Constitutional Law – New York Appellate Digest https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com Sun, 15 Nov 2026 21:10:10 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.4 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Favicon-Blue-01-36x36.png Constitutional Law – New York Appellate Digest https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com 32 32 171315692 A COUNTY LAW WHICH PROHIBITS TRANSGENDER ATHLETES FORM PARTICIPATING IN WOMEN’S AND GIRLS’ SPORTS AT A COUNTY PARK IS PREEMPTED BY THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYSHRL) AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/11/04/a-county-law-which-prohibits-transgender-athletes-form-participating-in-womens-and-girls-sports-at-a-county-park-is-preempted-by-the-new-york-state-human-rights-law-nyshrl-and-the-civil-rights-l/ https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/11/04/a-county-law-which-prohibits-transgender-athletes-form-participating-in-womens-and-girls-sports-at-a-county-park-is-preempted-by-the-new-york-state-human-rights-law-nyshrl-and-the-civil-rights-l/#respond Wed, 04 Nov 2026 18:00:10 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=607130 The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county law which prohibited transgender athletes from participating in women’s and girls’ sports at a county park was unconstitutional. The local law was called “A Local Law to Maintain a Safe and Fair Competitive Environment for Woman and Girls Participating in Sports and Athletic Events:”

Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “[n]o person shall, because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of the executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.”. * * *

“Discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression is also sex discrimination” (9 NYCRR 466.13[d]). “Gender identity or expression means a person’s actual or perceived gender-related identity, appearance, behavior, expression or other gender-related characteristic regardless of the sex assigned to that person at birth, including, but not limited to, the status of being transgender” … . “A transgender person is an individual who has a gender identity or expression different from the sex assigned to that individual at birth” … .

Here, the NYSHRL and Civil Rights Law § 40-c expressly prohibit the County from restricting access to places of public accommodation based on a person’s gender identity or expression, including whether the person identifies as transgender. Thus, the local law’s permitting scheme conflicts with, and is invalid as preempted by, the NYSHRL and Civil Rights Law § 40-c … . Long Is. Roller Rebels v County of Nassau, 2026 NY Slip Op 06427, Second Dept 11-4-26

Practice Point: A county law prohibiting transgender athletes from participating in women’s and girls’ sports at a county park is preempted by the NYS Human Rights Law and the Civil Rights Law.

Same analysis and result in a declaratory judgment action entitled People v County of Nassau, 2026 NY Slip Op 06472, Second Dept 11-4-26.

 

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THE DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING TO DISSOLVE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF HER PERSON (SECOND DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/28/the-developmentally-disabled-petitioner-had-the-right-to-counsel-of-her-own-choosing-in-this-proceeding-to-dissolve-the-guardianship-of-her-person-second-dept/ https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/28/the-developmentally-disabled-petitioner-had-the-right-to-counsel-of-her-own-choosing-in-this-proceeding-to-dissolve-the-guardianship-of-her-person-second-dept/#respond Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:24:02 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=607063 The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, considering matters of first impression, determined the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in a proceeding to dissolve the guardianship of her person:

The right of an individual to select counsel “implicates both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public interest” … .

Contrary to the determination of the Surrogate’s Court, the record demonstrates that, under the circumstances present here, the petitioner freely and independently retained counsel of her own choosing. At the hearing, the petitioner articulated her purpose in retaining counsel and demonstrated an understanding of the nature and consequences of having counsel. The record shows, inter alia, that the petitioner had contacted more than one legal organization and spoke personally to the attorney whom she retained, and continued to communicate and work with that attorney. During the court’s inquiry, the petitioner was able to articulate a clear understanding of the purpose and goals of the proceeding and why counsel was sought to be retained. Matter of Jessica L.M. (Deborah M.), 2026 NY Slip Op 06306, Second Dept 10-28-26

Practice Point: Here the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in this dissolution-of-guardianship proceeding.

 

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THE “GUARANTY LAW,” ENACTED BY THE NYC COUNCIL DURING COVID, DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (DISAGREEING WITH THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT); THE GUARANTY LAW PRECLUDED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY GUARANTIES OF CERTAIN COMMERCIAL LEASES FOR 16 MONTHS (FIRST DEPT) https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/20/the-guaranty-law-enacted-by-the-nyc-council-during-covid-did-not-violate-the-contracts-clause-of-the-u-s-constitution-disagreeing-with-the-southern-district-the-guaranty-law-precluded-the-en/ https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/20/the-guaranty-law-enacted-by-the-nyc-council-during-covid-did-not-violate-the-contracts-clause-of-the-u-s-constitution-disagreeing-with-the-southern-district-the-guaranty-law-precluded-the-en/#respond Wed, 21 Oct 2026 00:11:59 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606959 The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rosado, over a dissenting opinion, determined the “guaranty law,” enacted during COVID, did not violate the Contracts Clause of the US Constitution:

