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PLAINTIFF GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF SLIPPING AND FALLING ON A LANDING WET FROM RAIN AT THE TWELFTH HOLE OF DEFENDANT GOLF COURSE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping and failing on a stairway landing wet from rain. The stairway is used to accessed the tee box on the twelfth hole of defendant golf course:

“As a general rule, participants properly may be held to have consented, by their participation, to those injury-causing events which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation” … . ” ‘It is not necessary to the application of assumption of [the] risk that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which his or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results’ ” … . “The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, however, will not serve as a bar to liability if the risk is unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased” … . …

Here, defendants established on their motion that plaintiff was an experienced golfer who had played defendants’ golf course several times in the past … . Moreover, defendants demonstrated that, at the time of the incident, plaintiff knew that the course was still wet from rain that had just fallen, and that he was familiar with the stairway in question, having just used it moments before his accident. Conrad v Holiday Val., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05333, Fourth Dept 10-2-20

 

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