, waived his right to participate in the hearing. The AFC appeared at the hearing on the child’s behalf and reiterated that the child had waived his right to participate in the hearing. The court stated, however, that it was “required by law to have some communication” with the child, and that the child would therefore be required to appear at the next scheduled hearing date. …

Here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Although the permanency hearing must include “an age appropriate consultation with the child” (Family Ct Act § 1090-a [a] [1]), that requirement may not “be construed to compel a child who does not wish to participate in his or her permanency hearing to do so” … . The choice belongs to the child. Indeed, “[a] child age fourteen and older shall be permitted to participate in person in all or any portion of his or her permanency hearing in which he or she chooses to participate” … . Moreover, “a child who has chosen to participate in his or her permanency hearing shall choose the manner in which he or she shall participate, which may include participation in person, by telephone or available electronic means, or the issuance of a written statement to the court” … . Although the court may limit the participation of a child under the age of 14 based on the best interests of the child… , the court lacks the authority to compel the participation of a child who has waived his or her right to participate in a permanency hearing after consultation with his or her attorney … . Matter of Shawn S., 2018 NY Slip Op 04208, Fourth Dept 6-8-18

FAMILY LAW (PERMANENCY HEARING, FOURTEEN YEAR OLD CHILD HAD THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO WAIVE HIS PRESENCE AT THE PERMANENCY HEARING AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO APPEAR, APPEAL HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT))/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, MOOTNESS,  FOURTEEN YEAR OLD CHILD HAD THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO WAIVE HIS PRESENCE AT THE PERMANENCY HEARING AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO APPEAR, APPEAL HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT))/PERMANENCY HEARINGS (FAMILY LAW, FOURTEEN YEAR OLD CHILD HAD THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO WAIVE HIS PRESENCE AT THE PERMANENCY HEARING AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO APPEAR, APPEAL HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT))/MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (APPEALS, FAMILY LAW, FOURTEEN YEAR OLD CHILD HAD THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO WAIVE HIS PRESENCE AT THE PERMANENCY HEARING AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO APPEAR, APPEAL HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT))

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DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS MOTIONS TO VACATE HIS CONVICTIONS, EVEN THOSE ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motions to vacate his convictions on ineffective assistance grounds. The Fourth Department noted that, where some of the allegations of ineffective assistance are outside the record, a hearing on a motion to vacate can encompass all allegations of ineffective assistance, even those which could have been raised on appeal:

Where, as here, “an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves . . . mixed claims’ relating to both record-based and nonrecord-based issues . . . [, such] claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding, whether or not the [defendant] could have raised the claim on direct appeal” … . In such situations, i.e., where the “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside of the record, a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety” … . That is because “each alleged shortcoming or failure by defense counsel should not be viewed as a separate ground or issue raised upon the motion’ . . . Rather, a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes a single ground or issue upon which relief is requested’ “.. . In other words, “such a claim constitutes a single, unified claim that must be assessed in totality” … . …

… “[D]efendant established that there were sufficient questions of fact . . . whether [trial counsel] had an adequate explanation’ for [her] failure to pursue certain lines of defense on cross-examination or for [her] failure to call an expert on defendant’s behalf, and defendant is therefore entitled to an opportunity to establish that [he] was deprived of meaningful legal representation’ ” … . For example, defense counsel failed to address at trial evidence in the medical records that tended to disprove allegations of penetration. We also note that defendant presented sworn allegations supporting his contention that DNA buccal swabs were taken from him by the use of excessive force. Such an allegation, if true, would support suppression of the damaging DNA evidence had such a motion been made … . No such motion was made, and “[s]uch a failure, in the absence of a reasonable explanation for it, is hard to reconcile with a defendant’s constitutional right to . . . effective assistance of counsel” … . People v Wilson, 2018 NY Slip Op 04233, Fourth Dept 6-8-18

CRIMINAL LAW (VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS MOTIONS TO VACATE HIS CONVICTIONS, EVEN THOSE ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS MOTIONS TO VACATE HIS CONVICTIONS, EVEN THOSE ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS MOTIONS TO VACATE HIS CONVICTIONS, EVEN THOSE ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS MOTIONS TO VACATE HIS CONVICTIONS, EVEN THOSE ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO ( INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS MOTIONS TO VACATE HIS CONVICTIONS, EVEN THOSE ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))

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DECISION WITHHELD AND PEOPLE DIRECTED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE APPELLATE COUNSEL WITH TRIAL EXHIBITS COUNSEL WAS UNABLE TO ACCESS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department withheld decision and directed the People to provide defense counsel with certain trial exhibits counsel was unable to access prior to perfecting the appeal:

Defendant contends, among other things, that the People deprived him of an opportunity to develop an effective argument on appeal by failing to provide him with certain video and photographic exhibits that were introduced into evidence at trial in a format that he could readily view … . Specifically, defendant avers that, although the People provided him with copies of 14 DVDs introduced as exhibits at trial, he was unable to view the contents of exhibit Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18 and 108.