This case calls on us to determine the constitutionality of New York City Administrative Code § 22-1005, commonly referred to as the “guaranty law.” Enacted by the New York City Council in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the guaranty law precluded the enforcement of personal liability guaranties of certain commercial leases for a statutorily prescribed 16-month period. Principally, we are asked to decide whether this law, which the City Council passed as a means of mitigating the economic fallout of the public health crisis and to help small business owners avoid personal bankruptcy, impermissibly impairs existing contractual obligations in violation of the Contracts Clause of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution. … [W]e conclude that the guaranty law does not violate the Contracts Clause.

[Overview of the facts:]

… [T]he landlord entered into a lease agreement with the tenant to rent the lower level of its building … for a 10-year term expiring on August 31, 2025. As principal of the tenant, a gallery that conducts shows for artists and sells artwork, the guarantor signed a “good guy” guaranty, agreeing to personally guaranty the tenant’s obligations under the lease. …

In March 2020, the tenant stopped paying rent, and by email dated November 1, 2020, the guarantor informed the landlord that the tenant intended to surrender the space back to the landlord on November 30, 2020. The tenant agreed to forfeit the security deposit to “settle up,” and by email dated December 7, 2020, the guarantor informed the landlord that the tenant had closed the gallery and returned the keys that day.

The landlord commenced this action against the tenant and the guarantor, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of lease, (2) breach of guaranty, (3) attorneys’ fees under the guaranty, and (4) attorneys’ fees under the lease. The landlord sought to enforce the lease and personal guaranty … . 513 W. 26th Realty LLC v George Billis Galleries, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06058, First Dept 10-20-26

 

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ONE PROSPECTIVE JUROR TESTIFIED THE DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE WITH HER; THE JUDGE GRANTED THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ENTIRE JURY PANEL; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FIRST QUESTION THE REMAINING JURORS ON THE PANEL ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL BEFORE DISMISSING THEM, THE JUDGE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PARTICULAR JURY CHOSEN ACCORDING TO LAW (SECOND DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/14/one-prospective-juror-testified-the-defendant-attempted-to-communicate-with-her-the-judge-granted-the-peoples-motion-to-dismiss-the-entire-jury-panel-because-the-judge-did-not-first-question-the-r/ Wed, 14 Oct 2026 21:35:41 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606933 The Second Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge should not have dismissed the entire jury panel without conducting an inquiry. One prospective juror on the panel alleged the defendant tried to communicate with her. The People moved to dismiss the panel which the judge granted without questioning the remaining jurors about their ability to be fair and impartial:

“A defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law, in whose selection [the defendant] has had a voice” … . Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law article 270, the first 12 members of the jury panel who are not excluded as prescribed by the statute constitute the trial jury … . Where a jury panel is “properly drawn and sworn to answer questions truthfully, there must be legal cause or a peremptory challenge to exclude a [prospective] juror” ( … see CPLR 270.15 … ). “A defendant ‘is . . . entitled to insist that the jury shall be selected according to methods established with a view to secure a just and impartial administration of the jury system . . . The court cannot arbitrarily, and without cause, set aside a competent juror. Neither the court nor the parties can select the jury, except in the way pointed out by the statute'” … . * * *

By dismissing the entire jury panel without questioning the ability of the individual prospective jurors to be fair and impartial …, the court deprived defendant of a jury chosen “at random from a fair cross-section of the community” … . People v Gaston, 2026 NY Slip Op 05971, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: A judge cannot arbitrarily and without cause dismiss a competent juror. Here the judge dismissed an entire panel of prospective jurors because one prospective juror alleged the defendant tried to communicate with her. In that situation, the judge should have questioned the remaining prospective jurors about their ability to be fair and impartial to determine if there was cause for dismissal.​

 

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THE LIMITED INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY THE JUDGE BEFORE HOLDING THE TRIAL IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT FORFEITED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/07/the-limited-inquiry-conducted-by-the-judge-before-holding-the-trial-in-defendants-absence-was-insufficient-to-demonstrate-defendant-forfeited-his-right-to-be-present-at-the-trial-second-dept/ Wed, 07 Oct 2026 17:00:39 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606824 The Second Department, reversing the judgment of conviction, determined the inquiry conducted by the judge when the defendant did not show up for trial was insufficient. The record did not establish defendant had deliberately forfeited his right to be present:

… [T]he court held a colloquy on the record, during which the court and defense counsel stated that the defendant had previously assured them of his intention to be present at trial. Defense counsel further informed the court that he did not know where the defendant was, and had looked for him in the courthouse. Defense counsel stated that he had been unable to reach the defendant that morning, but had received a message from the defendant’s mother indicating that the defendant was “on the way.” …  Following limited inquiry, the court commenced the trial in the defendant’s absence shortly after 12:00 p.m.

