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THE COVID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLL FROM MARCH TO NOVEMBER 2020 DID NOT ONLY APPLY TO ACTIONS WHOSE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED DURING THAT PERIOD; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S ACTION WAS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID toll of the statute of limitations rendered plaintiff’s negligence action timely, noting that the toll did not apply only to statutes of limitations which expired during the toll period:

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. In Brash v Richards, this Court held that the executive orders “constitute a toll” of the filing deadlines applicable to litigation in New York courts (Brash v Richards, 195 AD3d 582, 582 … ). … [T]his toll of the statute of limitations did not only apply to statutes of limitations that expired between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020 … .

… [D]ue to the tolling provision of the executive orders, the statute of limitations within which the plaintiff was required to commence this action was tolled between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020 …  Thus, this action … was commenced against those defendants well within the statute of limitations. Williams v Ideal Food Basket, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 04436, Second Dept 8-30-23

Practice Point: The COVID toll of the statute of limitations from March to November 2020 applies to all actions, not only those whose statutes of limitations expired during that period of time.

Similar issue and result in Baker v 40 Wall St. Holdings Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 0179, Second Dept 4-3-24.

 

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