… [P]laintiff submitted evidence establishing that the 2008 acceleration was validly revoked through the execution of the loan modification agreement, thereby causing the statute of limitations to reset as of that date. Defendants do not dispute that, even after FAPA [Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act], a validly executed loan modification agreement can reset the statute of limitations period on a previously accelerated loan, so long as the agreement complies with the writing requirements of General Obligations Law § 17-105 (1) … . * * *

Nothing in FAPA or the General Obligations Law changed the basic rule that the statute of limitations runs separately from the due date of each unpaid installment … , or, if the mortgagee elects to accelerate the entire debt, from the date of the acceleration … . * * *

Defendants’ missed payments in 2009 gave plaintiff the right to sue to recover such payments, but did not obligate plaintiff to do so. Instead, plaintiff could wait to exercise its option to accelerate the entire amount of the debt upon any subsequent default, in which case the statute of limitations would run from the date of the acceleration … , subject to forfeiture of the right to recover any missed payments that did not occur within six years prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action … . Ditech Fin. LLC v Temple, 2026 NY Slip Op 00951, Third Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: A loan modification agreement entered within six years of the 2008 acceleration of the debt deaccelerated the debt and reset the statute of limitations (a scenario not changed by the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act [FAPA]).

Practice Point: The six-year foreclosure statute of limitations starts running upon each missed mortgage payment. Here the 2018 foreclosure action was timely because it was brought within six years of a missed payment. Any missed payments which occurred prior to six years before the 2018 foreclosure was commenced were forfeited.

… Fifteen members of the Monroe County SWAT team and additional uniformed officers arrived at the apartment in an armored vehicle called a BearCat. The SWAT team members wore body armor and camouflage tactical clothing and carried assault rifles. The defendant did not live in the apartment but had been there for approximately 18 hours and stayed overnight the prior evening. An officer admitted that the police chose not to obtain an arrest warrant for the defendant because they wanted to interview him before his right to counsel attached.

A police investigator testified that upon seeing the defendant through the apartment window, he shouted at him to “come on out, house is surrounded . . . come out empty handed and come out with your hands up.” The defendant … exited the building, at which point he was taken into custody. Officers then entered the apartment and ordered the tenant and her cousin to “come out with [their] hands up” and lie face down with “guns to [them].” The tenant testified that she was scared; she and her cousin were handcuffed; and the police separated them and put the tenant into the back of a police patrol car, where she could not see her cousin and remained for approximately five to seven minutes. An officer obtained the tenant’s consent to search. * * *

When officers subject someone to a display of authority that induces them to exit the home under coercion, the sanctity of the home has been invaded to the same extent as if the officers had physically entered. Such a show of force violates Payton and renders an arrest unlawful … . * * *

… [T]he Appellate Division applied an incorrect legal standard in considering the validity of the tenant’s consent. People v Gonzalez (39 NY2d 122, 128-130 [1976]) sets forth the factors that should be considered in determining whether the consent was voluntary. Those include “whether the consenter is in custody or under arrest”; “the circumstances surrounding the custody or arrest,” including whether the person was “confronted by a large number of police agents”; whether the person was handcuffed; “the background of the consenter,” including their age and prior experience with police; “whether the consenter has been . . . evasive or uncooperative with the law enforcement authorities”; and “whether [the person] was advised of [their] right to refuse to consent” … .  The Appellate Division instead recited and applied the factors set forth in People v Borges (69 NY2d 1031, 1033 [1987]), which go to whether voluntary consent was attenuated from an illegal arrest, not whether the consent itself was voluntary. People v Shaw, 2026 NY Slip Op 00961, CtApp 2-19-26

Practice Point: If a person is coerced by the police into leaving his home by a show of force, a warrantless arrest outside the home violates Payton and is illegal.

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when a consent to search obtained by the police can be considered voluntarily given.

… [E]mployment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under notice pleading standards … . Indeed, a “plaintiff alleging employment discrimination need not plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination but need only give fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds” … . In an action brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), “[f]air notice is all that is required to survive at the pleading stage” … . * * *

Although a “single, isolated comment” or “stray remark” will not always suffice to sustain a discrimination or hostile work environment claim … , “a single comment that objectifies women being made in circumstances where that comment would, for example, signal views about the role of women in the workplace” could be actionable … . Here, where plaintiff alleged that her supervisor implied that she only received high evaluation scores because she was engaging in sexual relations with higher-ups, the alleged remarks and attendant hostile conduct were more than “petty slights and trivial inconveniences” … . Cummings v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 00972, First Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: Pleading standards are more lenient in employment discrimination cases. Fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds are sufficient to survive dismissal.