“‘A defendant’s right to be present at a criminal trial is encompassed within the confrontation clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions'” … . A defendant may “forfeit that right by deliberately absenting himself [or herself] from the proceedings” … . However, “‘before proceeding in the defendant’s absence, the court has an obligation to inquire into the surrounding circumstances to determine if the defendant’s absence is deliberate and to recite on the record the reasons for its finding,'” and “‘[t]he failure to conduct such an inquiry constitutes reversible error'” … . Furthermore, “[w]hile the right to be present may, under some circumstances, be waived by a defendant’s conduct, trial in absentia is not thereby automatically authorized” … . “Rather, the trial court must exercise its sound discretion upon consideration of all appropriate factors, including the possibility that [the] defendant could be located within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty of rescheduling trial and the chance that evidence will be lost or witnesses will disappear” … .

Here, the Supreme Court erred in conducting the trial in the defendant’s absence without sufficient inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s absence, and the record is therefore insufficient to establish that the defendant deliberately absented himself from the proceedings and thereby forfeited his right to be present … . Furthermore, the record does not reflect that the court considered all of the appropriate factors before proceeding in the defendant’s absence … . People v Jorge, 2026 NY Slip Op 05811, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the inquiry a judge must make before proceeding with a trial in the defendant’s absence.

 

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THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN ERLINGER V US DOES NOT ALTER THE LANDSCAPE OF NEW YORK’S PREDICATE OFFENDER STATUTES; A JUDGE, AS OPPOSED TO A JURY, CAN MAKE THE CALCULATIONS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE BOUNDS OF THE 10-YEAR LOOKBACK PERIOD, INCLUDING THE TOLLING OF THE LOOKBACK BY INCARCERATION (SECOND DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/10/07/the-supreme-courts-ruling-in-erlinger-v-us-does-not-alter-the-landscape-of-new-yorks-predicate-offender-statutes-a-judge-as-opposed-to-a-jury-can-make-the-calculations-necessary-to-determine-th/ Wed, 07 Oct 2026 15:46:05 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606818 The Second Department, reversing the resentence, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Landicino, determined the US Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v US “does not alter the landscape of New York’s predicate offender statutes, the constitutionality of which is well-settled.” Therefore a judge, as opposed to a jury, can make the ministerial calculations required for any tolling of the 10-year lookback period for predicate offenses:

… [T]he tolling calculation under the subject predicate felony offender statutes does not involve an inquiry into the underlying facts that led to the predicate convictions. Rather, the court is required to determine the dates that a defendant entered and was discharged from a correctional facility upon serving a prior sentence … . These ministerial calculations do not implicate any factual determination as to the defendant’s actions during a prior crime of conviction and are akin to the “fact of prior conviction” … . To the extent that a sentencing court must divine the date of the commission of the present offense in order to determine the bounds of the 10-year lookback period, it is constitutionally permitted to use Shepard documents [judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant] to ascertain “the jurisdiction in which the defendant’s crime occurred and its date” … . Such an inquiry certainly does not impermissibly invite the sentencing court to “try to discern what a trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant’s underlying conduct” … . A jury is not required to resolve an inquiry that “does not relate to the commission of the offense itself” … . To protect the rights of a defendant during sentencing as a predicate felony offender, New York’s procedural rules provide for a hearing before the judge when the defendant “controverts an allegation” in the predicate felony statement (CPL 400.21). That is all that is required—the Constitution does not entitle a defendant to a jury determination on the issue of whether a predicate offense was committed within 10 years of the commission of the instant offense, including any calculation regarding the periods during which the defendant was incarcerated. People v Gardner, 2026 NY Slip Op 05809, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: In New York, a judge, as opposed to a jury, may make the lookback calculations associated with the application of the predicate offender sentencing statutes.

