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“GOOD CAUSE” FOR FILING A LATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION MUST BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE INITIAL MOTION PAPERS, NOT IN THE REPLY PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s late summary judgment motion should not have been granted because the initial papers  did not demonstrate “good cause” for the late filing. The “good cause” allegations in defendant’s reply papers should not have been considered:

Defendant’s motion was … untimely … and, thus, defendant was required to demonstrate “good cause” for the untimeliness of the motion in its initial motion papers (CPLR 3212 [a] …). Indeed, “[i]t is well settled that it is improper for a court to consider the ‘good cause’ proffered by a movant if it is presented for the first time in reply papers” … . Inasmuch as it is undisputed here that defendant did not proffer any good cause for the delay in its initial motion papers, the court erred in considering the motion and should have denied it as untimely … . Worden v City of Utica, 2024 NY Slip Op 02628, Fourth Dept 5-10-24

Practice Point: If you make a late summary judgment motion, you must demonstrate “good cause” for being late in the initial motion papers. A “good cause” demonstration in the reply papers should not be considered by the judge.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS QUANTUM MERUIT CASE. DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE A JURY TRIAL AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL ON DAMAGES; BENCH-TRIAL VERDICT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant never waived a jury trial in this quantum-meruit action. Therefore, although plaintiff was granted summary judgment, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on damages:

… [T]he order awarding damages must be reversed, and the judgment vacated … . Upon granting plaintiff summary judgment for liability on its quantum meruit claim, Supreme Court conducted a hearing on attorneys’ fees. However, claims seeking recovery under the “quasi-contractual theory of quantum meruit” for “only money damages” are considered “actions at law” entitling parties to a trial by jury … . Defendant did not waive a jury trial, but instead filed his jury demand “within fifteen days after service of the note of issue,” and more than a year before the purported attorney fee hearing was held (CPLR 4102[a]). Defendant’s “right to a jury trial [wa]s not lost, when [the] motion [and cross-motion] for summary judgment [were] decided against [him]” … , yet Supreme Court deprived him of this right by conducting a bench trial on damages … . Hilton Wiener LLC v Zenk, 2024 NY Slip Op 02595, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Quantum meruit is an action at law entitling parties to a jury trial.

Practice Point: Here defendant never waived a jury trial and, although summary judgment was awarded to plaintiff, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on damages.

 

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SUPREME COURT DID NOT CITE ANY “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” TO JUSTIFY ITS SUA-SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this divorce action, determined there was no demonstration of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify Supreme Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint:

“A court’s power to dismiss a [complaint], sua sponte, is to be used sparingly, and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . Here, the Supreme Court did not identify any extraordinary circumstances warranting sua sponte dismissal of the complaint … . The plaintiff moved, inter alia, to consolidate custody and family offense proceedings that were pending in the Family Court, Queens County, and the Family Court, Kings County, with the instant action. There was no motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety or to change venue before the court … . Ivashchenko v Borukhov, 2024 NY Slip Op 02526, Second Dept 5-8-24

Practice Point: This decision illustrates the appellate-courts’ discomfort with sua sponte dismissals of complaints (dismissal in the absence of a motion requesting it).

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED USING DEFENDANT’S BOW; DEFENDANT MOVED FOR PERMISSION TO PERFORM TESTS ON THE BOW WHICH INVOLVED REMOVING AND THEN REPLACING THE DAMAGED COMPONENT OF THE BOW; THE JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH TESTING WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant bow manufacturer (PSE) was not entitled to testing of the bow beyond the visual inspection already done. Plaintiff was struck in the eye when using the bow. Defendant moved for permission to replace the damaged component of the bow, test the bow, and then replace the damaged component. Supreme Court had granted the motion:

A party “seeking to conduct destructive testing should provide a reasonably specific justification for such testing including, inter alia, the basis for its belief that nondestructive testing is inadequate and that destructive testing is necessary; further, there should be an enumeration and description of the precise tests to be performed, including the extent to which each such test will alter or destroy the item being tested” … . Even assuming, arguendo, that the additional testing proposed by PSE is non-destructive, we conclude that PSE failed to establish in the first instance that the additional testing is “material and necessary” to its defense of the action (CPLR 3101 [a] …). PSE’s expert made only a conclusory statement that re-stringing the bow with an undamaged component “should better represent the condition it was in prior to the” accident … . Therefore, even in the absence of an abuse of the court’s discretion, we substitute our own discretion for that of the motion court and deny the motion … . Roche v Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 02419, Fourth Dept 5-3-24

Practice Point: There are standards which must be met in a products liability case before a court will allow testing, either nondestructive of destructive testing, of the product. Those standards were not met by the motion papers in this case.

