FORMER SAME SEX PARTNER WHO AGREED TO THE CONCEPTION OF A CHILD CARRIED BY HER FORMER PARTNER DEMONSTRATED SHE HAD STANDING AS A PARENT TO SEEK PARENTING TIME WITH THE CHILD (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined that petitioner, who participated in the conception of the child (by artificial insemination) carried by her then same-sex partner, was a “parent” entitled to visitation (parenting time) with the child pursuant to Matter of Brooke S.B. v Elizabeth A.C.C. (28 NY3d 1 [2016]):
… [T]he parties agreed to conceive a child using artificial insemination. Both parties attended appointments with a fertility doctor. In testimony that Family Court found to be credible, petitioner stated that she and respondent agreed to select a sperm donor who would reflect petitioner’s ethnic background. There were two inseminations; petitioner was present and injected the sperm on at least one of these occasions. Petitioner’s credit card was used to pay the related expenses. … Petitioner attended at least one baby shower where friends and family members of both parties were present. Petitioner attended respondent’s prenatal appointments, was present when the child was born, and cut the child’s umbilical cord. The child was given two last names, reflecting the parties’ two surnames. … Petitioner testified that the child was named, in part, after petitioner’s mother. Petitioner assisted in buying items for the child and shared day-care costs with respondent. The two parties are listed as the child’s two mothers in some of her medical and immunization records. Respondent testified that she told petitioner that the child would be part of petitioner’s life if they continued to reside together and also if they separated, so long as petitioner did not engage in illegal activities, but that if petitioner did so engage, she would not have a role in the child’s life.
Upon this record, we find that Family Court correctly determined that petitioner falls within the statutory definition of a parent and, thus, has standing in this proceeding. Contrary to respondent’s argument, Family Court did not err in applying the conception test to determine petitioner’s standing rather than a “functional” test that would have examined the relationship between petitioner and the child after the child’s birth … . The evidence fully establishes that the parties planned jointly for the child’s conception, participated jointly in the process of conceiving the child, planned jointly for her birth, and planned to raise her together. Accordingly, petitioner satisfied her burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she and respondent entered into an agreement to conceive the child and raise her as co-parents. Thus, she established her standing to seek custody and parenting time under the conception test without regard to her subsequent relationship with the child … . Matter of Heather NN. v Vinnette OO., 2019 NY Slip Op 09325, Third Dept 12-26-19