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POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SUFFERED BY A COURT OFFICER AFTER THE OFFICER RETURNED FIRE KILLING A SHOOTER AT THE COURTHOUSE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT.

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined the incident which led to petitioner’s psychological injury was not an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law. Petitioner was therefore not entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits. Petitioner was on duty in the courthouse when a man fired a shotgun into the building. Petitioner returned fire, killing the shooter:

It is well settled that for purposes of the Retirement and Social Security Law, an accident is “a sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact” … . “Significantly, it must result from an activity that is not undertaken in the performance of ordinary job duties and that is not an inherent risk of such job duties” … , nor can it stem from hazards that may be reasonably anticipated … . Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the event producing the injury was an accident … , and the Comptroller’s determination will be upheld where it is supported by substantial evidence … .

There is no question that petitioner’s heroic efforts saved many lives on the morning in question, and he is to be commended for his service in the protection of others. There is also no question, however, that — based upon a review of petitioner’s job description and testimony — petitioner was injured during the course of executing the very duties that he had been assigned to perform and in the context of responding to a risk that was both reasonably foreseeable and, more to the point, inherent in the execution of his regular duties. Matter of Kowal v DiNapoli, 2016 NY Slip Op 08144, 3rd Dept 12-1-16

 

RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SUFFERED BY A COURT OFFICER AFTER THE OFFICER RETURNED FIRE KILLING A SHOOTER AT THE COURTHOUSE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT)/ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS (POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SUFFERED BY A COURT OFFICER AFTER THE OFFICER RETURNED FIRE KILLING A SHOOTER AT THE COURTHOUSE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT)/POLICE OFFICERS (COURT OFFICER, RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW, POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SUFFERED BY A COURT OFFICER AFTER THE OFFICER RETURNED FIRE KILLING A SHOOTER AT THE COURTHOUSE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT)

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