 

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AN ACTION AGAINST A CORPORATION AND AN ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPALS OF THE CORPORATION DO NOT HAVE AN “IDENTITY OF PARTIES” WHICH WOULD ALLOW DISMISSAL OF ONE OF THE COMPLAINTS; TEXT MESSAGES DO NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT BASED ON “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE;” THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION; THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined certain causes of action should not have been dismissed. Dismissal of two causes action on the ground there existed identical causes of action in another lawsuit was error because the parties in the two lawsuits were not the same. It was error to dismiss a cause of action based on documentary evidence because text messages do not fit the definition of “documentary evidence.” It was also error to dismiss the action for conversion for failure to state a cause of action:

It is well settled that ” ‘[i]ndividual principals of a corporation are legally distinguishable from the corporation itself’ and a court may not ‘find an identity of parties by, in effect, piercing the corporate veil without a request that this be done and, even more importantly, any demonstration . . . that such a result is warranted’ ” … . * * *

… [T]he court erred in using text message excerpts to justify dismissal of the fourth cause of action or, indeed, any cause of action. Documents such as text messages “do not meet the requirements for documentary evidence” to support a CPLR 3211 (a) (4) motion … . To be considered documentary, evidence must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity, that is, it must be essentially unassailable” … . Here, the text messages do not even identify the person who is communicating with plaintiff. The names and numbers are redacted. Moreover, the text messages do not “conclusively establish[ ] a defense as a matter of law” with respect to the fourth cause of action … . * * *

The second cause of action alleges that defendants converted plaintiff’s personal property, including dental equipment, to their own use. “Two key elements of conversion are (1) plaintiff’s possessory right or interest in the property . . . and (2) [a] defendant’s dominion over the property or interference with it, in derogation of plaintiff’s rights” … . … [W]e conclude that the pleading includes sufficient allegations to support a cause of action for conversion. Plaintiff alleged that each defendant exerted dominion and control over property to which she had a possessory right or interest … . Nosegbe v Charles, 2024 NY Slip Op 02406, Fourth Dept 5-3-24

Practice Point: An action against a corporation and an action against individual principals of that corporation do not have “an identity of parties” which would subject one of the actions to dismissal.

Practice Point: Text messages are not “documentary evidence” which can be the basis for dismissal of a complaint.

 

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IN THIS PARTITION ACTION, THERE WAS NO PENDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION THE PARTIES HAD LAID THEIR PROOF BARE SUCH THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have granted summary judgment in the absence of a motion and a hearing. The underlying issue is whether the subject real property should be partitioned or sold at auction:

… [D]efendant and decedent made an oral motion for … a hearing on whether the property could be partitioned. Rather than decide that motion, the court directed the parties to exchange expert reports and set the matter down for a conference, at which time a hearing would be scheduled if the parties could not come to an agreement regarding partition. However, when the parties appeared for the scheduled conference, the court did not set a date for the hearing, but, instead, held the conference, and subsequently, in effect, granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. Because “there was no motion for summary judgment pending before the court at that time, . . . it was error for the court to grant such relief” … . Although a court “has the power to award summary judgment to a nonmoving party, predicated upon a motion for the relief by another party, it may not sua sponte award summary judgment if no party has moved for summary judgment . . . , unless it appears from a reading of the parties’ papers that they were deliberately charting a course for summary judgment by laying bare their proof” … . Here, contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, it does not appear that the parties were deliberately charting a course for summary judgment. Indeed, the only motion pending before the court was the oral motion of defendant and decedent for … a hearing. Therefore, we reverse … and remit the matter for a hearing on whether the property may be partitioned without undue prejudice and for an accounting. The accounting shall be held “before interlocutory judgment is rendered” (RPAPL 911 …). Smith v Smith, 2024 NY Slip Op 02478, Fourth Dept 5-3-24

Practice Point: Generally a judge cannot grant summary judgment absent a motion.

Practice Point: If the parties lay bare all their proof indicating they have charted a course for summary judgment (not the case here), the court may award summary judgment absent a motion.

 

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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED SUPREME COURT, SUA SPONTE, PROPERLY DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.27 BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT’S DIRECTIVES; THE DISSENT ARGUED DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 202.27 WAS IMPROPER AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DISMISSAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a substantive dissent, determined Supreme Court, sua sponte, properly dismissed the foreclosure action as abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s directive. The dissent argued the criteria for a section 202.27 dismissal were not met and the motion to vacate the dismissal should have been granted:

… [W]e reject plaintiff’s contention that the action was improperly dismissed. Although the April 2020 order does not specify which statutory or regulatory basis was being relied upon to dismiss the action, this Court has “consistently held” that 22 NYCRR 202.27 authorizes a trial court to dismiss an action as abandoned where a “party fails to timely comply with a court’s directive to progress the case” … . Supreme Court described in its April 2020 order how plaintiff had made no effort to move this action forward since 2016 and how plaintiff was summoned to a status conference in November 2019, where the court directed plaintiff to move for a judgment of foreclosure no later than December 31, 2019. Plaintiff failed, without explanation, to comply with that directive, and Supreme Court was therefore within its discretion to dismiss the action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.2 … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Hartquist, 2024 NY Slip Op 02352, Third Dept 5-2-24

Practice Point: The court has the power to, sua sponte, dismiss an action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 where plaintiff has failed to comply with court directives.