… [D]efendants are not entitled to a jury trial on their counterclaims. Generally, a party asserting a fraudulent inducement claim may pursue a jury trial, notwithstanding the existence of a jury waiver clause, when that party primarily seeks money damages … . Here, by contrast, defendants’ counterclaims seek rescission of the contract and side letter agreement, with damages only sought in the alternative. As the Court of Appeals has held, “[a]ll issues pertaining to [an] equitable defense and counterclaim, whether matters of fact or law, [are] to be determined by the court under CPLR 4101” … and “[r]escission claims, of course, are equitable in nature” … . Accordingly, defendants’ counterclaims must be tried by the court, not a jury, by virtue of the equitable relief they seek. Penske v National Holding Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 00978, First Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: Where a cause of action seeks equitable relief, here rescission of a contract, it must be tried by the court, not a jury, even if damages are demanded in the alternative.

Prior to the commencement of jury selection for the second trial, the People made a Molineux application to allow the complainant to testify about an alleged prior oral sexual encounter with defendant. The People argued, inter alia, that this evidence was “inextricably intertwined” with the complainant’s testimony as to the charges of sexual abuse, provided relevant background, and put the complainant’s testimony “into a believable context.” Supreme Court granted the People’s motion. The court concluded that the proposed testimony was “inextricably woven [in]to the narrative.” …

Supreme Court erred in granting the People’s Molineux application. Even if the People established some non-propensity basis for introducing this evidence, “the prejudicial nature of that evidence far outweighed any probative value” … . People v Nieves, 2026 NY Slip Op 00979, First Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: Here in this sexual abuse prosecution, the complainant’s testimony about a prior, uncharged sex act was deemed much more prejudicial than probative. Therefore the testimony was inadmissible, despite the argument that it was “inextricably intertwined” with the narrative of the crime or provided relevant background.

Supreme Court erred in finding that defendant failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel absented himself from a proffer session midway through the session. Absent an express waiver from defendant, counsel had an obligation to be present during the session and to “be alert to, and to avert if he could, the possibility that defendant’s cooperation would hurt rather than help him” … . Under the circumstances, where counsel advanced no sound strategic reason behind his decision to leave the proffer session, his absence deprived defendant of meaningful representation at a critical stage in the proceeding … . Defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s absence, because a statement defendant made during the proffer session implicating himself in the burglaries for which he was ultimately tried and convicted for, was successfully used by the prosecution to impeach defendant’s credibility at the trial … . People v Anonymous, 2026 NY Slip Op 00980, First Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: A proffer session is a critical stage of a criminal proceedings at which a defendant may incriminate himself. Here defense counsel’s leaving a proffer session midway constituted ineffective assistance warranting vacation of the conviction.

On appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment (220 AD3d 1223 [4th Dept 2023]). The Court held that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, stating that, “[a]lthough a different verdict would not have been unreasonable,” the jury did not “fail[ ] to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded” … . …

In Baque, we recently clarified the Appellate Division’s role in reviewing the weight of the evidence in a case involving purely circumstantial evidence. In a circumstantial evidence case, the jury must conclude that ” ‘the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence’ ” (Baque, 43 NY3d at 29 …). Observing that the Appellate Division’s function in conducting a weight review was to “independently assess all of the proof,” we explained that the Appellate Division, like the jury, must conclude that the evidence gives rise to such an inference … . We further reiterated in Baque that this Court has no power to review the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the weight of the evidence unless that Court ” ‘manifestly failed to consider the issue or did so using an incorrect legal principle’ ” … . * * *

Here, the Appellate Division expressly rejected defendant’s weight of the evidence challenge and did so by citing Bleakley and People v Danielson (9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007])—citations that we noted in Baque indicated that the Appellate Division applied the correct legal standard … .

… [W]e assume that the Appellate Division appropriately conducts its weight of the evidence review in a circumstantial evidence case, unless its decision manifestly demonstrates otherwise … . …

… [T]he Appellate Division cited …cases … indicating that the Appellate Division deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations and that it did not view this as an appropriate case in which to substitute its own credibility determinations for that of the jury … . …

In sum, Baque did not alter the longstanding principle that this Court “cannot review a weight of the evidence challenge unless the intermediate appellate court manifestly failed to consider the issue or did so using an incorrect legal principle” … . People v Anderson, 2026 NY Slip Op 00967, CtApp 2-29-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for the criteria for a Court-of-Appeals review of an Appellate Division’s weight-of-the-evidence ruling.

Family Court failed to satisfy the procedural mechanism required by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Domestic Relations Law, art 5-A) when a custody-related proceeding is pending in another state. Specifically, after the court became aware of the Ohio proceeding, the record does not reflect that the court attempted to communicate with the Ohio court, which is a reversable error … . * * *

… Family Court failed to comply with the statutory requirement to consider, under the circumstances presented and in light of the serious allegations of domestic violence in the mother’s petition, whether it was necessary to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect the mother and the child … . Matter of Shelby C.V. v Joshua W.K, 2026 NY Slip Op 01002, First Dept 2-17-26

Practice Point: It is reversible error for a judge to fail to communicate with a court in another jurisdiction after learning of another custody-related proceeding there.

