GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED (JURORS) – New York Appellate Digest

Sworn Juror Who Was From the Same Neighborhood as Defendant Stated His Fear of Drug Dealers Would Prevent Him from Reaching an Impartial Verdict—the Juror Was Properly Discharged as “Grossly Unqualified” and “For Cause” Based Upon a Newly Discovered Ground

CurlyHost — Thu, 11 Jun 2015 04:00:00 +0000

The First Department determined a sworn juror was properly discharged as “grossly unqualified,” as well as “for cause.” The juror lived in the neighborhood where the crime occurred and where defendant and his accomplices lived. The juror told the court that his fear of drug dealers in his neighborhood would prevent him from reaching an impartial verdict. The juror had not mentioned his fear before he was sworn:

The juror’s fear provided grounds for the court to dismiss him as “grossly unqualified to serve” pursuant to CPL 270.35(1), even if the court did not cite the statutory phrasing, because it was clear that the juror could not remain impartial. Additionally, since the juror had not mentioned that he feared for his safety when questioned by the court and the parties before being sworn, he was properly discharged for cause, on a newly discovered ground, pursuant to CPL 270.15(4). People v Ward, 2015 NY Slip Op 04928, 1st Dept 6-11-15

Defendant Did Not Have the Right to Be Present During Discussion of Exclusion of a Sworn Juror

CurlyHost — Wed, 18 Mar 2015 04:00:00 +0000

The Second Department determined the defendant’s absence from a conference re: whether a sworn juror was grossly unqualified to serve did not violate defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial:

The defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of trial was not violated by his absence from an in camera interview with a sworn juror, conducted in the presence of the prosecutor and defense counsel, to determine whether that sworn juror was grossly unqualified to serve (see CPL 270.35[1]). A defendant’s statutory right to be present at trial (see CPL 260.20) “extends to all material stages of the trial, including ancillary proceedings in which defendant’s presence could have a substantial effect on [his or her] ability to defend against the charges'” … . A conference to determine whether a sworn juror should be excluded (see CPL 270.35) is an ancillary proceeding, at which the defendant’s presence is “only necessary where defendant has something valuable to contribute'” … .

Under the circumstances presented here, the defendant’s presence at the conference could not have had a substantial effect on his ability to defend the charges, and the defendant could not have made a valuable contribution to the conference … . People v Peoples, 2015 NY Slip Op 02143, 2nd Dept 3-18-15

Court’s Failure to Inquire About a Juror’s Sleeping During Deliberations Required Reversal

CurlyHost — Thu, 11 Dec 2014 05:00:00 +0000

The First Department reversed defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial because the trial judge did not conduct a “probing inquiry” after being informed by jurors that a juror was sleeping during the deliberations:

The court should have conducted a “probing and tactful inquiry” … into whether, and to what extent, the juror had been sleeping, in order to determine whether this behavior rendered him grossly unqualified … . The court’s observation of jury demeanor during the supplemental instruction was not enough to resolve the issue of what was going on in the jury room, and this was not a case where reliance on a general instruction was an appropriate exercise of discretion … . Without any inquiry of the allegedly sleeping juror, or of any other juror, it is impossible to know whether the juror was innocuously dozing off from time to time, or whether he slept through so much of the deliberations that he could be deemed absent, such that the verdict was reached by a jury of 11 persons. Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse. People v Franqui, 2014 NY Slip Op 08736, 1st Dept 12-11-14

Defense Counsel Should Have Been Present During Exchange Between Judge and Juror Which Resulted in Disqualification of Juror/Judge Should Have Disclosed Reason for Disqualification

CurlyHost — Wed, 08 Jan 2014 05:00:00 +0000

The Second Department determined defense counsel’s absence from an exchange between the judge and a juror, which led to the disqualification of the juror, required reversal:

The juror reported that a third party had told him that the defendant had an “aggressive demeanor,” was a “little wild,” was “somebody you don’t mess around with,” and was someone he “should avoid.” The trial court, in discharging the juror, merely told defense counsel that this juror had lied to the court and, thus, was grossly unqualified to continue serving pursuant to CPL 270.35.

“[A]n inquiry to determine the existence and extent of prejudice affecting the gross disqualification of a sworn juror . . . is inextricably related to defendant’s entitlement to a fair hearing … . Therefore, the unique, indispensable presence of at least the single-minded counsel for the accused’ … is minimally necessary to safeguard that fundamental fairness to defendant” … .