 

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WHERE A COURT’S DETERMINATION TO ENHANCE A DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS BASED SOLELY ON CALCULATIONS DRAWN FROM CERTIFIED PUBLIC RECORDS OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR INCARCERATION, SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT CAN BE IMPOSED BY A JUDGE (AS OPPOSED TO A JURY) (FIRST DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/09/24/where-a-courts-determination-to-enhance-a-defendants-sentence-is-based-solely-on-calculations-drawn-from-certified-public-records-of-defendants-prior-incarceration-sentence-enhancement-can-be-i/ Thu, 24 Sep 2026 15:56:46 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606595 The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the question whether periods of incarceration which tolled the look-back period for enhancement of defendant’s sentence can be determined by a judge, as opposed to a jury:

The court granted defendant’s CPL 440.20 motion and concluded that the initial predicate statement was facially insufficient and that, pursuant to Erlinger [602 US 821], tolling determinations must be made by a jury. The court held that it could “neither determine, nor convene a jury to determine[,] that defendant was previously incarcerated at a particular time and place in an effort to enhance his sentencing.” * * *

​Defendant moved under CPL 440.20 to set aside the persistent violent felony offender sentence, arguing that the predicate felony statement was facially insufficient because it omitted periods of incarceration necessary to toll the statutory ten-year lookback period. Defendant contended that, under Erlinger, a jury was required to make the factual determination of whether any tolling finding would bring his prior conviction within the lookback window. * * *

As this Court found in People v Young (…2026 NY Slip Op 02883 […2026]), Erlinger does not apply to the tolling protocol contained in New York’s predicate felony sentencing statutes. These involve a “rote arithmetic calculation to be made based on certified public records” … . Such objective determinations fall within the narrow Almendarez-Torres exception permitting judicial determination of “the fact of a prior conviction” and associated ministerial facts such as dates.

… [T]he sentencing court erred in holding that tolling findings must be made by a jury and that it therefore could not sentence defendant as a persistent violent felony offender. As in Young, the tolling determination at issue required the court to review official admission and release records as well as calculate the periods during which defendant was confined. This administrative determination does not implicate the Sixth Amendment under Erlinger but rather falls within the Almendarez-Torres exception. People v Sabater, 2026 NY Slip Op 05459, First Dept 9-24-26

Practice Point: Where sentence enhancement is based solely on certified public records of prior incarceration, there is no requirement that a jury, as opposed to the judge, make the enhancement determination.

 

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THE SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE PROVISIONS WHICH ALLOW THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF VEHICLES USED BY DRUNK DRIVERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL (SECOND DEPT). https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/09/02/the-suffolk-county-code-provisions-which-allow-the-seizure-and-forfeiture-of-vehicles-used-by-drunk-drivers-is-constitutional-second-dept/ Wed, 02 Sep 2026 18:25:22 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606439 The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCormack, determined the provisions of the Suffolk County Code which provide for the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used by drunk drivers is constitutional:

On this appeal, we are called upon to consider the validity of Suffolk County’s civil forfeiture statute, codified in chapter 420, article II (hereinafter chapter 420) of the Code of Suffolk County (hereinafter the Code), pursuant to which a vehicle being operated by the defendant Hassan Qamar (hereinafter the defendant) was seized at the time of his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The defendant challenges the validity of chapter 420 of the Code on three bases: (1) that the procedures relating to the post-seizure hearings conducted pursuant thereto violate article VI of the New York State Constitution, and deprived him of due process of law, (2) that the provisions of chapter 420 of the Code are preempted by State law, and (3) that the forfeiture of his vehicle constitutes an excessive fine prohibited by the State and Federal Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the defendant’s challenges to the procedures involving the post-seizure hearing have been rendered academic, and that there is no merit to his remaining challenges. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. * * *

… [A] Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter the SCPD) police officer observed the defendant operating a Nissan Altima (hereinafter the vehicle) on Pulaski Road in Huntington at a speed of 100 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone and passing a steady red traffic control light. According to the felony complaint, the defendant, inter alia, had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and admitted having “a few beers and a few shots of J[a]m[e]son[ ] W[h]iskey.” The defendant purportedly displayed “clues indicative of intoxication upon submitting to standardized field sobriety test” and submitted to a chemical breath test that resulted in a .20% blood alcohol content. The defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a) and driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3). The defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3) on April 1, 2015. The vehicle was seized and impounded by the SCPD pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code. * * *

… [T]he defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a), with one prior conviction. …

 … [T]he plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code, seeking forfeiture of the defendant’s vehicle.   Cohen v A 2019 Nissan, 2026 NY Slip Op 05158, Second Dept 9-2-26

 