 

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COMPLAINT ALLEGING THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST STUDENTS OF COLOR AND SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging the New York City public school system discriminates against Black and Latinx students and seeking injunctive relief was justiciable and stated valid causes of action. Therefore the complaint, which had been dismissed, is now reinstated. The opinion is comprehensive and far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs allege that State and City policies create a “racialized” admission pipeline. According to plaintiffs, the pipeline begins with a single standardized test for the City’s Gifted & Talented (G&T) programs taken by children as young as four-years-old. The G&T test, plaintiffs assert, disproportionately benefits “privileged” white students and their “in-the-know” parents, who have the “navigational capital” to understand the admissions process and the economic capital to pay for expensive test preparation. The G&T programs, plaintiffs allege, provide superior academic preparation, which allows primarily white and Asian students to continue through the pipeline to academically screened middle and high schools, relegating Black and Latinx students to unscreened schools, often in poorly maintained buildings with limited extracurricular programs. The end of the pipeline, or “zenith” as plaintiffs describe it, is admission to one of eight New York City specialized high schools based on the results of the Special High School Admissions Test (the SHSAT).* * *

The pipeline, plaintiffs claim, is designed to exclude Black and Latinx students from the City’s prime educational opportunities. According to plaintiffs, the State and the City “intentionally adopted” and “for decades have intentionally retained—with no pedagogical basis—testing-based sorting that they know excludes students of color from equal educational opportunities.” This knowledge was acquired, plaintiffs allege, “through decades of experience and reflected in [defendants] own admissions” including the knowledge of the public school system’s “racist character and outcomes.” Despite this knowledge, plaintiffs allege that the State and the City “intentionally refuse to dismantle . . . its racialized channeling system.” IntegrateNYC, Inc. v State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02369, First Dept 5-2-24

Practice Point: Here Supreme Court’s conclusion that the suit seeking injunctive relief from discriminatory education policies and procedures in the New York City public school system was not “justiciable” was rejected.

 

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THE NEARLY $10 MILLION VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE; IT WAS ALLEGED DEFENDANT DOCTOR SHOULD HAVE SENT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT TO THE EMERGENCY ROOM AND THE FAILURE TO DO SO PLAYED A ROLE IN PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S SUICIDE THE NEXT DAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nearly $10 million verdict should not have been set aside on the ground the evidence of proximate cause was insufficient. Plaintiff alleged defendant doctor (Strange) should have sent plaintiff’s decedent to the emergency room the day before plaintiff’s decedent committed suicide. The matter was remitted for consideration of other grounds for setting aside verdict:

… Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of Strange’s motion which was to set aside the verdict on the issue of proximate cause and for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, since the jury reasonably concluded, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Strange’s alleged departures were a proximate cause of the decedent’s death. The plaintiff’s expert witness testified that the decedent’s suicide was preventable and that a referral to the emergency room would have allowed the decedent to be admitted to the hospital. Such testimony was sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude that it was more probable than not that Strange’s conduct, under these circumstances, diminished the decedent’s chance of a better outcome … . Shouldis v Strange, 2024 NY Slip Op 02340, Second Dept 5-2-24

Practice Point: Proximate cause in a medical malpractice case is demonstrated if the doctor’s conduct “diminished the … chance of a better outcome.”

 

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AFTER PLAINTIFF’S POST-NOTE DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR THE NONPARTY WITNESS WAS QUASHED, PLAINTIFF OBTAINED A VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FROM THE NONPARTY WITNESS; OBTAINING THE STATEMENT WAS A PROPER METHOD OF “INFORMAL DISCOVERY” (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff properly conducted “informal discovery” by obtaining a voluntary statement from a nonparty witness after plaintiff’s post-note deposition subpoena for the witness was quashed:

Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion to quash the untimely, post-note deposition subpoena plaintiff served on nonparty witness Harris-Aikens, and to preclude plaintiff from “examining or otherwise taking any sworn testimony from” Harris-Aikens (the December Order), and suspended disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3103(b). …

… [T]he Harris-Aikens witness statement did not constitute “disclosure of the particular matter in dispute” prohibited by CPLR 3103(b). The statement was not an examination or other sworn testimony explicitly prohibited by the December Order, and was not otherwise an enumerated “disclosure device” under CPLR 3102(a) … . Rather, obtaining the witness statement was plaintiff’s proper exercise of ex parte, informal discovery, which the Court of Appeals has long recognized as a permissible and invaluable avenue by which litigants prepare for trial … . Everett v Equinox Holdings, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 02276, First Dept 4-30-24

Practice Point: Obtaining a voluntary statement from a nonparty witness here did not violate the court order quashing a deposition subpoena for the same witness. The voluntary statement was a proper form of “informal discovery.”

 

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