Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree based on the complaint that he pushed his mother to the ground causing her to twist and injure her toe. He was remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections and held at Rikers Island. The charge was later elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony based on his mother’s age. After defendant was evaluated for competency a second time in January 2025, both evaluators concluded that defendant was unfit to proceed. Supreme Court agreed, and on February 24, 2025, it ordered defendant remanded to the custody of OMH for restorative treatment. The order of commitment required that the defendant “be transferred into the custody of the Office of Mental Health no later than March 24, 2025” and warned that a failure to do so would result in a finding of contempt. It is uncontested that the transfer was delayed until July 25, 2025. * * *

OMH argues that defendant failed to prove that OMH’s delay caused his mental health to deteriorate. However, the relevant issue is not whether defendant deteriorated while he was in custody but whether OMH provided the requisite restorative care. In any event, Supreme Court was entitled to credit Dr. Goldsmith’s testimony that defendant’s condition did deteriorate at Rikers. OMH’s attempt to blame defendant for his loss because he is mentally ill and refuses treatment is risible. The purpose of a transfer to a secure psychiatric facility is so that a mentally ill defendant can receive statutorily mandated restorative care and treatment. To attribute defendant’s loss or injury to defendant’s preexisting mental illness, which causes defendant to refuse treatment, turns Criminal Procedure Law article 730 on its head. People v G.O., 2026 NY Slip Op 05242, First Dept 9-10-26

The statute protects a worker from gravity-related hazards posed by a permanent stairway that “provided the sole means of access to the floors of the building” where the worker was working … . However, the issue of whether a stairway is the sole means of access should not be construed so strictly as to “preclude recovery merely because plaintiff had an alternative means to descend from his work area, especially when that alternative route may have seemed more dangerous than the stairs plaintiff did utilize” … . Here, the only other staircase available to plaintiff at the worksite would have required him to access a stairway used by hospital patients during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, which he was instructed not to use. As a result, under these facts, the purported alternative staircase did not present a viable means of egress for plaintiff, and the staircase plaintiff used was his sole means of access to his work area … . Moreover, the stairs were defective in that the treads were worn out or missing.

We have considered and rejected … the argument that the statute does not cover permanent staircases … . As we recently explained, “permanent staircases are not categorically excluded from Labor Law 240(1) coverage,” and will qualify as a safety device under the Labor Law where the staircase is the sole means accessing the plaintiff’s work area … .

… Supreme Court improperly concluded that this principle applies only in situations where the plaintiff was required to work on the staircase upon which he fell … .

Supreme Court’s … conclusion that a plaintiff using a permanent staircase as a “passageway” will not give rise to Labor Law 240(1) liability is also misplaced … .  Riley v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2026 NY Slip Op 05241, First Dept 9-10-26

Practice Point: A permanent stairway which is the sole viable means of access to a work site is a “safety device” within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1).

CPL 440.47 is a procedural vehicle that allows “presently incarcerated persons serving sentences of at least eight years . . . to apply for resentencing pursuant to the framework established in Penal Law § 60.12 (1)” … . CPL 440.47 (1) details the pre-application phase, which is step one of the resentencing process. At step one, the defendant must request permission to apply for resentencing in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12 and demonstrate his or her eligibility for same. To do so, there are two simple criteria: such person “[(1)] must include in his or her request documentation proving that she or he is confined in an institution operated by the [D]epartment of [C]orrections and [C]ommunity [S]upervision serving a sentence with a minimum or determinate term of eight years or more for an offense committed prior to [August 12, 2019] and [(2)] that she or he is serving such sentence for any offense eligible for an alternative sentence under section 60.12 of the [P]enal [L]aw” ,,, . If the court finds that the defendant satisfies these criteria, it must notify the defendant that he or she may submit an application for resentencing (see CPL 440.47 [1] [c]). After the court notifies the defendant, he or she can request the appointment of an attorney to assist with the next steps … . However, if the court finds that the defendant has not met the requirements to apply for resentencing, it must notify the defendant of same and dismiss the request without prejudice … . It is evident from the plain language contained herein that such dismissal cannot constitute “an order denying resentencing” (CPL 440.47 [3] [a]). Of note, step one, as far as we can tell, is completely unique to the DVSJA as it asks that a defendant request permission to make the CPL 440.47 … . To that end, at step one, the defendant is merely considered a “person” rather than an “applicant” and, as such, has not actually asked the court to grant resentencing … . By virtue of this simple distinction, it is apparent that the pre-application procedure does not implicate the merits of resentencing … .. People v Shawn A., 2026 NY Slip Op 05216, Third Dept 9-3-26