Here, the absence of defense counsel from the in camera interview, coupled with the court’s failure to disclose what the juror said, deprived the defense of the opportunity to inquire as to whether the juror made similar prejudicial statements to any other jurors… . People v Otigho, 2014 NY Slip Op 00128, 2nd Dept 1-8-14

New Trial Ordered: Juror Found “Grossly Unqualified” by the Trial Judge Should Have Been Dismissed/One Juror Was Absent from the Deliberations for About An Hour

Bruce Freeman — Thu, 19 Dec 2013 19:19:29 +0000

The Third Department ordered a new trial was because one of the juror’s, juror No. 4 should have been dismissed after the trial court determined that the juror was “grossly unqualified,” and because deliberations continued while juror No. 4 was absent from the jury room for about an hour:

“If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict, . . . . the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . , the court must discharge such juror” (CPL 270.35 [1]… ). “A juror will be deemed to be grossly unqualified to serve only when, after conduct[ing] a probing, tactful inquiry into the specific circumstances, it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict” … . Although the trial court traditionally is accorded “great deference in deciding whether a juror is grossly unqualified” …, inasmuch as juror No. 4 repeatedly expressed her inability to render a decision one way or the other, and County Court expressly found that she was both grossly unqualified to serve and unable to afford either the People or defendant a fair trial, County Court erred in failing to discharge juror No. 4… .

Moreover, even assuming that we discerned no impropriety with respect to juror No. 4’s continued service on the jury, we nonetheless would be compelled to reverse defendant’s conviction and order a new trial, as it is readily apparent from the record that the jury deliberated – on at least one occasion – with fewer than 12 members present. CPL 310.10 (1) provides, in relevant part, that “[f]ollowing the court’s charge, . . . the jury must retire to deliberate upon its verdict in a place outside the courtroom . . . and must, except as otherwise provided in [CPL 310.10 (2)], be continuously kept together under the supervision of a court officer.” Consistent with the provisions of CPL 310.10 (2), “[a]t any time after the jury has been charged or commenced its deliberations, and after notice to the parties and affording such parties an opportunity to be heard on the record outside of the presence of the jury, the court may declare the deliberations to be in recess and may thereupon direct the jury to suspend its deliberations and to separate for a reasonable period of time to be specified by the court.” Additionally, “[b]efore each recess, the court must . . . direct [the jury] not to resume its deliberations until all twelve jurors have reassembled in the designated place at the termination of the declared recess.” * * *

Here … juror No. 4 was absent from the jury room for slightly more than one hour… . People v Cridelle, 104319, 3rd Dept 12-19-13

Pre-Deliberations Note from Juror Did Not Raise Question Whether Juror Was “Grossly Unqualified;” No Hearing Necessary

Bruce Freeman — Tue, 07 May 2013 17:49:59 +0000

The Court of Appeals, over a substantial dissent by Judge Lippman, determined that a note from a juror to the judge, prior to deliberations, did not raise the question whether the juror was “grossly unqualified” and therefore did not trigger the need for an in camera interview of the juror pursuant to People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290. The note used the term “we” and raised the inference the jurors were engaging in premature deliberations about the need for additional evidence. The Court of Appeals wrote:

Our intention in Buford was to create a framework by which trial courts could evaluate sworn jurors who, for some reason during the trial, may “‘possess[] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict'” …. Such scenarios include, but are not limited to, a juror’s bias against a particular race …, a juror’s intimate relationship with a prosecution witness …, or a juror’s conversation with a member of the defendant’s family seeking information about the defendant’s background ….

Here, there is no indication from the note’s use of the word “we” that the note-writing juror’s impartiality was in doubt or that the juror had committed any misconduct. The note’s contents were indicative of two possibilities: that there had been premature deliberations and/or the jury was requesting additional evidence after the parties had rested and the evidence had closed. …People v Mejias and Rodriguez, Nos 67, 68, CtApp 5-7-13

In a Prohibition Proceeding Brought Under Article 78, Trial Judge’s Mistrial Order Deemed Improper, Retrial Precluded

Bruce Freeman — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 15:12:26 +0000

After a juror was discharged for misconduct, the People stated they did not want to go forward with the jury deliberations. The defense, however, wanted to continue to verdict with the remaining 11 jurors. The trial court ordered a mistrial. The defendant brought an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit a second trial on double jeopardy grounds. The Second Department, after determining the four-month statute of limitations did not apply, granted the petition, finding the trial judge should not have ordered a mistrial over the defense objection:

Here, the People have not met their burden of demonstrating that the declaration of a mistrial was manifestly necessary. While it is undisputed that juror number 11 was grossly unqualified to continue serving, the court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial without considering other alternatives. The defendant specifically indicated his desire to waive trial by a jury of 12 persons and proceed with the remaining 11 jurors, an option that has been endorsed by the Court of Appeals …. Under the circumstances presented, as urged by defense counsel, it would have been appropriate to poll the remainder of the jurors to ascertain whether they could render an impartial verdict …. Moreover, as the improper information imparted to the jurors did not significantly prejudice the People, the court should have considered whether a specific curative instruction could have clarified what constituted “evidence” and whether such an instruction could have cured the impropriety …. Accordingly, there is an insufficient basis in the record for the declaration of a mistrial, and thus retrial is precluded. Matter of Smith v Brown, 2013 NY Slip Op 02584, 2013-00751, 2nd Dept, 4-17-13