Practice Point: Allegations of domestic violence may trigger the statutory requirement that a judge consider exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect family members.

The Town uses a notification system called “E-news” to send subscribers email alerts regarding news, updates, or announcements relating to the Town. Petitioner James Russell submitted a FOIL request to the Town seeking disclosure of the names and email addresses of all residents of the Town who subscribe to E-news. Petitioner’s FOIL request relied on the Appellate Division’s decision in Matter of Livson v Town of Greenburgh, which held that a neighboring town was required under FOIL to disclose a similar email subscriber list for its electronic news service because the town had failed to “articulate any privacy interest that would be at stake” (see 141 AD3d 658, 661 [2d Dept 2016]). Petitioner’s request also stated that he would not reproduce, redistribute, or circulate the names or email addresses or use the information contained therein for solicitation, fundraising, or any commercial purpose—the same conditions that the court imposed in Livson … .  * * *

On one side of the scales, the subscribers have a strong privacy interest in keeping their names and email addresses confidential to avoid unwanted and unwelcome communications, and to minimize the risk of cybersecurity threats resulting from disclosure of such information. An email address, and the corresponding holder’s name, are commonly treated as personally identifying information (PII). For example, New York’s Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act includes email addresses, in combination with a password or security question and answer that would permit access to an online account, as an example of protected information which—if accessed or acquired without valid authorization—triggers notification to the affected persons … . …

Generally, individuals share their email address with people they know, or in exchange for a particular benefit or information that they consent to receive. They assume and rely on a common understanding that those with whom they share their email address will maintain that information private from third parties and the public at large, unless otherwise agreed or implied. * * *

The subscribers’ privacy concerns also reflect the ubiquitous use of email as a means of communicating highly sensitive private information. One’s email account generally contains a large amount of personal data. For example, medical records, job applications, consumer purchase histories, tax returns, and credit card, bank account, and social security numbers are often embedded in emails, or in documents attached to emails. In addition, people often use their email addresses as a username or user ID to log in to many different websites or access online services … . * * *

On the other side of the scales, there is no public interest served by disclosure here. Petitioner argues only that disclosure will increase public engagement on issues of community concern. Matter of Russell v Town of Mount Pleasant, N.Y., 2026 NY Slip Op 00966, CtApp 2-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for a discussion of the privacy concerns raised by the publication of one’s name and email address.

The court … read the note into the record as follows:

“We the jury would like clarification on the law regarding the first three charges. There is a portion that states the operation is intent to move the vehicle. There was, however, another segment. That segment, stated that operation is if the engine is running.”

When it read the note to the parties it omitted a question from the jury … . The full note stated:

“We would like clarification on the law regarding the first 3 charges. There is a portion that states that operation is intent to move the vehicle. There was however another segment that segment that stated that operation is if the engine is running. Are both correct?” … .

When the court read [another] portion of the note aloud, the court again altered the jury language. The court stated:

“And, then they also said the law for consumption of alcohol beverages in certain motor vehicles does not seem to contain a section that includes solely the engine running, which is also correct, and I will just read them that charge. Is that acceptable?”

But the note read:

“Also, the law for [Consumption] of Alcoholic Beverages in certain motor vehicles does not seem to contain the section that includes solely the engine is running. Is this also correct?. * * *

The court’s failure to read the jury note verbatim, or otherwise create a record demonstrating that the parties had received a copy of the note, deprived Mr. Galindo [defendant] of meaningful notice of the precise contents of the substantive jury note. By omitting the question “Are both correct?”, the court obscured the nature of the jury’s inquiry with respect to the “operates” element shared by the three counts of intoxication and the unlicensed operation charge. The jury’s question strongly suggests it wanted to know whether the “operates” instruction contained two distinct conditions either one of which could satisfy the “operates” element. Put differently, the jury’s question crystallizes its inquiry: whether intent to move the vehicle was necessary or a running engine was sufficient to meet the definition of operation. Had Mr. Galindo been accurately apprised of the contents of the jury note, he would have had the opportunity to provide input into how the court resolved the jury’s inquiry. Instead, Mr. Galindo was deprived of meaningful notice, and rereading the original CJI instruction responsible for the jury’s initial confusion did not adequately address the jury’s question. People v Galindo, 2026 NY Slip Op 00965, CtApp 2-19-26

Practice Point: Here the judge’s failure to read out the jury note verbatim constituted a  mode of proceedings error.