Defendants are not entitled to reinstatement of their counterclaims, which were each unequivocally rejected by the jury after a lengthy trial. Pursuant to CPLR 4404(a), a court may set aside a jury verdict, or order a new trial, where “the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence,” or “in the interest of justice.” In making this determination, the court must proceed with caution, because “in the absence of indications that substantial justice has not been done, a successful litigant is entitled to the benefits of a favorable jury verdict” … . Thus, a verdict should only be set aside if the evidence is so in favor of the moving party that the verdict “could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” … , or in the interests of justice due to “errors in the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence, mistakes in the charge, misconduct, newly discovered evidence, and surprise” … . Beach v Touradji Capital Mgt., LP, 2026 NY Slip Op 05231, First Dept 9-3-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the criteria for setting aside a jury verdict. Here the jury’s rejection of defendants’ counterclaims should not have been disturbed.​

… [T]he tenants exercised their second extension option under the lease … . The parties attempted to negotiate a new annual net rent, but upon reaching an impasse, they proceeded to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (the AAA). That arbitration concluded with a one-week hearing that resulted in a final award largely in the landlord’s favor. * * *

… [T]he umpire created an appearance of impropriety when he directly communicated with the landlord’s counsel about a paid offer to serve as a neutral umpire in the [another arbitration] and did so without including the tenants in the conversation. Further, the umpire’s subsequent attempt to remedy this issue with a disclosure to the tenants failed to cure his misconduct. Indeed, the disclosure was incomplete as it was the landlord’s counsel, not the umpire, who informed the tenants of the direct communication with the landlord’s counsel. To compound matters, the umpire then attempted to bargain with the tenants — offering to trade his rejection of the offer in exchange for the cooperative withdrawing its recusal application. Ultimately, although he did eventually decline the offer, the umpire’s actions irreversibly and improperly implicated the “integrity of the process” … . Matter of 57th & 6th Ground LLC v Carnegie House Tenants Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 05230, First Dept 9-3-26

Practice Point: In this arbitration of a rent reset, the umpire communicated directly with landlord’s counsel, creating the appearance of impropriety. The award was therefore vacated.

… [D]efendant, then 17 years old, chased a young woman across a basketball court, grabbed her from the back while placing his arm around her neck, and eventually brought her to the ground….  As a result, the young woman suffered minor injuries. At no point, including at the time of his arrest, did defendant take out, display, use, or fire [the] gun [found in his fanny pack]. Nor did he otherwise threaten to do so. * * *

Under the RTA, prosecutions of adolescent offenders — defined as 16 or 17 year olds charged with a felony — are presumptively removable from the Youth Part of Supreme Court to Family Court (see CPL 722.10[1]; CPL 722.23[1], [2] …). The People can rebut that presumption if a defendant is charged with a class A nondrug felony or a violent felony, and the People prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” that defendant (1) “caused significant physical injury” during the commission of the offense, (2) “displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon” in “furtherance of” the offense, or (3) committed a sex offense (see CPL 722.23[2][c] …). “Otherwise, the case is removed to Family Court unless, upon a motion by the People, the [Y]outh [P]art determines that ‘extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer of the action to’ Family Court” … . * * *

… [D]efendant shouldered caretaker responsibilities for his family, including assisting his mother during a difficult pregnancy and being a source of mentorship and support for his younger siblings. He participated avidly in sports teams and lessons. His maturity was importantly manifested by his demonstrated amenability to Family Court’s services. For example, defendant highlighted his improved school performance during the COVID-19 pandemic, his interest in pursuing vocational studies, and his successful graduation from the Exalt Youth program with perfect attendance and outstanding participation. …

In our view, these are precisely the types of facts that the legislators contemplated would support removal to Family Court … . People v Key, 2026 NY Slip Op 05234, First Dept 9-3-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in depth discussion of the purpose and implementation of the “Raise the Age” legislation which allows the transfer of adolescent offenders’ felony prosecutions to Family Court.

Practice Point: Here the majority and the dissenters agreed Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the People’s motion to deny the transfer of the adolescent’s case to Family Court, but the majority went on to invoke its “interest of justice” jurisdiction to reverse, something the Court of Appeals would not have the power to do.