Defendant has a “fundamental right to appellate review of a criminal conviction” … and, to that end, it is well-settled that the People “‘must provide a record of trial sufficient to enable a defendant to present reviewable issues on appeal'” … . Here, there is no dispute that the subject exhibits were admitted into evidence, were viewed by the juries at both of defendant’s trials and are now a part of the record from which defendant may prepare his appellate arguments and this Court may conduct meaningful appellate review. Based upon our own efforts to view these exhibits, we find defendant’s observation to have merit. People v Haggray, 2018 NY Slip Op 04036, Third Dept 6-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW DECISION WITHHELD AND PEOPLE DIRECTED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE APPELLATE COUNSEL WITH TRIAL EXHIBITS COUNSEL WAS UNABLE TO ACCESS (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DECISION WITHHELD AND PEOPLE DIRECTED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE APPELLATE COUNSEL WITH TRIAL EXHIBITS COUNSEL WAS UNABLE TO ACCESS (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, DECISION WITHHELD AND PEOPLE DIRECTED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE APPELLATE COUNSEL WITH TRIAL EXHIBITS COUNSEL WAS UNABLE TO ACCESS (THIRD DEPT))

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DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in an appeal by the People of a suppression ruling, determined the suppression motion should have been denied in its entirety. Defendant never made a motion to suppress information taken from his cell phone. Yet County Court apparently speculated that the police must have searched defendant’s cell phone before the Miranda warnings were given:

… [T]he detectives approached defendant outside his place of employment and asked him to accompany them to the police station. Defendant voluntarily agreed and they drove him to the station without placing him in handcuffs. The videotaped statement indicates that, during the ride and before entering the interview room, they engaged in general conversation regarding defendant’s background, education, employment and family life, but did not discuss the criminal investigation. Inside the interview room, defendant was initially not restrained. The detectives asked if he would like water and provided him a drink. Later, they obtained a cigarette and allowed him to smoke it, and permitted him to make a phone call. At the beginning of the conversation in the interview room, a detective administered Miranda warnings and defendant stated that he was willing to talk to them and answer questions. Defendant was not threatened or coerced during the interview.

County Court did not rely on these facts, but instead focused on what it deemed “the troubling and unavoidable issue that, prior to entering the interview room and prior to Miranda warnings, . . . defendant’s phone had already been seized by the police.” The court highlighted the People’s failure at the hearing to address this seizure of the phone even though, as discussed above, the People were not on notice that anything related to the phone was being challenged by defendant. The court chastised the People for failing to acknowledge or explain “the circumstances under which . . . defendant’s phone was seized and potentially searched, pre-Miranda.” The record contains no factual support for, and actually belies, the court’s speculative assertion that the phone was searched before Miranda warnings were administered, because the video shows that, when the detective eventually brought the phone into the interview room and obtained defendant’s consent to look at some of its features, defendant had to unlock the phone with either a password or swiping pattern. People v Moore, 2018 NY Slip Op 04042, Third Dept 6-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SUPPRESSION, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPPRESSION, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPPRESSION, PEOPLE’S APPEAL,  DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (SUPPRESSION, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))

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PEOPLE CONCEDED ROBBERY THIRD SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, NO NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL, CONVICTION REDUCED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) defendant’s conviction of robbery second, determined Supreme Court should have submitted robbery third to the jury as a lesser included offense. But because the People agreed that the conviction could be reduced to robbery third a new trial was not necessary:

There was a reasonable view of the evidence supporting defendant’s request for submission of third-degree robbery as a lesser included offense, and we have considered and rejected the People’s argument that the issue is unpreserved. The appropriate remedy for this type of error would normally be a new trial. However, the People’s concession that, if we reach this error, the conviction should be reduced to third-degree robbery renders a new trial unnecessary because the modification provides defendant with a greater remedy than he would have received had the trial court submitted that charge to the jury … . People v Cabassa, 2018 NY Slip Op 03810, First Dept 5-29-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, PEOPLE CONCEDED ROBBERY THIRD SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, NO NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL, CONVICTION REDUCED (FIRST DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES (PEOPLE CONCEDED ROBBERY THIRD SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, NO NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL, CONVICTION REDUCED (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, PEOPLE CONCEDED ROBBERY THIRD SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, NO NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL, CONVICTION REDUCED (FIRST DEPT))