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PURSUANT TO CPL 30.30(2)(A), THE 90-DAY SPEEDY TRIAL CLOCK DOES NOT COUNT DAYS WHEN DEFENDANT IS NOT IN CUSTODY; HERE DEFENDANT WAS INITIALLY INCARCERATED, RELASED ON BAIL, AND THEN INCARCERATED AGAIN; THE DAYS DURING WHICH DEFENDANT WAS OUT ON BAIL ARE NOT PART OF THE 90-DAY CALCULATION (SECOND DEPT) https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/09/02/pursuant-to-cpl-30-302a-the-90-day-speedy-trial-clock-does-not-count-days-when-defendant-is-not-in-custody-here-defendant-was-initially-incarcerated-relased-on-bail-and-then-incarcerated-again/ Wed, 02 Sep 2026 16:09:37 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606450 The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, in a matter of first impression, determined the 90-day clock for a speedy trial violation pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) includes only the days during which defendant was incarcerated. Here defendant was initially incarcerated, then released on bail when his girlfriend posted bail, and then incarcerated again when his girlfriend withdrew as the surety. Defendant’s total number of incarcerated days before the People were ready for trial was 80 days:

Counsel for the defendant contended, among other things, that the 31 days between September 9, 2024, and October 11, 2024, when the defendant was no longer in custody as he had posted bail did not qualify under CPL 30.30(3) or (4) as an exception to the 90-day readiness requirement and that, therefore, 117 days were chargeable to the People for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a). According to counsel, since the People were not ready for trial within 90 days after the defendant was first in custody, the defendant was entitled to be released under CPL 30.30(2)(a). Counsel argued that there was no statutory basis for two different CPL 30.30 clocks or for resetting the clock to exclude the 31 days when he was out on bail.

In opposition, the People contended that the 31 days when the defendant was out on bail should be excluded from the calculation of time under CPL 30.30(2)(a). They contended, in sum and substance, that, upon the defendant’s return to custody in this case, the 90-day time clock under CPL 30.30(2)(a) for the People to be ready for trial reset and began again. The People argued, in the alternative, that the 31 days that the defendant was out on bail should be excluded from the 90-day calculation of readiness under CPL 30.30(2)(a). Thus, they contended that the time chargeable to the People was 80 days, plus 4 days that the Supreme Court charged to the People with respect to a challenge the defendant had made to the validity of the People’s COC, but that, since only 84 days were chargeable under CPL 30.30(2)(a), the People had declared their readiness for trial within the statute’s permissible time frame. * * *

Supreme Court correctly determined that the defendant was not unlawfully detained in violation of CPL 30.30(2)(a). Under the appropriate calculation, here, 20 days was chargeable to the People before the defendant was released on bail from his original custody. Thereafter, an additional 60 days were chargeable to the People for the time period preceding the People’s filing of the COC and the SOR, during which the defendant was again incarcerated. Thus, for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a), 80 days were chargeable to the People under CPL 30.30(2). People ex rel. Liles v Richards, 2026 NY Slip Op 05191, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: Pursuant to CPL 30.30(a)(2), the 90-day speedy trial clock does not include days when defendant is not in custody. Here defendant was initially incarcerated, released on bail, then incarcerated again. Because the days when defendant was out on bail are not part of the calculation, the speedy trial statute was not violated.

 

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THE TOWN PLACED A $24,000 LIEN ON PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY FOR REPAIR WORK DONE BY THE TOWN BEFORE THE PROPERTY WAS TRANSFERRED TO PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF BROUGHT A PROCEDURAL-DUE-PROCESS ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN (42 USC 1983); THE ACTION FAILED BECAUSE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF A CPLR ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT). ​ https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/2026/08/12/the-town-placed-a-24000-lien-on-plaintiffs-property-for-repair-work-done-by-the-town-before-the-property-was-transferred-to-plaintiff-plaintiff-brought-a-procedural-due-process-action-against-the/ Wed, 12 Aug 2026 22:52:29 +0000 https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/?p=606253 The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town was entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 action alleging a violation of procedural due process. Plaintiff, after purchasing the property, was assessed over $24,000 for repairs to the property paid for by the town and necessitated by the prior owner’s failure to maintain the property. The procedural due process claim failed because plaintiff had the option of bringing an Article 78 proceeding:

“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment” … . “‘Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands'” … . In determining what due process requires in a specific context, courts consider “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail” … .

Here, although the plaintiff’s property interest was affected by the special assessment and lien, the risk of erroneous deprivation was remedied by the availability of a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 … . Accordingly, the Town demonstrated, prima facie, that it did not deprive the plaintiff of due process … . First Sovereign Equity Group, Inc. v Town of Smithtown, 2026 NY Slip Op 04928, Second Dept 8-12-26

Practice Point: Here the risk of erroneous deprivation of plaintiff’s property by the town was remedied by the availability of a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Therefore the criteria for a viable procedural-due-process action against the town were not met.

 

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