Generally, “where an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment, the employer is liable for the employee’s negligence under a theory of respondeat superior, and a plaintiff may not proceed with a cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring and retention” … . Thus, since here, the defendants admit that [the driver] was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, neither his personnel file nor the portions of the defendants’ policy manual relating to the retention or training of [the driver] are discoverable … . In addition, the plaintiff failed to show that any alleged remaining portions of the policy manual “would yield matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action” … . Lewis v New York City Tr. Auth., 2026 NY Slip Op 05175, Second Dept 9-2-26

​Practice Point: Where the employer admits the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the employer is liable for the negligence of the employee under a theory of respondeat superior. Generally, in that circumstance a negligent hiring and retention cause of action is not available to the plaintiff.

Here, the plaintiff’s RPAPL 1304 notice, dated July 15, 2016, contained the statutory language that was in effect at the time of the notice. However, RPAPL 1304 was amended effective December 20, 2016, and the amendment changed the language that the statute required the notice to contain … . Thus, the plaintiff’s July 15, 2016 RPAPL 1304 notice did not satisfy the condition precedent to litigation for this action commenced in August 2017, after the effective date of the amendment … . Although this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it may be reached as it involves a pure question of law that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided if brought to the court’s attention at the proper juncture … . Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Fischman, 2026 NY Slip Op 05212, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: The RPAPL 1304 foreclosure notice provisions were changed by amendment between the time the notice was sent to defendants and the action was brought, rendering the notice defective. The issue was properly raised for the first time on appeal.​

The plaintiff … moved to confirm a referee’s report of sale and for leave to enter a deficiency judgment against Newman in the sum of $1,222,732.14. … Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. A judgment was entered … in favor of the plaintiff … . …

RPAPL 1371(2) specifies the manner in which notice of such motions shall be served, and upon whom the notice shall be served, as follows: “Simultaneously with the making of a motion for an order confirming the sale, . . . the party to whom such residue shall be owing may make a motion in the action for leave to enter a deficiency judgment upon notice to the party against whom such judgment is sought or the attorney who shall have appeared for such party in such action. Such notice shall be served personally or in such other manner as the court may direct.”

Here, the plaintiff’s electronic filing of the motion papers on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing System did not constitute proper service in accordance with RPAPL 1371(2) … Consequently, “‘this constitutes a complete bar to the entry of a deficiency judgment'” … . 11-36 31st Ave. Lender, LLC v RM Newman, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05151, Second Dept 902026

Practice Point: Electronic filing of a motion to confirm a referee’s report and for leave to enter a default judgment is improper service. The correct method of service is codified in RPAPL 1371(2).

On this appeal, we are called upon to consider the validity of Suffolk County’s civil forfeiture statute, codified in chapter 420, article II (hereinafter chapter 420) of the Code of Suffolk County (hereinafter the Code), pursuant to which a vehicle being operated by the defendant Hassan Qamar (hereinafter the defendant) was seized at the time of his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The defendant challenges the validity of chapter 420 of the Code on three bases: (1) that the procedures relating to the post-seizure hearings conducted pursuant thereto violate article VI of the New York State Constitution, and deprived him of due process of law, (2) that the provisions of chapter 420 of the Code are preempted by State law, and (3) that the forfeiture of his vehicle constitutes an excessive fine prohibited by the State and Federal Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the defendant’s challenges to the procedures involving the post-seizure hearing have been rendered academic, and that there is no merit to his remaining challenges. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. * * *

… [A] Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter the SCPD) police officer observed the defendant operating a Nissan Altima (hereinafter the vehicle) on Pulaski Road in Huntington at a speed of 100 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone and passing a steady red traffic control light. According to the felony complaint, the defendant, inter alia, had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and admitted having “a few beers and a few shots of J[a]m[e]son[ ] W[h]iskey.” The defendant purportedly displayed “clues indicative of intoxication upon submitting to standardized field sobriety test” and submitted to a chemical breath test that resulted in a .20% blood alcohol content. The defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a) and driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3). The defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3) on April 1, 2015. The vehicle was seized and impounded by the SCPD pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code. * * *

… [T]he defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a), with one prior conviction. …

 … [T]he plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code, seeking forfeiture of the defendant’s vehicle.   Cohen v A 2019 Nissan, 2026 NY Slip Op 05158, Second Dept 9-2-26