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LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, as an exception to the mootness doctrine, determined a letter written by petitioner should have been interpreted as a demand to contest his involuntary confinement pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law:

In light of petitioner’s release from involuntary confinement pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) article 9, this appeal is moot, as petitioner concedes. However, we reach the merits because the appeal raises a substantial and novel issue that is likely to recur yet typically evades review … .We reject respondent’s argument that the issue raised in this proceeding is unlikely to recur … .

As respondent now concedes, the letter submitted by petitioner on the day he was involuntary admitted to Lincoln Hospital reasonably conveyed that he sought a “hearing on the question of need for involuntary care and treatment” (MHL § 9.31[a]), and should have been forwarded to the appropriate court “forthwith”… . The handwritten letter says, “I am falsely imprisoned and deprived of liberty,” in violation of certain United States Supreme Court decisions, “I demand a jury trial immediately,” and “I demand my lawyer.” To the extent the court found the request in this letter insufficiently clear or formal, because there were other, unrelated complaints raised in the letter or for any other reason, this was error. The letter should have been interpreted reasonably to effectuate the statute’s purpose of allowing patients to challenge their involuntary confinement on an expedited basis, as required by MHL § 9.31. Matter of State of N.Y. ex rel. Giffen v Hoffman, 2018 NY Slip Op 03462, First Dept 5-10-18

​MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT, LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT))/INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (MOOTNESS, EXCEPTION TO, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, (INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT, LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT))/MOOTNESS (APPEALS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, (INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT, LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (HABEAS CORPUS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, (INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT, LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT))/HABEAS CORPUS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT, LETTER WRITTEN BY PETITIONER UPON INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS A DEMAND FOR AN EXPEDITED CHALLENGE TO THE CONFINEMENT UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (HABEAS CORPUS), ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN THIS CASE, THE ISSUE WAS HEARD ON APPEAL BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO RECUR (FIRST DEPT))

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POLICE ENTRY INTO A SINGLE USE BATHROOM IN A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT CONSTITUTED A SEARCH, DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BASED UPON THE CONCLUSION THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in a single-use bathroom in an adult bookstore, His suppression motion should not, therefore, have been denied on the ground the police entry into the bathroom was not a search. The matter was remitted for consideration of the issue raised by the People at the suppression hearing which was not ruled on by Supreme Court:

The court erred in denying defendant’s suppression motion on the ground that the police entrance into a single-use restroom located in an adult film and novelty store was not a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that, once he closed the door, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy while using the small, single-use restroom because at that point he was “entitled to assume that while inside he … will not be viewed by others” … . The closed door of the restroom was comparable to closed bathroom stalls in public restrooms, where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists … . This expectation of privacy was not negated by the facts that the restroom was located in a commercial establishment and was unlocked … .

In the alternative, the People argue, as they did at the hearing, that the police entrance into the restroom was reasonable because it was based on probable cause to suspect that there was drug use occurring inside. However, because “the hearing court did not rule on this issue in denying the suppression motion, and therefore did not rule adversely against defendant on this point, we may not reach it on this appeal” … . Accordingly, we hold the appeal in abeyance and remand for determination, based on the hearing minutes, of the issue raised at the hearing, but not decided … . People v Vinson, 2018 NY Slip Op 03437, First Dept 5-10-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (SEARCH AND SEIZURE, EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, POLICE ENTRY INTO A SINGLE USE BATHROOM IN A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT CONSTITUTED A SEARCH, DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BASED UPON THE CONCLUSION THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON (FIRST DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, POLICE ENTRY INTO A SINGLE USE BATHROOM IN A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT CONSTITUTED A SEARCH, DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BASED UPON THE CONCLUSION THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON (FIRST DEPT))/SUPPRESSION (SEARCH AND SEIZURE, EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, POLICE ENTRY INTO A SINGLE USE BATHROOM IN A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT CONSTITUTED A SEARCH, DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BASED UPON THE CONCLUSION THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON (FIRST DEPT))/EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY (SEARCH AND SEIZURE, POLICE ENTRY INTO A SINGLE USE BATHROOM IN A COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT CONSTITUTED A SEARCH, DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BASED UPON THE CONCLUSION THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF AN ISSUE WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON (FIRST DEPT))

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AFTER A SPECTATOR ALERTED THE COURT JURORS HAD BEEN OVERHEARD REFERRING TO THE DEFENDANT IN DEROGATORY TERMS THE TRIAL JUDGE QUESTIONED THE SPECTATOR BUT TOOK NO FURTHER ACTION, MATTER REMITTED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SPECTATOR WAS SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion, reversed the Appellate Division and sent the matter back to the Appellate Division for a factual determination whether the trial judge’s credibility assessment of a spectator who claimed to have overheard jurors speaking about the defendant in derogatory terms was supported by the weight of the evidence. After questioning the spectator the trial judge determined no further inquiry was required. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction over a dissent:

… [W]e are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it chose not to conduct an inquiry of two sworn jurors pursuant to People v Buford (69 NY2d 290 [1987]). Alerted to a complaint by a courtroom spectator that during a break in the trial the spectator allegedly overheard the jurors refer to defendant by a derogatory term, the trial court immediately called the spectator to the stand and elicited sworn testimony regarding her allegation. At the conclusion of the examination, the judge determined that a Buford inquiry was not required based on the testimony provided. We conclude on this record that the trial court made an implied credibility finding that the spectator was not worthy of belief and therefore a Buford inquiry was not warranted. This determination by the trial court was not reviewed by the Appellate Division. It was error for the Appellate Division to opine as to what remedy was warranted in response to the content of the spectator’s allegation, without determining whether the allegation was credible in the first instance. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division order and remit the case to that Court to exercise its own fact-finding power to consider and determine whether the trial court’s finding as to the spectator’s credibility was supported by the weight of the evidence. * * *

If, on remittal, the Appellate Division finds, upon its own factual review, that the record supports the trial court’s determination that the spectator lacked credibility, no further action was required. If the Appellate Division finds that the credibility determination was not supported, it must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in not taking further action … . … [A] credible allegation that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve or engaged in substantial misconduct within the meaning of CPL 270.35 cannot be ignored by the trial court, and failure to appropriately remedy the matter is reversible error. People v Kuzdzal, 2018 NY Slip Op 03304, CtApp 5-8-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (JURORS, AFTER A SPECTATOR ALERTED THE COURT JURORS HAD BEEN OVERHEARD REFERRING TO THE DEFENDANT IN DEROGATORY TERMS THE TRIAL JUDGE QUESTIONED THE SPECTATOR BUT TOOK NO FURTHER ACTION, MATTER REMITTED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SPECTATOR WAS SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP))/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, BIAS, AFTER A SPECTATOR ALERTED THE COURT JURORS HAD BEEN OVERHEARD REFERRING TO THE DEFENDANT IN DEROGATORY TERMS THE TRIAL JUDGE QUESTIONED THE SPECTATOR BUT TOOK NO FURTHER ACTION, MATTER REMITTED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SPECTATOR WAS SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, AFTER A SPECTATOR ALERTED THE COURT JURORS HAD BEEN OVERHEARD REFERRING TO THE DEFENDANT IN DEROGATORY TERMS THE TRIAL JUDGE QUESTIONED THE SPECTATOR BUT TOOK NO FURTHER ACTION, MATTER REMITTED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SPECTATOR WAS SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP))

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LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for leave to appeal in a case seeking habeas corpus relief for two chimpanzees alleged to be confined by their owners to small cages in a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area … . Judge Fahey wrote a thoughtful concurring opinion questioning the rationale used by the Appellate Division to deny relief:

The Appellate Division’s conclusion that a chimpanzee cannot be considered a “person” and is not entitled to habeas relief is in fact based on nothing more than the premise that a chimpanzee is not a member of the human species … . …

The better approach in my view is to ask not whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether a chimpanzee has the same rights and duties as a human being, but instead whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. That question, one of precise moral and legal status, is the one that matters here. Moreover, the answer to that question will depend on our assessment of the intrinsic nature of chimpanzees as a species. …

Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced detentions visited on him or her? This is not merely a definitional question, but a deep dilemma of ethics and policy that demands our attention. To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect … . Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Lavery, 2018 NY Slip Op 03309, CtApp 5-8-18

​ANIMAL LAW (LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP))/APPEALS (ANIMAL RIGHTS, LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP))//HABEAS CORPUS (ANIMAL RIGHTS, LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP))